美國能幫忙平息台灣政治風暴?

http://online.wsj.com/news/article_email/SB10001424052702303532704579476991164565378-lMyQjAxMTA0MDAwMzEwNDMyWj

The U.S. Can Help Calm Taiwan's Political Storm

By RUPERT HAMMOND-CHAMBERS

Updated April 2, 2014 1:39 p.m. ET

There is increasing concern these days about America's apparently diminishing ability to promote security and liberty overseas, from Syria to Ukraine and beyond. But on Friday U.S. officials will have an unusual opportunity to advance overseas interests with ease—by strengthening bilateral trade relations with Taiwan.

At a meeting in Washington, U.S. and Taiwanese officials could announce their intention to launch negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Agreement. Crucially, such an agreement would also position the U.S. to support Taiwan's eventual membership in the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership free-trade accord that is the centerpiece of Washington's "pivot" to Asia. Taiwan's accession to TPP would add a high-tech export economy to the trade zone while also helping democratic Taiwan offset its creeping overreliance on trade with China.

Back in Taiwan this week, President Ma Ying-jeou is facing unprecedented street protests against ratification of a trade agreement he signed last year with China. The protests represent a critical juncture in Taiwan's domestic debate on relations with China. Unless Taipei resolves the dispute soon, tensions across the Taiwan Strait could heighten dramatically—with serious implications not just for Taiwan and China but for the U.S., which for decades has guaranteed stability across the Strait.

President Ma has pushed an ambitious set of initiatives to normalize China-Taiwan trade and cultural relations since 2009. Taiwan has seen soaring numbers of Chinese tourists, Taiwanese companies increasingly use China as their primary platform for global production, and China's share of Taiwanese exports is now greater than 40%. Thanks to this massive commercial relationship, cross-Strait tensions have dropped to a historic low.

A cargo crane piles up containers before they are placed on a boat at Taiwan's northern Taipei Port which lies south of the Tamshui River. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Mr. Ma sought economic liberalization with China so that he could then pursue liberalization with Taiwan's other principal trading partners. It had to be China first, and then everyone else, because Beijing is unlikely ever to acquiesce to Taiwan engaging with other countries without first considering China's interests.

The challenge was ensuring that the China-first strategy not result in domestic angst over stepping too far into China's sphere of influence. Regrettably, that angst has materialized. While trade with China has boomed, Taiwan's ties with other existing and potential trade partners have expanded only marginally. This has left Mr. Ma's China policy vulnerable to major domestic criticism.

With the current street protests—including a student-led occupation of the legislature—there is a risk that Taiwan's debate over relations with China will become radicalized. Mr. Ma's ability to push new China initiatives would then disappear, as would his viability as a partner for China. This is where these cross-Strait trade issues intersect with power politics in Beijing and Washington.

From his election in 2008, Beijing rightly viewed Mr. Ma as best positioned to move cross-Strait relations in a China-favorable direction, allowing for economic and cultural engagement that would build momentum to deal with thornier issues surrounding sovereignty. Unlike the majority of people in Taiwan—who seek economic opportunity and are content with their self-governing status quo—China pursues rapprochement to advance the cause of unification. Beijing rejects the status quo and is committed to unifying with Taiwan through negotiation or force.

If China concludes that Mr. Ma is no longer able to advance cross-Strait relations, tensions with Taiwan could spike quickly. China will likely wait and assess the situation after Taiwan's next presidential election in 2016, but whether Mr. Ma's Kuomintang wins or loses, Taiwan's next president will have significantly less leeway in dealing with China.

Washington, for its part, remains hugely vested in Taipei's ability to forge ahead, and generally in a peaceful Taiwan Strait. Yet the U.S. has mostly stayed on the sidelines during Mr. Ma's tenure, thrilled with the short-term advances in cross-Strait ties and happy to harvest a peace dividend before peace has broken out. The U.S. has focused on smaller initiatives with Taiwan, such as a visa-waiver program, typically leaving aside arms sales and high-level diplomacy—issues that complicate U.S.-China relations.

But the consequences of continued inaction could be dire, with the Taiwan Strait again becoming the main flashpoint in U.S.-China relations.

By publicly declaring its backing for Taiwan's bilateral and multilateral economic ambitions—including a bilateral investment agreement with Washington and a path to participation in TPP—the U.S. would lend invaluable support to peace and stability cross-Strait relations. The U.S. would help ensure that Taiwan's domestic debate on China policy takes place not just in the shadow of a rising China, but amid expanding Taiwan ties with trade partners around the globe.

Mr. Hammond Chambers is president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council and a managing director of BowerGroupAsia