川普該學印度如何玩一中

(Ajin 開口)

感謝Baobab大大報碼底下這篇精采文章，刊登在Foreign Policy 雜誌上。文章內容主要是建議川普老大要學印度如何玩北京一中，玩到北京無法對印度耍任何脾氣，也不感發作，還得規矩地和印度交往。

四十年以來，北京一直對新德里施壓，要印度當局承認一中，尤其西藏（圖博）是屬於中國。但印度卻偏偏不甩，依然讓達賴喇嘛的流亡政府存在德蘭沙拉。至於對台灣的立場，印度連鳥都不鳥，根本完全不表意見。

台灣應該加緊和印度來往，印度非常需要台灣的經貿，民生工業，和現代化技巧; 台灣也非常需要印度的市場和電腦軟體科技，兩國應該可以非常好的合作。若有朝一日，印度決定和台灣建交，北京一點鳥辦法也沒有，連屁也不敢放啦！

川普該學印度如何玩一中

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/20/trump-should-read-indias-playbook-for-taunting-china/

特朗普應該閱讀印度如何狩獵中國

原文：Trump Should Read India’s Playbook for Taunting China

BY JEFF M. SMITH

<谷歌翻譯>

DECEMBER 20, 2016

2016年12月20日

唐納德•特朗普決定突破協議，成為幾十年來第一位總統當選，與台灣總統電話通話，是一個巨大的失誤或精明的戰略政變，取決於Beltway內部人士要求。至少，特朗普與台灣總統蔡英文的分裂交流引發了關於美中關係性質和北京版“一個中國”政策的神聖性的實質性辯論，這一政策將中國不可剝奪的主權台灣和西藏。

然而，隨著華盛頓受到來自北京的可能的反彈，特朗普蔡氏交易所的批評者和支持者忽略了一個關鍵事實。在全球權力在中國壓力的壓力下，台灣和西藏領導人（如達賴喇嘛）。棄一個國家的時代，一個國家已經公開挑戰北京一個中國的政策六年多：印度。

與許多中國鄰國一樣，在21世紀後期，印度仍然適應2008年出現的更加堅定和民族主義的中國外交政策品牌，當時北京領導人將全球金融危機解釋為一個巨大的力量從一個衰落的西方轉變為一個上升的中國。雙邊關係一再通過摩擦對中國入侵印度邊界，北京阻止聯合國對巴基斯坦恐怖主義分子製裁的努力，以及印度總理和達賴喇嘛訪問阿魯納恰爾邦的情況進行了多次測試，其中大部分被中國稱為“南藏”等。

一個中國的挑釁比其他的更深。 2010年，北京否認簽證給B.S.賈斯瓦爾因為他擔任印度軍事指揮官在克什米爾的領導，這是中國的“全天候朋友”巴基斯坦聲稱擁有長期爭議的領土。中國多年來一直與印度一起使用領事機構 - 為印度克什米爾和阿魯納恰爾邦的居民簽發單獨的獨特簽證，作為對印度主權的非正式挑戰 - 但是拒絕給予Jaswal的簽證令人沮喪。

新德裡的反應是不具特色的迅速和懲罰，暫停所有形式的雙邊軍事關係和聯合演習。當2010年12月中國總理溫家寶訪問新德裡時，印度首次在與中國的聯合聲明中拒絕承認一個中國政策。新德裡北京表示，如果希望印度對一個中國政策同意，就必須承認印度對克什米爾和阿魯納恰爾邦的主權。 “球在他們的法院。毫無疑問，“當時外交部長Nirupama Rao解釋道。

隨後幾年的聯合聲明繼續忽略了一個中國政策，這是納倫德拉•莫迪總理在2014年上任時採取的立場。“對於印度達成一個中國政策，中國應重申一個印度政策“外交部長斯瓦拉傑在2014年9月中國國家主席習近平第一次訪問新德裡之前宣布。”當我們與我們提出西藏和台灣問題時，我們分享了他們的敏感性......他們應該理解和欣賞我們的敏感性阿魯納恰爾邦“。

中國在溫家寶訪問兩年後重視簽證問題，此後不久就恢復了軍事關係。更重要的是，在印度對一個中國政策的改變六年後，它沒有遭遇到可以與政策轉向相聯繫的明顯的政治或經濟上的反彈。

可以肯定的是，印度否認一個中國政策對中國的情緒和政治爭議不如美國對台灣的態度轉變。在中印關係方面，一個中國政策主要涉及西藏，在較小程度上涉及其長期存在的邊界爭端，其中北京仍然聲稱佔領了超過3萬平方英裡的印度領土。

1947年，印度共和國繼承了英國拉吉與中國的不穩定邊界，以及對西藏的一系列特別貿易特權，包括在指定貿易站駐守護送部隊的權利。自從1950年中國“和平解放”西藏以來，印度對高原的意圖和對印度對印度的干涉敏感。達賴喇嘛在1959年逃離中國鎮壓，在印度尋求庇護，後來在達蘭薩拉成立了一個流亡的西藏政府，這種焦慮被放大了。中國和印度於1962年在爭議邊界發動長達一個月的戰爭後，中國領導人認為，“中印衝突中心”不是邊界爭端，而是“西藏利益衝突”。

因此，值得注意的是，除了廣泛拒絕讚成一個中國政策外，新德裡還沒有表明它計劃迴避對西藏（更不是台灣）的中國主權的一再重申。另一方面，莫迪總理採取了幾個舉措，低於這個門檻，以表示對西藏和邊界爭端更加藐視的態度。在他任職期間，例如，Modi沿著有爭議的中印邊境快速跟蹤軍事和民用基礎設施升級，北京享有巨大和擴大的優勢。

最近，新德裡授予達賴喇嘛允許在2017年初訪問阿魯納恰爾邦，這是一個在過去吸引中國人的舉動。也許最令人驚訝的是，今年10月新德裡授予美國駐印度大使Richard Verma訪問敏感的，中國要求的，在阿魯納恰爾邦的Tawang鎮。就在上週，印度總統普拉納布•穆克吉在印度總統府主持了達賴喇嘛，蔑視北京的抗議外交照會。在一個罕見的舉動，它甚至提出幫助蒙古最近由北京施加的天氣貿易制裁作為蒙古11月主辦達賴喇嘛的懲罰。這些都沒有導致北京的任何直接懲罰性反應。

它不僅僅是西藏。自2010年簽證拒簽事件以來，印度對台灣的外展活動明顯加快，包括2011年主持幾個台灣政府部長;簽署關於避免雙重避稅，文化合作和相互學位認可的新協議;分別允許2012年和2014年前台灣總統和副總統過境中轉;並邀請一位前台人士參加今年兩次高調的國際會議。這些動作還沒有從大陸得到任何尖銳的反應。

印度對一個中國政策的態度告訴我們關於特朗普蔡電話？也就是說，質疑一個中國政策的神聖性不一定是北京的“死刑判決”，尤其是當挑戰是間接和不明確的時候。到目前為止，中國對電話的靜音響應支持這種評估。

對北京的官吏，莫迪代表一種陌生的商品：一個自信，自信，民族主義的印度領導人，政治資本過剩。對於特朗普來說，情況更是如此，他對中國來說，仍然籠罩在不確定性和不可預測性的掩護之中。中國的領導層對於預測特朗普對區域棋盤上的每一個動作的反應都不太有信心，相比之下，奧巴馬更加可計算的風格，自然傾向於謹慎行事。經過多年測試其鄰國和華盛頓的“紅線”，北京在接收端也不那麼舒服。

如果特朗普 - 蔡氏交易所是一個微妙的，校準的戰略的一部分，旨在減少中國對戰略模糊的近乎壟斷和它在奧巴馬政府期間抓住的主動權，它最終可以產生美國，中國，和台灣。

另一方面，如果特朗普 - 蔡氏交流在以台灣為壓力點對中國採取更加不加區別的報復態度之前，特朗普的團隊應該準備好一系列潛在的波動，危險和不可預測的中國反應。

作為北京和華盛頓與中國現任台灣事務部長張志軍，以及與中國一些最高級外交官在台灣的許多交流會的十多次會議，我發現很難誇大北京的精神和嚴肅性到台灣及其地位。它對美國對一個中國政策的態度比印度更敏感，部分原因是中國從未感受到印度勢力特別的威脅，部分原因是中國的領導層更加直接地將其合法性與台灣的統一性相比，而不是任何問題相關西藏。

這並不意味著華盛頓應該在中國強制的威脅下妥協它的價值：我相信美國總統應該保留在任何他喜歡的時間和在他選擇時任何時候說話的權利，無論是台灣總統還是達賴喇嘛。

特朗普和他的團隊似乎已經恢復了這一權利，並且到目前為止，已經移動針對台灣，而不破壞與中國的關係。但是，為了紀念這一戰略政變，他們必須在三邊關係中創造新的平衡，不僅更有利於美國和台灣的利益，而且足夠穩定，以防止在西方與中國發生不必要的戰爭太平洋。

原文 Trump Should Read India’s Playbook for Taunting China

New Delhi has been poking at Beijing's One-China Policy for years without wrecking the relationship

BY JEFF M. SMITH

DECEMBER 20, 2016

Donald Trump’s decision to break protocol and become the first president-elect in decades to speak by phone with a Taiwanese president was either a colossal blunder or a shrewd strategic coup, depending on which Beltway insider you ask. At the least, Trump’s divisive exchange with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has sparked a substantive debate about the nature of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations and the sanctity of Beijing’s version of the “One-China” policy, which codifies China’s inalienable sovereignty over Taiwan and Tibet.

Yet, as Washington braces for potential blowback from Beijing, both critics and supporters of the Trump-Tsai exchange have overlooked one key fact. In an era when global powers are shunning both Taiwanese and Tibetan leaders (like the Dalai Lama) under the weight of Chinese pressure, one country has been openly challenging Beijing’s One-China policy for more than six years: India.

Like many of China’s neighbors, in the late 2000s India was still adjusting to the more assertive and nationalistic brand of Chinese foreign policy that emerged in 2008, when Beijing’s leaders interpreted the global financial crisis as symbolic of a great power shift from a declining West to an ascendant China. Bilateral ties were repeatedly tested by friction over Chinese incursions into India across their disputed border, Beijing’s efforts to block U.N. sanctions on Pakistan-based terrorists, and visits by the Indian prime minister and the Dalai Lama to the state of Arunachal Pradesh, most of which is claimed by China as “South Tibet,” among others.

One Chinese provocation cut deeper than the rest. In 2010, Beijing denied a visa to Lt. Gen. B.S. Jaswal on account of his posting as the head of India’s military command in Kashmir, the long-disputed territory claimed by China’s “all-weather friend” Pakistan. China had been employing consular chicanery with India for years — stapling separate, unique visas to Indian residents of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh as an informal challenge to Indian sovereignty there — but the denial of a visa to Jaswal struck a nerve.

New Delhi’s reaction was uncharacteristically swift and punitive, suspending all forms of bilateral military ties and joint exercises. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited New Delhi in December 2010, for the first time India refused to acknowledge the One-China policy in a joint statement with China. Beijing, New Delhi signaled, would have to recognize Indian sovereignty over Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh if it wanted India’s consent on the One-China policy. “The ball is in their court. There is no doubt about that,” explained Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao at the time.

Joint statements in the years to follow continued to omit the One-China policy, a position adopted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he assumed office in 2014. “For India to agree on a one-China policy, China should reaffirm a one-India policy,” External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj declared before Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first trip to New Delhi in September 2014. “When they raised the issue of Tibet and Taiwan with us, we shared their sensitivities.… They should understand and appreciate our sensitivities regarding Arunachal Pradesh.”

China relented on the visa question two years after Wen’s visit, and military ties were restored shortly thereafter. More important, six years after India’s change of heart on One-China policy, it has suffered no discernable political or economic backlash that can be tied to the policy shift.

To be sure, India’s denial of the One-China policy is less emotionally and politically contentious for China than any shift in American posture toward Taiwan. In the context of China-India relations, the One-China policy mostly relates to Tibet and, to a lesser extent, their long-standing border dispute, in which more than 30,000 square miles of Indian territory is still claimed by Beijing.

In 1947, the Republic of India inherited from the British Raj an unsettled border with China and a series of special trading privileges with Tibet, including the right to station escort troops at specified trading posts. Ever since China “peacefully liberated” Tibet in 1950, it has been critical of Indian intentions on the plateau and sensitive to Indian interference there. That anxiety was amplified after the Dalai Lama fled a Chinese crackdown in 1959 and sought refuge in India, later establishing a Tibetan government in exile in Dharamsala. After China and India fought a monthlong war across their disputed border in 1962, Chinese leaders argued that the “center of the Sino-Indian conflict” was not the border dispute but a “conflict of interests in Tibet.”

It’s notable, then, that beyond its broad refusal to endorse the One-China policy, New Delhi has given no indication that it plans to walk back its repeated reaffirmations of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet (much less Taiwan). On the other hand, Prime Minister Modi has adopted several initiatives short of that threshold to signal a more defiant posture on Tibet and the border dispute. Early in his tenure, for instance, Modi fast-tracked military and civilian infrastructure upgrades along the disputed Sino-Indian border, where Beijing has enjoyed a large and widening advantage.

More recently, New Delhi granted the Dalai Lama permission to visit Arunachal Pradesh in early 2017, a move that has drawn Chinese ire in the past. Perhaps most surprising, this past October New Delhi granted U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma access to the sensitive, Chinese-claimed town of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, another first. And just last week Indian President Pranab Mukherjee hosted the Dalai Lama at India’s Presidential Palace, blithely dismissing Beijing’s protesting diplomatic note. In a rare move, it even offered to help Mongolia weather trade sanctions recently imposed by Beijing as punishment for Mongolia’s hosting of the Dalai Lama in November. None of this has resulted in any direct punitive response from Beijing.

It’s not just Tibet, either. Since the visa denial incident in 2010, India has witnessed a marked acceleration in its outreach to Taiwan, including hosting several Taiwanese government ministers in 2011; signing new agreements on double taxation avoidance, cultural cooperation, and mutual degree recognition; permitting a former Taiwanese president and vice president transit layovers in 2012 and 2014, respectively; and inviting a former Taiwanese official to address two high-profile international conferences this year. These moves have yet to draw any sharp response from the mainland.

What does India’s approach to the One-China policy tell us about the Trump-Tsai phone call? Namely, that questioning the sanctity of the One-China policy is not necessarily a “death sentence” with Beijing, especially when the challenges are indirect and inexplicit. To date, China’s muted response to the phone call supports that assessment.

To Beijing’s mandarins, Modi represents an unfamiliar commodity: a confident, assertive, nationalist Indian leader with a surplus of political capital. The same is even truer for Trump, who, for China, remains shrouded in a cloak of uncertainty and unpredictability. China’s leadership isn’t nearly as confident that it can predict Trump’s response to each move on the regional chessboard, compared with Barack Obama’s more calculable style, and is naturally inclined to proceed cautiously. After years of testing the “red lines” of its neighbors and Washington as well, Beijing is not nearly as comfortable being on the receiving end.

If the Trump-Tsai exchange was part of a nuanced, calibrated strategy designed to diminish China’s near-monopoly on strategic ambiguity and the initiative it seized during the Obama administration, it could eventually produce a more balanced trilateral relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan.

If, on the other hand, the Trump-Tsai exchange precedes a more indiscriminately vindictive posture toward China using Taiwan as a pressure point, Trump’s team should be prepared for a wide range of potentially volatile, dangerous, and unpredictable Chinese responses.

As a party to more than a dozen meetings in Beijing and Washington with China’s current Taiwan affairs minister, Zhang Zhijun, and to numerous exchanges on Taiwan with some of China’s senior-most diplomats, I find it difficult to overstate the intensity and seriousness Beijing devotes to Taiwan and its status. It is far more sensitive to changes in America’s posture on One-China policy than India, partly because China has never felt particularly threatened by Indian power, and partly because its leadership has more directly linked its legitimacy to the reunification of Taiwan than to any issue related to Tibet.

That doesn’t mean Washington should compromise its values under threat of Chinese coercion: I believe the U.S. president should reserve the right to speak to whomever he likes and at the time of his choosing, whether that’s Taiwan’s president or the Dalai Lama.

Trump and his team appear to have reclaimed that right and, thus far, to have moved the needle on Taiwan without destabilizing ties with China. But for this to be remembered as a shrewd strategic coup, they will have to walk a fine line in creating a new balance in trilateral relations not only more favorable to U.S. and Taiwanese interests but stable enough to prevent an unnecessary war with China in the Western Pacific.

Photo credit: AFP/Stringer