〈Foreign Policy〉川普不知該如何處置中國？

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/05/trumps-team-has-no-idea-what-its-doing-on-china/

Trump’s Team Has No Idea What It’s Doing On China

BY MIRA RAPP-HOOPER, ALEXANDER SULLIVAN

APRIL 5, 2017

川普不知該如何處置中國？

<谷歌翻譯>

唐納德·特朗普自己承認，不是非常分析或審慎。在最近的“時代”雜誌採訪中，他宣稱：“我是一個非常本能的人，但我的本能就是對的。”不幸的是，在外交政策方面，他的本能往往與潛在危險的方式相互矛盾。更糟糕的是，以先入為主的觀念而不是仔細思考問題的衝動並不局限於總統。它處於世界上最為重要的雙邊關係當中，尤其是在處理美中關係時呢。

特朗普以現代記憶中任何一個行政當局最不確定的中國政策進入白宮。在擔任主席兩個多月的時間裡，中國國家主席習近平的首腦會議快速接近，政府產生了更多的問題。還沒有製定一個引導中國的連貫一致的戰略，也沒有對亞太地區有明確的政策。

這可能是原諒的 - 如果不是因為行政當局的高級官員擁有兩套極端的本能，這兩種本能與長期的兩黨美國對華政策不符。特朗普團隊從傳統的大企業背景 - 包​​括高級顧問Jared Kushner和國務卿蒂爾森（Rex Tillerson）的成員都擁有高度交易和潛在的協調者的本能。根據這種首創方式，美國應該放寬北京在亞洲擴大影響力的願望，以求解決朝鮮或雙邊貿易逆差等離散問題。第二套本能是由經濟民族主義者 - 最主要的是首席戰略家史蒂夫·班農和白宮全國貿易委員會主席彼得·納瓦羅，他們對中國的經濟和軍事崛起充滿敵意。

美中關係近年來的管理越來越具有挑戰性，理論上應該受到新的觀念的歡迎。然而，這兩種做法都帶來了美國利益和該地區的短期和長期危險。

對中國的交易方式認為，它對於非常關切的問題有重大的影響，力求引起北京的援助，即使這意味著簽署了其他美國利益的過程。高層管理人員是否持不同意見尚不清楚，但是顯而易見的是，交易的本能在一些顯著的相互作用中佔上風。

在蒂爾森最近訪問亞洲時，這種態度的最明顯的表現是他的言論反映了西方自己對美中關係的看法。蒂勒森一再（錯誤地）說：“自從四十多年前兩國關係歷史性開放以來，美中關係一直以理解不衝突，不辱罵，相互尊重和贏得為指導 - “合作”。這一段可能直接來自中國的國家媒體，受到北京報的熱烈的讚揚（儘管有幾個專欄作家警告說這太重視了）。聲音可能聽起來完全無害，但實際上有令人擔憂的影響。

習近平首先在西班牙前總統巴拉克•奧巴馬（Barack Obama）首腦會議上介紹了這個中文措辭，作為“重大關係新模式”，原來的形式包括尊重“核心利益”，這是北京認為是國家的無定形問題清單它將用武力來維護安全利益。它原來包括西藏，台灣和新疆，但多年來一直在發展。

雖然南海沒有正式列入名單，但中國私人官員有時會使用三段話：“主權和領土完整是核心利益，中國對南海具有不可剝奪的主權，所以......”蒂爾森指出沒有使用“核心利益”這個詞，但對中國來說，“相互尊重”的對像是不言而喻的。 “新模式”隱含地承認美國正在衰落，基本上設想到中國在亞洲的影響力範圍。

在2013 - 2014年度，奧巴馬政府首先謹慎接受口號，只是重新考慮和明智地放棄，省略其聲明中提到的短語。奧巴馬隊在這個問題上的經驗使得蒂爾森的話語更加神秘，因為國務院和國家安全委員會的職業中國專家對這種語言非常熟悉，並且深刻理解了它的含義。

蒂爾森從北京回來後，國務院發言人有機會回顧他的意見。相反，他肯定了蒂勒森仔細地選擇了他的話。媒體報導說，特朗普的女，，賈里德·庫什納（Jared Kushner）已經成為與北京外界傳統渠道的潛在關鍵對話者，在推動語言方面發揮了關鍵作用。庫什納缺乏正式的中國經驗，在行政當中也穿著許多其他的帽子，可能正在談判對中國“核心利益”的進一步承認，以及習近平的“一帶一路”全球基礎設施投資的簽字外交政策計劃。

為什麼與北京有密切業務關係的Tillerson（或Kushner）會復興這些短語，並使他們成為他第一次與中國接觸的保險貼吧？白宮為什麼像“華盛頓郵報”所說，允許中國官員起草共產黨和特朗普政府之間的初步認識？

一個解釋可能是從蒂爾森和庫什納在中國的商業經驗中學到的本能。中國的外國公司通過重複自己喜歡的短語，迅速地從當地的合作夥伴那裡學習，以爭取政府的青睞;在胡錦濤的陪同下，每個外國公司在中國尋求業務的時期都談到了北京如何向“和諧社會”邁進。自從習近平掌權以來，企業紛紛垮台，推動“中國夢”，這些本能可能為公司被允許進入中國市場所需要的那種打屁股工作，但對於國家領導人來說，這些實力正在適得其反。

但每一個跡象表明，這是一種有針對性的策略，答案可能在於“雙贏合作” - 追求更好的交易。住房主義者對中國框架的擁抱為北京對朝鮮採取更大膽的行動或宣布對美國的投資作出交易，以換取美國對其他中國利益的尊重。然而，如果發生某種類型的“交易”，其條款仍然是一個秘密，這不利於該地區的盟友以及在家的觀察員。事實上，美國總統和他的女law在中國有很大的商業利益，提高了蒂勒森在北京的修辭讓步對美國外交政策沒有任何收穫的可能性。比蒂爾森的言論更加令人擔憂，而本週晚些時候在馬拉一世的任何迴響都是他們可能發現一些交易發生的事實，遠離了公眾的眼睛。

然而，通過行政當局也是由班農和納瓦羅代表的“經濟民族主義”的火焰。這些顧問以零和的方式查看所有的國際政治 - 貿易和安全。在這個鏡頭下，中國的崛起​​只會對美國的福利和利益造成極大的不利。

事實上，班農對北京表現出深刻的敵意，作為最右邊媒體佈萊泰巴特的編輯，並且主持了其日常廣播節目。

班農認為中國是通過不公平的貿易做法和企業瀆職偷走了美國的工作，並表示長期以來一直對美國進行“經濟戰”。

班農認為中國是通過不公平的貿易做法和企業瀆職偷走了美國的工作，並表示長期以來一直對美國進行“經濟戰”。美國與中國的貿易逆差是“我們問題的核心”，中國持有的美國主權債務使美國“陷入對我們的敵人”。

班農對安全問題的看法並不樂觀：他認為美中衝突是不可避免的。他就伯羅奔尼撒戰爭談論美中關係，並比較了今天的亞洲與第一次世界大戰的“火柴盒” - 儘管他在這些比較中並不孤單。他對“中國明顯試圖驅趕我們南海的軍事對抗”和“五年十年將要在南海戰爭”的信心更為引人注目。

最令人不安的是班農傾向於把與中國的關係視為一場嚴峻的“文明衝突”。在2014年向右翼天主教論壇發表的講話中，他表示，美國面臨著一個“激進，傲慢”的“擴張主義中國”猶太教基督教西方正在退縮，“種族和身份偶爾會對中國的其他公眾意見，包括他厭惡東亞（和南）亞洲移民在美國世界領先的科技產業中的優勢和一瞥建議中國可以利用移民作為擴張工具。

納瓦羅似乎分享了許多班農令人不安的中國觀點，以及該國缺乏正式的專業知識。前經濟學教授撰寫書籍，製作電影，如臥虎藏龍：中國軍國主義對世界的影響，中國的戰爭與中國的死亡：面對龍 - 全球呼籲。他還要求對中國進口商品徵收43％的關稅，如果實施，這可能導致全球經濟衰退。

美國曾經有過中國的鷹派，而希拉里·克林頓政府在北京可能會比奧巴馬政府更難走。

特朗普政府的民族主義團體有什麼不同，他們專門積極反對中國的崛起​​，以零和價值觀看待關係。

他們所說的政策願望是盡可能地解開美中經濟相互依存的有害因素，盡可能遏制中國的軍事擴張。這將標誌著美國外交政策的戲劇性逆轉。雖然雙曲論評論家將美國亞洲政策視為對中國的“遏制”戰略，雙方無疑在許多問題上進行競爭，但外國沒有為中國的發展做出更多的貢獻。實際上，理查德·尼克松總理府對“和平，穩定，繁榮，全球負責任的中國的崛起​​”表示歡迎。當這個願望被拋棄並被民族主義的修辭和威脅取而代之的時候，它會加劇太平洋兩岸的焦慮，並能夠自信地預測像班農這樣的自我預言的戰爭。

橢圓形辦公室的策略密碼使這兩種截然不同的本能變得更加惡化。特朗普對美中關係幾乎沒有一致的看法。然而，他明確地表達了蒂爾森只是暗示的交易方式，例如當他表示要對美國與台灣的關係進行調整時，是否“與中國達成交易，包括與貿易有關的其他事項”。然而，特朗普利用中國（連同墨西哥和伊斯蘭世界）作為一種政治支柱：不如說是一個真正的地方，而不是像美國的利益一樣的外國力量的象徵，必須在後者的道路上追趕回到偉大。現任總統以班農表示，“我們不能繼續讓中國強姦我們的國家”。在西安訪問的前期，特朗普已經回到了中國的保護主義，這次首腦會議將是一個非常困難的會議，因為我們不能再有大量的貿易赤字和失業。美國公司必須準備考慮其他替代方案。“隨後，簽署了一項行政命令來審查美國的貿易赤字，特別是與中國的貿易赤字。

無法調和這些相互衝突的範式可能已經阻礙了旨在表明美國承諾的簡單政策維護海洋自由。此外，由於行政部門還沒有填補其高級職位，所以很少有專家甚至可以試圖引導政府走向更加可預測的路線。

如果這些意見中的任何一個意見都上升並結晶成政策，這將嚴重損害美國利益和福利以及亞太地區的安全。美國及其盟國既不能單方面地將重要利益放在短期收益和令人難以置信的承諾之下，也不能挑起與世界第二大權力的經濟或軍事衝突。

更糟糕的是，如果這兩種本能指導美國的政策同時出現，使得它陷入危險，不確定和不定期的錯誤計算和危機。例如，如果官員沒有澄清蒂爾森在北京的交易意見，那麼西可能會得出結論，華盛頓終於接受了中國的“核心利益”概念，並認為這個門將在南海進一步擴張。但是，如果中國向這個方向邁出一步，就開始在斯卡伯勒淺灘建造廣泛的軍事設施，令美國的盟友感到困擾，經濟民族主義者可能會推動相互升級。現在南海是中國自己的民族主義敘事中的一個關鍵問題，難以退縮，造成世界兩大軍事大國之間發生重大衝突的風險。

隨著特朗普西高峰的快速接近，嚴肅的國家安全專業人士，包括國防部長詹姆斯·馬蒂斯和國家安全顧問馬克馬斯特，必須堅持，​​政府開始製定一個連貫一致的中國戰略。他們肯定不會在本週的領導人見面之前完成這一工作，但他們仍然應該要求總統確定具體目標，並倡導避免交易性住房的Scylla政策和猥褻升級的政策。

華盛頓應堅持中國的共同合作像北朝鮮這樣的挑戰，但明確表示，不惜以重要的美國或盟國利益為代價購買北京的幫助。它應該謹慎投資於強有力的威懾，而不必承擔衝突的必然性。它可以要求對雙邊貿易公正的條款，而不會發生一場肆虐全球的經濟戰爭。

當世界兩大最大的領導人相遇時，危險的本能就不能取代政策和戰略。習近平很容易認識到並利用衝動和準備不善的對手。而在4月6日以後，如果冷靜下來，更加謹慎的頭腦不會凌駕，這些肆意的傾向拉動和推動政策，成本可能不亞於美國在亞洲的地位和整個地區的和平與穩定。

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/05/trumps-team-has-no-idea-what-its-doing-on-china/

Trump’s Team Has No Idea What It’s Doing On China

The administration is torn between short-sighted dealmakers and zero-sum nationalist hardliners.

BY MIRA RAPP-HOOPER, ALEXANDER SULLIVAN

APRIL 5, 2017

Donald Trump is, by his own admission, not terribly analytical or deliberative. In a recent Time magazine interview, he declared, “I’m a very instinctual person, but my instinct turns out to be right.” Unfortunately, when it comes to foreign policy, his instincts often contradict one another in potentially dangerous ways. Even worse, the impulse to act on preconceived notions, rather than thinking through problems carefully, isn’t limited to the president. It pervades his administration — especially when dealing with the most consequential bilateral ties in the world: U.S.-China relations.

Trump entered the White House with the most uncertain China policy of any administration in modern memory. More than two months into his presidency, and a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping fast approaching, the administration has generated more questions than answers. It has not yet developed a coherent strategy for engaging China, nor does it have clear policies for the Asia-Pacific.

This could be forgiven — if not for the fact that senior officials in the administration harbor two extreme sets of instincts, both of which are at odds with long-standing, bipartisan U.S. policy toward China. Members of Trump’s team from a traditional big-business background — including senior advisor Jared Kushner and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson — hold instincts that are highly transactional and potentially accommodationist. According to this business-first approach, the United States should appease Beijing’s desire for an expanded sphere of influence in Asia in exchange for help on discrete issues such as North Korea or the bilateral trade deficit. The second set of instincts is held by the economic nationalists — most notably chief strategist Steve Bannon and Peter Navarro, the head of the White House National Trade Council — who are thoroughly hostile to China’s economic and military rise.

The U.S.-China relationship has grown increasingly challenging to manage in recent years, and new ideas should, in theory, be welcome. Both of these approaches, however, bring with them short-term and long-term dangers for U.S. interests and for the region.

The transactional approach to China accepts that it has significant sway on issues of great concern and seeks to elicit Beijing’s assistance, even if it means signing away other U.S. interests in the process. It is not clear whether top administration officials hold these views immutably, but it is nonetheless evident that deal-making instincts have prevailed in a few notable interactions.

The clearest manifestation of this attitude came during Tillerson’s recent trip to Asia, when his statements parroted Xi’s own vision for the U.S.-China relationship. Tillerson repeatedly (and erroneously) stated, “Since the historic opening of relations between our two countries more than 40 years ago, the U.S.-China relationship has been guided by an understanding of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation.” That paragraph could have come straight from Chinese state media and was warmly applauded by the Beijing papers (although a few columnists warned of taking this too seriously). The verbiage may sound entirely innocuous but in fact has worrying implications.

This Chinese phraseology was first introduced by Xi at his 2013 summit with former President Barack Obama as the “new model of major-country relations.” The original formulation includes respect for “core interests,” an amorphous list of issues Beijing considers to be national security interests that it would use force to defend. It originally included Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang but has evolved over the years.

While the South China Sea is not officially on this list, in private Chinese officials sometimes use a syllogism: “Sovereignty and territorial integrity are core interests, and China has inalienable sovereignty over the South China Sea, so….” Tillerson pointedly did not use the phrase “core interests,” but to China, the object of “mutual respect” is self-evident. The “new model” implicitly acknowledges that the United States is in decline and essentially envisions a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia.

In 2013-2014, the Obama administration cautiously accepted the slogan at first, only to reconsider and wisely discard it, omitting any mention of the phrase from its statements. The Obama team’s experience with this issue makes Tillerson’s choice of words all the more mystifying, because career China experts at the State Department and National Security Council are very familiar with this language and understood well what it implied.

After Tillerson returned from Beijing, the State Department spokesman had the opportunity to walk back his comments. Instead, he affirmed that Tillerson had chosen his words carefully. Media reporting suggests that Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who has set himself up as a potentially key interlocutor with Beijing outside traditional channels, had played a critical role in pushing the language. Kushner, who lacks any formal China experience and wears many other hats within the administration, may be negotiating further recognition of China’s “core interests,” as well as Xi’s signature foreign-policy initiative, the “One Belt, One Road” global infrastructure investment plan.

Why would Tillerson — or Kushner, who has strong business ties with Beijing — revive these phrases and make them the bumper sticker of his first engagement with China? Why would the White House, as the Washington Post alleges, allow Chinese officials to draft the initial understandings between the Communist Party and the Trump administration?

One explanation may be instincts learned from Tillerson and Kushner’s business experience in China. Foreign firms in China rapidly learn from their local partners to curry favor with the government by repeating its own preferred phrases; under Hu Jintao, there was a period when every foreign company seeking business in China spoke of how Beijing was working toward a “harmonious society”; since Xi took power, firms have fallen over themselves to promote the “China dream.” Those instincts might work for the kind of bootlicking needed for firms to be allowed into the Chinese market, but they’re actively counterproductive for national leaders.

But every indication is that this is a directed strategy of a kind and that the answer may lie in “win-win cooperation” — the pursuit of a better deal. The accommodationists’ embrace of China’s framework sets the stage for a bargain in which Beijing takes bolder action on North Korea or announces investments in the United States in exchange for U.S. deference on other Chinese interests. If some type of “deal” took place, however, its terms remain a secret, which unsettles allies in the region, as well as observers at home. Indeed, both the U.S. president and his son-in-law have significant business interests in China, raising the possibility that Tillerson’s rhetorical concessions in Beijing reaped no gains for American foreign policy whatsoever. Far more worrisome than Tillerson’s words themselves, and any echo thereof at Mar-a-Lago later this week, is the fact that they may signal that some transaction took place, far from the public eye.

Yet also coursing through the administration is the fire of “economic nationalism,” represented by Bannon and Navarro. These advisors view all of international politics — trade as well as security — in zero-sum terms. Under this lens, the rise of China can only be starkly inimical to American welfare and interests.

Indeed, Bannon showed a deep-seated hostility toward Beijing, as editor of the far-right media outlet Breitbart and host of its daily radio program. 

Bannon views China as having stolen American jobs through unfair trade practices and corporate malfeasance, saying it has long conducted “economic warfare” against the United States.

Bannon views China as having stolen American jobs through unfair trade practices and corporate malfeasance, saying it has long conducted “economic warfare” against the United States. The U.S. trade deficit with China is “the beating heart of our problem,” and China’s holdings of U.S. sovereign debt put America “in hock to our enemies.”

Bannon’s sentiments on security issues are no more sanguine: He views conflict between the United States and China as inevitable. He speaks about U.S.-China relations in terms of the Peloponnesian War and has compared present-day Asia to the “matchbox” that set off World War I — although he is hardly alone in these comparisons. More striking are his statements about “the military confrontation [China is] obviously trying to drive us to in the South China Sea” and his confidence that “we’re going to war in the South China Sea in five or 10 years.”

Most disconcerting of all is Bannon’s tendency to view relations with China as a harsh “clash of civilizations.” In a 2014 speech to a right-wing Catholic forum, he said the United States faces an “expansionist China” that is “motivated, arrogant, and [thinks] the Judeo-Christian West is in retreat.” Race and identity occasionally tinge his other public comments on China, including his disgustfor the preponderance of East (and South) Asian immigrants in America’s world-leading tech industry and a glancing suggestion that China may use its emigrants as tools of expansion.

Navarro seems to share many of Bannon’s troubling China views, as well as a lack of formal expertise on the country. The former economics professor has written books and produced films with such hyperbolic titles as Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World, The Coming China Wars, and Death by China: Confronting the Dragon — A Global Call to Action. He has also called for a 43 percent tariff on Chinese imports, which would likely lead to a global recession if implemented.

America has had China hawks in positions of power before, and a Hillary Clinton administration would likely have taken a harder line on Beijing than the Obama administration. 

What’s different about the nationalist group in the Trump administration is that they specifically and actively oppose the rise of China and see the relationship in zero-sum terms.

What’s different about the nationalist group in the Trump administration is that they specifically and actively oppose the rise of China and see the relationship in zero-sum terms. Their stated policy aspirations are to unravel supposedly harmful U.S.-China economic interdependence to the greatest possible extent — and to contain China’s military expansion wherever possible. This would mark a dramatic reversal of American foreign policy. While hyperbolic critics have long characterized U.S. Asia policy as a “containment” strategy aimed at China — and the two sides no doubt compete over many issues — no foreign country has done more to facilitate China’s development than the United States. In reality, every presidential administration since Richard Nixon has welcomed “the rise of a China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and a responsible player in global affairs.” And with good reason. When this aspiration is discarded and replaced with nationalist rhetoric and threats, it heightens anxieties on both sides of the Pacific and can make confident predictions of war like Bannon’s into self-fulfilling prophecies.

These two starkly different sets of instincts are worsened by the policy cipher in the Oval Office. Trump has articulated few consistent views on the U.S.-China relationship. He has, however, made explicit the transactional approach that Tillerson only implied, such as when he said he would condition U.S. relations with Taiwan on whether “we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.” Nonetheless, on the campaign trail, Trump used China (along with Mexico and the Islamic world) as a political prop: less of a real place than as a symbol of the foreign forces that had taken advantage of America and must be brought to heel on the latter’s road back to greatness. The now-president said, in Bannon-esque terms, “We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country.” In the run-up to Xi’s visit, Trump has been back on Twitterslamming China’s protectionism, predicting that the summit meeting would be a “very difficult one in that we can no longer have massive trade deficits … and job losses. American companies must be prepared to look at other alternatives.” This followed the signing of an executive order to scrutinize U.S. trade deficits, particular those with China.

The inability to reconcile these conflicting paradigms may already be holding up straightforward policies designed to demonstrate U.S. commitment to upholding freedom of the seas. Moreover, because the administration has not yet filled its senior Asia positions, there are few experts who can even attempt to steer the administration toward a more predictable course.

If either of these sets of views ascends and crystallizes into policy, this would gravely damage U.S. interests and welfare, as well as the security of the Asia-Pacific region. The United States and its allies can afford neither to unilaterally cede important interests for short-term gains and incredible commitments nor to provoke an economic or military conflict with the world’s second-largest power.

An even worse outcome would be if both of these instincts guided U.S. policy simultaneously, leaving it dangerously indeterminate and inviting miscalculation and crisis. For instance, if officials do not clarify Tillerson’s transactional comments in Beijing, then Xi might conclude that Washington has finally accepted the Chinese conception of “core interests” and assume that the door was open for further expansion in the South China Sea. If China took a step in this direction, however, and began to build extensive military facilities on Scarborough Shoal, distressing the Philippines, a U.S. ally, the economic nationalists might urge reciprocal escalation. With the South China Sea now a key issue in China’s own nationalist narratives, it would find it hard to back down, raising the risk of a major conflict between the world’s two largest militaries.

With the Trump-Xi summit fast approaching, serious national security professionals, including Defense Secretary James Mattis and National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, must insist that the administration start to craft a coherent strategy for engaging China. They will surely not accomplish this before the leaders meet this week, but they should nonetheless press the president to identify specific objectives and advocate for policies that avoid the Scylla of transactional accommodation and the Charybdis of reckless escalation.

Washington should insist on China’s cooperation on shared challenges like North Korea but make clear that it will not buy Beijing’s help at the cost of vital U.S. or allied interests. It should make prudent investments in robust deterrence without assuming the inevitability of conflict. It can demand fairer terms on bilateral trade without unleashing an economic war that would ravage the globe.

When the leaders of the world’s two largest powers meet, dangerous instincts cannot substitute for policy and strategy. Xi Jinping will easily recognize and take advantage of an impulsive and ill-prepared counterpart. And after April 6, if cooler, more careful heads do not prevail and these reckless proclivities pull and push at policy, the cost may be no less than America’s standing in Asia and the peace and stability of the entire region.