中國的過去如何影響將來形像？

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/i_love_taiwan/UGc_R2D_DGk

History With Chinese Characteristics

How China's Imagined Past Shapes Its Present

By Elizabeth C. Economy

<谷歌翻譯>

中國特色史

中國的過去如何影響將來形像？

2012年11月15日，當時他擔任中共總書記的習近平在北京人民大會堂，反思了他五千年的歷史。西方援引中國對世界文明的“不可磨滅的貢獻”，呼籲“中華民族的偉大復興”，並承認其他人“一次又一次失敗”實現這一目標。習隱的言論是一個承諾：不像他的前輩，他不會很短。

習近平的複興敘事在今天的中國人中深深地引起了共鳴。它不僅將國家置於國際體系的中心位置，而且在國際體系的中心，使國家成為激發其先進文化和經濟成就力量的模仿。這也喚起了中國對世界其他地方的敬意的時代的歷史回憶，是世界級創新的源泉，是無畏的航海力量。這意味著中國過去不需要使用武力：它的美德本身就是引起別人的尊重。

習近平不是第一位要求國家復興的中國當代領導人。鄧小平，江澤民，胡錦濤都以振興，振興為主題，提醒中國人民過往的榮耀，企圖束縛現代中國。但是，為了實現國家復興的目標，習近平超越了他的前任。他已經提出了一項大規模的基礎設施計劃，即“腰帶與道路倡議”，旨在恢復古代絲綢之路和漢代早期繁榮的海上香料路線，從而加強了中國中心主張。他還闡述了“新型大國關係”的觀念，中國將享有與美國同等的全球權力地位。而且他恢復了這個國家幾百年來對南海等爭議地區的要求。

習近平的言論表明，今天中國祇是在全球秩序中恢復正常的地位，並且把歷史的規模化。

除了為中國的領導層提供合法的理由，這個敘述也有利於向世界其他國家表明，美國是太平洋權力統治的當前形勢，全球創新領導者和國家無與倫比的軟實力 - 只是一個歷史錯誤。習近平的言論表明，今天中國祇是在全球秩序中恢復正常的地位，並且把歷史的規模化。

由於西，其他官員和中國戰略家對自己的未來偉大的歷史權利以及共產黨缺乏充滿活力的史學傳統的信心，這個故事基本上是沒有挑戰的。然而，兩本迷人的新書 - 霍華德法國人在天堂和約翰·馮策雷（Pomfret）的 ”美麗國家和中央王國之間的一切”  (Under the Heavens and John Pomfret’s The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom) - 表明這個故事還有更多的東西。法國的書提出了關於復興敘事準確性的重要問題，而Pomfret則提供了對中國與美國關係的微妙研究。兩本書都以他們的歷史發現為跳點，解釋當代中國，並勸告美國官員制定政策。

過去是一個國外的國家

法國人高度重視中國與鄰國的關係。他不反對複興敘事的基礎，將中國描繪為亞洲的傑出權力，從唐代初到618年，到1912年到清末的近一百三十年。法國人根據中國稱為天下（全天下）的原則，描述了中國以“進貢制度”的形式通過關係的等級秩序來鬆散地管轄該地區（儘管如法國人所知，中國人沒有使用該術語）。在這個制度下，各國承認中國的文化和政治優勢，並表達了對中國權威的尊重，包括中國皇帝為了與中國進行貿易而直接打倒。

然而，法國人稱復興敘述是一個“半理想化的半神話過去”的故事。在許多方面，他建議，形成掩蓋的物質。在尋求安置他們的巨大鄰國的同時，中國邊緣國家經常採取各種形式的猥褻，顛覆，甚至徹底的蔑視，為中國自我形象與地緣政治現實之間的巨大差距做出貢獻。早在600年，日本才明確地開始獨立自主，與中國平等。那一年，日本代表團給隋朝的皇帝致信日本的皇后是“天國之子”

過去是一個國外的國家

法國人高度重視中國與鄰國的關係。他不反對複興敘事的基礎，將中國描繪為亞洲的傑出權力，從唐代初到618年，到1912年到清末的近一百三十年。法國人根據中國稱為天下（全天下）的原則，描述了中國以“進貢制度”的形式通過關係的等級秩序來鬆散地管轄該地區（儘管如法國人所知，中國人沒有使用該術語）。在這個制度下，各國承認中國的文化和政治優勢，並表達了對中國權威的尊重，包括中國皇帝為了與中國進行貿易而直接打倒。

然而，法國人稱復興敘述是一個“半理想化的半神話過去”的故事。在許多方面，他建議，形成掩蓋的物質。在尋求安置他們的巨大鄰國的同時，中國邊緣國家經常採取各種形式的猥褻，顛覆，甚至徹底的蔑視，為中國自我形象與地緣政治現實之間的巨大差距做出貢獻。早在600年，日本才明確地開始獨立自主，與中國平等。那一年，日本代表團致信隋朝的皇帝，提到日本的皇后是“旭日之地的天堂之子”，她的中國對手是“在天地的兒子”太陽“ - 這兩個人站在平等的位置。

十九世紀末的法國漫畫描繪了歐洲國家雕刻中國

從十七世紀初開始，日本也與琉球群島的國家共謀欺騙中國。在假裝成為中國的忠實支流的時候，王國秘密地是日本的藩籬;中國法院不知所措，一名日本氏族選擇了琉球國王。據法國人說，一個琉球領導人認為，如果王國冒犯中國，“這可以解釋事情，但如果冒犯日本，那就會受到懲罰。”其他地方君主更是公然駁斥了中國的統治。明朝中國皇帝的使者曾經訪問過緬甸，要求結束這個王國的不服從。國王回答說：“統治這個國家，我只明白別人對我說，我怎麼ow to給別人？

法國人也深深地認為，中國是一種根本不同的霸主。正如中國版的故事，中國與其他殖民勢力不同，中國通過善良和美德來管理鄰國，對軍事力量幾乎沒有用處。正如習近平自己在2014年向澳大利亞議會發表的演講中指出的那樣：“試圖用力量追求發展目標的國家總是失敗。 。 。 。這是歷史教我們的。中國致力於維護和平“，或者中國國務院總理李克強同年在倫敦發表演講時說，”擴張不是中國的DNA“。

然而，在法國的反思中，中國並不缺乏擴張主義和殖民地衝突。例如，在一千年的時間裡，中國各個朝代入侵了越南，試圖征服越南。越南人打敗中國七次。當十一世紀初的明星終於盛行時，他們在這個過程中殺死了多達七百萬的越南人。作為殖民統治者，中國人沒有特別開明：他們要求越南學校只教中國人，沒收越南文學，禁止檳榔咀嚼的當地傳統，強迫越南婦女穿中國禮服。那麼中國的殖民統治時間只有越南人推出明軍才21年，所以毫不奇怪。

法國人甚至對傳統的鄭和的正義提出質疑，鄭和是今天受到尊重的明朝探險家。正如法國人引用的兩位中國學者所說的，皇帝的威嚴與美德的知識通常被描繪成一個和平的海軍上將，他的任務是傳播，但是法國人發現證據顯示鄭正是中國的代理人擴張;例如，當蘇門答臘和錫蘭（現代斯里蘭卡）拒絕屈服於中國的霸權時，鄭先生入侵。雖然他的探險活動並不是為了保衛領土而設計的，但是它們的目的是要確保各國從屬於中國，要求在有必要的情況下強制執行軍事力量。事實證明，中國人在蘇維埃之前發現了幾個世紀以來的芬蘭化。

中國並不缺乏擴張主義和殖民地衝突。

通過對中國過去的德意志言辭，法國為中國崛起性質的當代政治辯論提供了重要的補充。中國學者和官員常常聲稱，他們的國家與其他權力不同 - 和平，非干涉主義和非殖民地 - 以緩和對軍事力量日益增長的擔憂。然而，法國人表示，這種說法沒有什麼優點;中國和所有的帝國一樣，都用武力來擴大領土。

儘管如此，更廣泛的複興敘事已經被證明是非常有力的，因為它描繪了中國在忍受“百年屈辱”之後的合法地位的勝利 - 這是十九世紀中葉鴉片戰爭之間的一百多年，在此期間中國遭受了嚴重的軍事失敗，默許了不平等的條約，中共1949年在內戰中勝利。在這個時期，中國被外部勢力滲透，掠奪，否則得到了勝利，尤其是日本。日本不僅在1879年吞併琉球群島，而且還在1895年的第一次中日戰爭中擊敗了中國，並於1931年和1932年入侵和占領了滿洲。東京的征服令人恥辱的是，中國人早就認為日本是劣質的衍生自己的國家。中國這個崛起的統治導致了中國領導人還沒有動搖的根深蒂固的不安全感。

海洋之星

數千英里之外，自1776年以來獨立，美國與中國與鄰國的交往方式截然不同。正如Pomfret所揭示的那樣，從17世紀80年代開始，中國和美國享有雙向的雙向關係，雙方的重要角色讚賞彼此的成就。例如，在1915年，美國詩人“以斯拉記”出版了他在唐代宋代唐代詩歌的翻譯，這本書是為了激發其他美國作家如歐內斯特·海明威的作品。美國的傑出中國人物包括國民黨領導人孫中山（夏威夷中學），哲學家胡適（康奈爾和哥倫比亞）以及商人宋楚瑜（哈佛大學和哥倫比亞大學）。其中許多人隨後呼籲同胞學習美國的創新精神和政治制度。

當美國人在十九世紀初期前往中國做生意時，中國官員和商人經常把他們描述為禮貌，順從和尊重;中國人特別讚賞美國人傾向於按照白銀的需求商品付款，而不是鴉片。反過來，美國人受益於第二次鴉片戰爭（1856-60），通過結束它的條約，中國迫使中國開放更多的與外界的貿易港口，使美國基督徒能夠在國內傳播。在接下來的數十年中，傳教士人數猛增至1900年的近4000人，其中許多是美國人，美元資助了若干慈善組織，醫學院校，YMCA和YWCA。

兩國文化交流蓬勃發展。 20世紀20年代，籃球和棒球遭受中國的暴風雨襲擊。大約在同一時間，中國餐館在美國首屈一指，在中國設置的故事 - 包括1933年的兒童故事“平安故事”中都有一個在長江生活的鴨子。在美國訓練的中國人回到中國，準備幫助改造國家。Pomfret recounts the story of Shi Meiyu (also known as Mary Stone) and Kang Cheng (also known as Ida Kahn), two women who were educated—and, in the case of Kang, raised—by 美國在中國的宣教師。在19世紀90年代，衛理公會教會在密歇根大學醫學院接受教育，之後兩名醫生返回中國，開辦了自己的診所。中國和美國的普遍欽佩，施康康啟發了一代中國女性成為醫生。

然而，正如Pomfret所說，兩國之間日益增長的互動也導致了越來越大的摩擦。 1862年，中國開闢了西方思想教育體系，建立了一所被稱為桐文根的政府學校，原來是用外語培訓口譯人員，後來擴大教授其他西方知識。中國傳統主義者反對西方知識分子的侵略，許多中國人憎惡美國傳教士傳播西方宗教的努力。一篇文章“關於邪教的事實的記錄”，聲稱教會儀式包括星期天的狂歡和塗血。

美國在這​​個關係中面對自己的辯論。 1868年，隨著Burlingame條約的簽署，它禁止對中國工人的歧視，對於在對方國家居住和旅行的中國和美國人規定相互對待。但後來呢是在1873年開始的美國長期的抑鬱症。一些美國人把中國移民歸咎於經濟不景氣，反華情緒激增。 1882年，國會通過了禁止所有中國移民的“中華排斥法”。

與中國不同的是，美國從來沒有對跨越太平洋的價值觀念的思想進行深刻的辯論。但是有些美國人對中國的不利影響感到擔憂。那位威爾斯利受過教育的中華民族第一夫人蔣介石夫人在1943年前往華盛頓，富蘭克林·羅斯福總統和其他美國官員擔心，她打敗日本人的呼籲將會破壞他的歐洲第一政策。隨著中國共產主義革命和朝鮮戰爭的成功，華盛頓擔心美國戰俘被洗腦，要求共產主義回歸。而不是慶祝士兵回歸，美國國防部鎖定了他們，並對他們進行了嚴密的精神病學解除武裝。

1858年的例子描繪了在第一次鴉片戰爭的最後一場大戰中奪取鎮江的英軍

回到過去

法國人和琵琶人很容易限制了他們寫出中國對外關係新情況的野心。然而，兩者都試圖利用他們的調查結果來增強對中國今天的了解，並向美國決策者提供諮詢。

中國與外界的歷史關係以及今天的關係與美國的關係最為容易。像過去一樣，Pomfret指出，中國的辯論是否應該效仿西方的自力更生，創新能力和融合這麼多文化或拒絕西方影響力的能力，以維護一個重要的中國文化。同時，中國目前正在努力推廣自己的價值觀 - 通過在全球各地設立政府資助的孔子學院文化中心，並通過廣播國營的英語廣播電視，逐漸引起美國官員的關注。

對於管理日益強大和不自主的中國來說，一貫照常的策略不太可能是足夠的。

法國人也發現了充分的證據表明中國的歷史觀念繼續引起共鳴。他建議拒絕常設仲裁法院的裁決（發現該國對所謂的九條線內的南海所有領土的要求不具有優勢），這體現了中國傳統意義上的偉大權力狀態允許它忽視國際法。中國的朝貢系統的迴聲可以聽出法國的特徵是中國對亞洲其他地區的主要信息：“為了確保你的繁榮，把你的貨車交給我們。是的，我們期待尊重，但不是為了穩定和共同繁榮而付出代價。“法國人說，這個地區的一些人實際上接受了這個信息，願意回到過去。例如，菲律賓學者愛德華多·塔德馬認為，各國應該與中國進行談判，中國可以再次尊重中國，以換取北京放寬其在南中國海的主權要求。當然，該地區的其他許多國家也認為這樣的一項協議是不可接受的。

也就是說，法國人也認為沒有實際存在的連續性。他所說的“心理和國家習慣”在“中國根深蒂固”中的說法，他們今天仍然塑造政策聽起來是合理的。但他的主要例子就是錯過了。他認為，中國向美國加入亞洲基礎設施投資銀行的提議反映了其“文化自信和信念，隨著中國逐漸但不可避免地成為第一，美國等其他國家將逐漸認識到阻力是毫無意義的並將請願進入中國法院。“但事實是，無論如何，中國領導層對將先進工業化國家引入亞洲基礎設施投資銀行的成功感到震驚。中國人民大學教授金燦榮告訴“紐約時報”，這種廣泛而熱烈的支持是出乎意料的。“許多中國官員和分析人士認為，銀行將失敗，或者在最好的情況下，只吸引發展中國家國家。

現在怎麼辦？

法國人和琵琶人對美中關係最大的挑戰是什麼呢？法國認為中國擴張主義是主要問題，認為北京試圖取代美國在亞洲。他寫道：“關於其外交語言的一切都說，它像西方太平洋一樣對古代已知的世界進行了觀察。相比之下，琵琶則認為，更為關心的是兩國公民積極反對“大和諧”，一方面是“謀求譴責中國為了世界弊病的民粹主義者”，另一方面是“反美”偏執狂“。

儘管他們有不同的診斷，法國人和Pomfret也是這樣處方的。兩人都認為，最好的方法是美國過去嘗試過的更好的方式：參與。都表示同情中國更大的權力和影響力。例如，法國人呼籲美國人了解中國遭受的不幸歷史時刻的排斥感：這是第二次世界大戰之後，就在中國達到最低點時，國際社會建立了一大堆條約和組織。他認為，美國應該更多地歡迎中國的聲音，更加平靜地接受中國的倡議。琵琶說，美國應“加倍努力，完成將中國拉入世界，追求偉大和諧的歷史使命，即使是最終無法實現”。

與此同時，法國和馮菲雷承認，國內政治和經濟力量也將塑造每個國家的外交政策。在敘述了中國許多國內經濟和社會挑戰以及美國的經濟和文化優勢之後，法國人總結說，美國可以自己反對“中國霸主”，他還指出，中國不斷冒風險，堅信印度和日本的理由反對。Pomfret urges U.S. policymakers to follow China’s lead and focus on developing the United States’ own “comprehensive national strength”—in other words, invest in infrastructure, education, and smart immigration policies. 他認為，中國必須進行政治改革，以維護國內的和平和海外的良好關係。這些建議都沒有打破新局面，但是法國人和琵琶瑞派讀者對於中國與外界的互動歷史模式的理解，堅持建議。

從表面上看，作者提出的美國在中國方面（或一半以上）與中國會晤，爭取塑造全球機構，同時為美國的經濟和安全能力提供支持，似乎是明智之舉。然而，現實情況是，大多數一般慣例的策略對於管理日益強大和不自主的中國來說是不夠的。琵琶人對中美兩國思想，文化，貿易廣泛流動的時代的描述並不反映現實。西方政府力求將外國思想資本流入中國，同時把中國在國外的政治，經濟和軍事影響力視為主流。

那麼現在呢，美國最好的道路就是承認與中國進行合作的重要性，同時在雙邊關係中採取更大的互惠因素。例如，華盛頓可能會限制中國企業進入美國市場，在中國經濟基本上與美國公司（如媒體和互聯網）接近的地區。或者可以堅持認為，自從中國在美國建立孔子學院以來，美國政府有權贊助類似機構在中國推廣美國文化和價值觀。美國的政策制定者應該重視中國“恥辱世紀”所教導的教訓：不平等待遇引起不滿和不滿。只有每個國家對對方的貨物，觀念和文化都開放，這種關係才會蓬勃發展。一個敞開的門必須走兩路。

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/i_love_taiwan/UGc_R2D_DGk

History With Chinese Characteristics

How China's Imagined Past Shapes Its Present

By Elizabeth C. Economy

On November 15, 2012, the day he became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping stood onstage at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, to reflect back on his country’s 5,000 years of history. After citing China’s “indelible contribution” to world civilization, Xi called for “the great revival of the Chinese nation.” And he acknowledged that others had “failed one time after another” to realize that goal. Implicit in Xi’s remarks was a promise: unlike his predecessors, he would not fall short. 

Xi’s narrative of rejuvenation has resonated deeply among today’s Chinese. It places the country not only at the center of the international system but also above it, casting the nation as one that inspires emulation by the force of its advanced culture and economic achievements. It also evokes historical memories of a time when China received tribute from the rest of the world, was a source of world-class innovation, and was a fearless seafaring power. And it implies that in the past, China did not need to use force: its virtue alone engendered deference from others. 

Xi is not the first contemporary Chinese leader to call for national revival. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao all embraced the theme of rejuvenation or invigoration to remind the Chinese people of past glories in an attempt to bind them to modern China. Xi has, however, surpassed his predecessors in the sheer scale of his efforts to achieve the goal of national revival. He has put in motion a massive infrastructure plan, the Belt and Road Initiative, which is designed to revive the ancient Silk Road and the maritime spice routes that flourished as early as the Han dynasty, thus reinforcing the claim of Chinese centrality. He has also articulated the idea of a “new type of great-power relations,” whereby China would enjoy the status of a global power on par with the United States. And he has revived the country’s centuries-old claims to the South China Sea and other disputed areas. 

Xi’s rhetoric suggests that China today is simply reclaiming its proper place in the global order and righting the scales of history.

Beyond providing China’s leadership with a legitimating rationale at home, this narrative also has the benefit of suggesting to the rest of the world that the current situation—in which the United States is the reigning Pacific power, the global leader in innovation, and the country with unrivaled soft power—is merely a historical aberration. Xi’s rhetoric suggests that China today is simply reclaiming its proper place in the global order and righting the scales of history. 

Because of the confidence with which Xi, other officials, and Chinese strategists assert their historical right to future greatness—as well as the Communist Party’s lack of a vibrant tradition of historiography—this story has gone largely unchallenged. Yet two fascinating new books—Howard French’s Everything Under the Heavens and John Pomfret’s The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom—suggest that there is much more to the story. French’s book raises important questions about the accuracy of the rejuvenation narrative, and Pomfret offers a nuanced study of China’s relations with the United States. Both books use their historical findings as a jumping off point to explain contemporary China and advise U.S. officials formulating policy toward it.

THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY

French pays greatest attention to China’s relations with its neighbors. He doesn’t dispute the basics of the rejuvenation narrative, portraying China as the preeminent power in Asia for the roughly 1,300-year period from the beginning of the Tang dynasty, in 618, to nearly the end of the Qing, in 1912. As French describes, under the principle of Chinese centrality known as tian xia (all under heaven), China loosely governed the region through a hierarchical order of relations in the form of the “tribute system” (although, as French notes, the Chinese did not use that term). Under that system, countries acknowledged the cultural and political superiority of China and expressed deference to Chinese authority—including literally kowtowing before the Chinese emperor in order to trade with China.

Yet French calls the rejuvenation narrative a story of “a half-idealized, half-mythologized past.” In many respects, he suggests, form masked substance. While seeking to placate their giant neighbor, the countries on China’s periphery often used various forms of subterfuge, subversion, and even outright defiance to get their way, contributing to a significant gap between China’s self-image and the geopolitical reality. As early as 600, for example, Japan subtly began to assert its independence from and sense of equality with China. In that year, a Japanese delegation brought a letter to the Sui dynasty’s emperor referring to Japan’s empress as the “son of heaven in the land of the rising sun” and to her Chinese counterpart as the “son of heaven in the land of the setting sun”—implying that the two stood on equal footing.

A French cartoon from the late-nineteenth century depicts the European powers carving up China

Beginning in the early 1600s, Japan also conspired with the kingdom of the Ryukyu Islands to deceive China. While pretending to be a loyal tributary of China, the kingdom was secretly a vassal of Japan; unbeknownst to the Chinese court, a Japanese clan selected each of the Ryukyu kings. According to French, one Ryukyu leader believed that if the kingdom offended China, “it could explain things away, but if it offended Japan, it would be punished.” Other regional monarchs rejected Chinese rule more overtly. An emissary of the Ming Chinese emperor once visited Burma to demand an end to that kingdom’s insubordination. The king replied, “Ruling this country, I only understand that others kowtow to me, how do I kowtow to others?”

French also takes on the deeply entrenched idea that China was a fundamentally different kind of hegemon. As the Chinese version of the story goes, unlike other colonial powers, China managed its neighbors through kindness and virtue and so had little use for military power. As Xi himself noted in a speech to the Australian Parliament in 2014, “Countries that attempted to pursue their development goals with the use of force invariably failed. . . . This is what history teaches us. China is dedicated to upholding peace.” Or as Chinese Premier Li Keqiang put it in a speech in London that same year, “Expansion is not in the Chinese DNA.”

In French’s retelling, however, China has not lacked for expansionist and colonial impulses. For example, over the course of 1,000 years, various Chinese dynasties invaded what is now Vietnam and attempted to conquer it. The Vietnamese defeated China seven times. When the Ming finally prevailed in the early 1400s, they killed as many as seven million Vietnamese in the process. And as colonial rulers, the Chinese did not prove particularly enlightened: they required Vietnamese schools to teach only Chinese, confiscated Vietnamese literature, barred local traditions, such as betel-nut chewing, and forced Vietnamese women to wear Chinese dress. No surprise, then, that Chinese colonial rule lasted only 21 years before the Vietnamese pushed out the Ming army.

French even calls into question the righteousness of the legendary Zheng He, the Ming dynasty explorer who remains much revered to this day. Zheng is typically portrayed as a peaceful admiral whose mission was to spread, in the words of two Chinese academics quoted by French, “knowledge of the emperor’s ‘majesty and virtue.’” But French unearths evidence suggesting that Zheng was actually an agent of Chinese expansionism; when Sumatra and Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) refused to yield to China’s hegemony, for instance, Zheng invaded. Although his expeditions were not designed to secure territory, they were intended to ensure that nations subordinated themselves to China, a demand that it would enforce with military power if necessary. The Chinese, it turns out, discovered Finlandization centuries before the Soviets did.

China has not lacked for expansionist and colonial impulses.

By demythologizing China’s past, French provides an important addition to contemporary political debates over the nature of China’s rise. Chinese scholars and officials routinely claim that their country is different from other powers—peaceful, noninterventionist, and noncolonial—to assuage concerns about its growing military strength. As French shows, however, such claims have little merit; China, like all imperial powers, used force in the service of territorial expansion.

Nonetheless, the broader rejuvenation narrative has proved so potent because it portrays the triumphal return of China to its rightful position after having endured the “century of humiliation”—the 100-plus years between the mid-nineteenth-century Opium Wars, during which China suffered dramatic military defeats and acquiesced to unequal treaties, and the Chinese Communist Party’s 1949 triumph in the country’s civil war. Over this period, China was penetrated, plundered, and otherwise bested by outside powers—above all, Japan. Japan not only annexed the Ryukyu Islands in 1879 but also defeated China in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and invaded and occupied Manchuria in 1931 and 1932. What made Tokyo’s conquests so humiliating was that the Chinese had long viewed Japan as inferior and largely derivative of their own country. China’s domination by this upstart contributed to a deep-seated sense of insecurity that Chinese leaders still have yet to shake.

AN OCEAN APART

Thousands of miles away and independent only since 1776, the United States engaged with China in a radically different manner from the way the Middle Kingdom’s neighbors did. As Pomfret reveals, starting in the 1780s, China and the United States enjoyed a rich, two-way relationship, with important players on both sides admiring the accomplishments of the other. In 1915, for example, the American poet Ezra Pound published his translations of Tang and Song dynasty poems in Cathay, a collection that inspired other American writers, such as Ernest Hemingway. Prominent Chinese figures studied in the United States, including the Nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen (who went to secondary school in Hawaii), the philosopher Hu Shih (Cornell and Columbia), and the businessman T.V. Soong (Harvard and Columbia). Many of them subsequently called on their compatriots to learn from the United States’ innovative spirit and political system. 

When Americans traveled to China to do business during the early 1800s, Chinese officials and merchants often described them as polite, compliant, and respectful; the Chinese particularly appreciated the Americans’ preference for paying in the in-demand commodity of silver as opposed to opium. The Americans, in turn, benefited from the Second Opium War (1856–60), which, through the treaties that ended it, forced China to open more of its ports for trade with the outside world and enabled American Christians to proselytize inside the country. In the decades that followed, the number of missionaries swelled, to nearly 4,000 by 1900, many of them American, and U.S. dollars funded a number of charitable organizations, medical schools, and YMCAs and YWCAs.

Cultural exchanges between the two countries flourished. In the 1920s, basketball and baseball took China by storm. Around the same time, Chinese restaurants debuted to great acclaim in the United States, as did stories set in China—including the 1933 children’s book The Story About Ping, featuring a duck who lived on the Yangtze River. And Chinese who trained in the United States went back to China prepared to help transform their country. Pomfret recounts the story of Shi Meiyu (also known as Mary Stone) and Kang Cheng (also known as Ida Kahn), two women who were educated—and, in the case of Kang, raised—by a U.S. missionary in China. In the 1890s, the Methodist Church supported their education at the University of Michigan’s medical school, after which the two returned to China as doctors and started their own clinics. Universally admired in both China and the United States, Shi and Kang inspired a generation of Chinese women to become physicians.

Yet as Pomfret describes, the growing interaction between the two countries also led to growing friction. In 1862, China opened up its educational system to Western ideas and established a government school known as the Tongwenguan, which originally trained interpreters in foreign languages but later expanded to teach other Western knowledge. Chinese traditionalists fought the incursion of Western intellectual influences, and many Chinese resented the American missionaries’ efforts to spread Western religions. One essay, “A Record of Facts to Ward Off the Cult,” claimed that church rituals included Sunday orgies and smeared blood. 

The United States confronted its own debates over the relationship. In 1868, with the signing of the Burlingame Treaty, it prohibited discrimination against Chinese workers and mandated reciprocal treatment for Chinese and Americans residing and traveling in each other’s countries. But then came the long depression in the United States that began in 1873. Some Americans blamed Chinese immigrants for the poor economy, and anti-Chinese sentiment flared. In 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which banned all Chinese immigrants. 

Unlike China, the United States never had a deep debate over the insidiousness of the values and ideas flowing across the Pacific. But some Americans did have concerns about undue Chinese influence. When Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the Wellesley-educated first lady of Nationalist China, traveled to Washington in 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt and other U.S. officials worried that her call for help in defeating the Japanese would undermine his Europe-first policy. And in the wake of China’s successful communist revolution and the Korean War, Washington feared that American prisoners of war had been brainwashed into seeking to spread communism on their return. Rather than celebrate the soldiers’ homecoming, the U.S. Defense Department locked them up and subjected them to intense psychiatric deprogramming.

An 1858 illustration depicts British troops capturing Zhenjiang in the last major battle of the First Opium War

BACK TO THE PAST

French and Pomfret could easily have limited their ambitions to writing informative new histories of China’s foreign relations. Both, however, try to use their findings to enhance understanding of China today and to offer advice to U.S. policymakers. 

The parallels between China’s historical relations with the outside world and its relations today are easiest to see in the country’srelationship with the United States. As in the past, Pomfret notes, the Chinese debate whether the country should emulate the West’s self-reliance, innovation, and ability to meld so many cultures or reject Western influence in order to preserve an essential Chinese culture. Meanwhile, China’s current efforts to spread its own values—by setting up government-funded cultural centers called Confucius Institutes around the world and by broadcasting state-run English-language radio and television—are increasingly raising concerns among U.S. officials. 

A business-as-usual strategy is unlikely to be sufficient for managing an increasingly powerful and illiberal China.

French, too, finds ample evidence that China’s historical mindset continues to resonate. He suggests that its rejection of the decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (which found the country’s claim to all the territories in the South China Sea within the so-called nine-dash line to be without merit) exemplifies China’s traditional sense that its great-power status allows it to ignore international law. Echoes of imperial China’s tribute system can be heard in what French characterizes as China’s main message to the rest of Asia: “In order to ensure your prosperity, hitch your wagons to us. Yes, we expect deference, but isn’t that a small price to pay for stability and co-prosperity?” According to French, some in the region actually accept this message and are willing to return to the past. The Philippine scholar Eduardo Tadem, for example, argues that states should reach a bargain with China in which they might again pay deference to China in exchange for Beijing’s relaxing its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Of course, many others in the region would consider such a deal unacceptable.

That said, French also sees continuity where none may actually exist. His claim that “habits of mind and of statecraft” are so “deeply ingrained in China” that they still shape policy today sounds reasonable. But his prime example misses the mark. He argues that China’s offer to the United States to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank reflected its “cultural self-confidence and belief that as China gradually but inevitably becomes number one, other countries including the United States will slowly come to appreciate that resistance is pointless and will petition for admission into the Chinese court.” The reality, however, is that from all accounts, the Chinese leadership was astonished at its success in bringing advanced industrialized nations on board to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Jin Canrong, a professor at Renmin University of China, told The New York Times, “Such wide and warm support was unexpected.” Many Chinese officials and analysts believed that the bank would fail or, in the best-case scenario, attract only developing countries. 

WHAT NOW?

French and Pomfret differ on what constitutes the biggest challenge to U.S.-Chinese relations. French identifies Chinese expansionism as the main problem, arguing that Beijing seeks to supplant the United States in Asia. “Everything about its diplomatic language says that it views the Western Pacific as it once did its ancient known world,” he writes. Pomfret, in contrast, argues that the greater concern is citizens in both countries who actively oppose “a Great Harmony”—on one side, “populists who seek to blame China for the world’s ills,” and on the other, “anti-American bigots.”

Despite their differing diagnoses, French and Pomfret arrive at the same prescription. Both think that the best way forward is a better version of what the United States has tried in the past: engagement. Both sympathize with China’s desire for greater power and influence. French, for example, calls on Americans to understand the feelings of exclusion that China suffered as a result of bad historical timing: it was right after World War II, just when China had reached its lowest point, that the international community established a raft of treaties and organizations. He argues that the United States should welcome China’s voice more and accept Chinese initiatives with more serenity. Pomfret says that the United States should “redouble its efforts to complete its historic mission to pull China into the world and to seek this Great Harmony, even if it is ultimately unattainable.”

At the same time, French and Pomfret recognize that domestic political and economic forces also shape each country’s foreign policy. After recounting China’s many domestic economic and social challenges and the United States’ economic and cultural strengths, French concludes that the United States can hold its own against the “Chinese juggernaut.” He also points out that China continuously risks overplaying its hand, with its assertiveness giving India and Japan reason to rise up in opposition. Pomfret urges U.S. policymakers to follow China’s lead and focus on developing the United States’ own “comprehensive national strength”—in other words, invest in infrastructure, education, and smart immigration policies. And he suggests that China will have to undertake political reform in order to preserve both peace at home and good relations abroad. None of these recommendations breaks new ground, but French and Pomfret do readers a favor by anchoring their advice in an understanding of China’s historical patterns of interaction with the outside world.

On the face of it, the authors’ proposals for the United States to meet China halfway (or more than halfway) in its bid to shape global institutions, while shoring up the United States’ economic and security capabilities, appear wise. Yet the reality is that a largely business-as-usual strategy is unlikely to be sufficient for managing an increasingly powerful and illiberal China. Pomfret’s depiction of a time in which ideas, culture, and trade flowed expansively between China and the United States does not reflect the present reality. Xi’s government seeks to limit the flow of foreign ideas and capital into China while asserting China’s own political, economic, and military influence abroad.

For now, then, the best path forward for the United States is to acknowledge the importance of cooperating with China while adopting a greater element of reciprocity in the bilateral relationship. For example, Washington might limit Chinese firms’ access to the U.S. market in areas where China’s economy remains largely closed to U.S. companies, such as media and the Internet. Or it could insist that since China is establishing Confucius Institutes in the United States, the U.S. government has the right to sponsor similar institutions to promote American culture and values in China. U.S. policymakers should take to heart the lesson that China’s “century of humiliation” taught: unequal treatment breeds dissatisfaction and resentment. The relationship will thrive only if each country remains open to the goods, ideas, and culture of the other. An open door must go both ways.