為什麼美國應該給台灣更大支持

（Ajin 開口）

這是美國大選前， AIT前處長司徒文發表的一篇文章。這篇文章的稀奇不在文章本身，而是刊登文章的機構， 居然是屬於保守派的Jewish Policy Center (JPC) 網頁上。

說到遊說機構，在華府JPC可能是榜首，具有最大影響力，聯繫美國小圓帽族群（華爾街，工商業，媒體），以色列和美國國會，白宮之間的最強大機構。

司徒文教授這篇文章可被JPC刊登，表示美國的小圓帽族群是站在台灣這邊的。不過別忘記，季辛吉也是小圓帽，但川普的女婿更是典型奉行正宗猶太教的家庭出身。所以即使都是小圓帽，對中國的意見未必都一致。但最少 JPC是挺台灣的。

https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2016/09/28/taiwan-deserves-stronger-u-s-support/

Why Taiwan Deserves Stronger U.S. Support

為什麼美國應該給台灣更大支持          

司徒文（William A. Stanton 前AIT駐台北處長）

September 28, 2016

（以下谷歌翻譯）

2016年9月28日

台灣是一個現代的奇蹟。在不到四十年的時間裡，台灣從軍事獨裁轉變為充滿活力的民主，從貧窮走向繁榮。它在中國持續的軍事威脅下，幾乎沒有自然資源。然而，它通過其人民的本土智力，教育和辛勤工作，取得了巨大的經濟，政治，社會和技術成就。

台灣在世界的地方

由於台灣是中國大陸的大陸，大多數人不知道台灣的成功，不知道台灣的歷史，低估了台灣的重要性。一些美國人甚至混淆台灣與泰國。儘管如此，儘管與中國相比，台灣在2015年排名為世界總購買力平價（PPP）第22位的國家。按人均PPP計算，台灣排名第29位，排名第29位，排名僅次於德國（28），加拿大（32），法國（38），英國），日本（42）和以色列（55）。 （排名取自在線CIA世界概況。）

其他全球排名也證明了台灣的成功。在2016年的傳統基金會經濟自由指數中，台灣排名第14位，領先於德國（17），日本（22），韓國（27），以色列（35），法國（75）和中國（144）。在2015 - 16年全球經濟論壇競爭力報告中，台灣排名第15位，領先於比利時（19），澳大利亞（21），法國（22），韓國（26），以色列（27）和中國（28）。在世界銀行2016年的“商業輕鬆”排名中，台灣在澳大利亞（13），加拿大（14），德國（15），以色列（54）和中國（84）之前排名第11位。在聯合國發起的2016年“世界幸福報告”中，台灣在157個國家中排名第35，分別位列西班牙（37），意大利（50），日本（53），韓國（58）和中國（83）。

台灣是全球供應鏈中的關鍵環節，特別是在信息和通信技術方面，它是半導體，平板顯示器和軟件開發領域的世界領先者。它也是一個主要的美國貿易夥伴。根據美國統計局的數據，2015年底台灣排名第九，與美國進行雙向貿易，排名甚至超過了印度，台灣是美國食品和農產品的第八大市場，根據美國農業部。

不斷發展的民主

一個強大和仍在發展的民主，台灣自1996年以來舉行了6次自由和公正的總統選舉，擔任總統的政黨改變了三次。它享有一流的國家衛生保健系統，優秀的大學，以及非常低的犯罪率。台灣事實上正是美國的民主，美國花了更多的財富和血液，試圖在伊拉克，阿富汗和其他地方培養。因此，作為亞洲和世界民主轉型的典範，台灣具有巨大的像徵意義。雖然陸地面積相對較小，但台灣仍然大於世界國家和地區的46％，其人口約2340萬人實際上大於世界238個國家和地區的近78％。

儘管台灣取得了非凡的成就，但面對日益強大的中國的威脅，一些評論家認為，台灣不值得繼續得到美國的支持，因為中國聲稱是其領土一部分的島國可能發生軍事衝突。例如，澳大利亞學者休•懷特（Hugh White）認為，“中國在經濟上太重要，軍事上太強大，任何人都無法代表台灣，尤其是當大家都知道中國最終實現統一的決心”時，我們可以想像，但懷特的反應是澳大利亞，一個美國盟友和人口比台灣小的民主成為中國野心的目標。

安全等式：中國

這些論點不僅駁斥了台灣作為經濟上成功的民主的重要性，而且低估了其在東亞太平洋沿岸中心的地緣戰略意義。早在1950年，道格拉斯麥克阿瑟將軍強調了台灣（或稱為福爾摩沙）的戰略意義，以說服杜魯門政府不要為了改善關係而放棄島上的中華民國北京。麥克阿瑟寫道：“共產黨人手中的福摩薩可以比作一個不沉澱的航母和潛艇招標，理想地位於完成蘇聯進攻戰略，同時由美國部隊基於沖繩和菲律賓的反擊行動。

雖然1950年後期“中蘇條約”和朝鮮入侵韓國改變了杜魯門的思想，中美軍事計劃者繼續承認台灣的巨大戰略軍事意義。控制沿太平洋沿岸的海洋需要控制從日本通過台灣到菲律賓的第一條島嶼鏈。台灣是連鎖的中心和關鍵環節。隨著時間的推移，中國的軍事野心已經擴大到包括預計的能力，主導海上美國控制的第二島鏈，在中國海岸以外1800海裡。

中國對這些島嶼鏈的控制將使中國能夠主導日本和韓國的商業和通信的主要海道，以及在領土爭端中獲得巨大的影響，不僅在台灣，而且在南中國海。這些水域的控制具有攻擊性和防禦性。從東南部的新加坡和馬六甲海峽到東北的台灣海峽，南海是世界上最重要的能源和貿易路線之一。根據美國能源信息署的數據，全球原油的近三分之一和全球液化天然氣（LNG）的一半以上通過南中國海，並且擁有同樣巨大的商業貿易量。此外，根據羅伯特•卡普蘭在亞洲大鍋：南海和穩定太平洋的結束，“世界上一半以上的商業船隊噸位通過這些阻塞點[馬六甲，Sund他，龍目島和馬卡薩海峽”，是全球所有海上運輸量的三分之一。

中國：更廣泛的看法

如果中國控制台灣和南海，它將實際上控制東亞的整個太平洋邊緣，而中國邊緣的較小國家將別無選擇，只能成為中國的順從支流國或遭受不服從的後果。因此，不難看出為什麼中華民國對台灣和南海的統治是習近平總統中國“夢想”的一部分。

因此，台灣事實上的主權損失也會破壞亞洲的整個美國聯盟制度以及其他亞洲軍事夥伴關係，這些夥伴關係維護了包括中國在內的東亞國家自朝鮮戰爭以來所享有的和平，穩定和日益繁榮。這就是為什麼大多數亞洲國家歡迎奧巴馬總統的“轉向亞洲”，以及為什麼印度，越南，日本，澳大利亞，新加坡和菲律賓以及美國之間的軍事合作不斷增加。

美國對南海航行自由的承諾以及1979年“台灣關係法”規定的美國對台灣的繼續支持，是我們盟國的“煤礦的金絲雀”。如果美國勉強履行這些承諾，我們的盟國對美國的信心將會蒸發。中國征服日本和韓國的唯一選擇可能是發展核武器，這已經是首爾政界領導人提出的一個問題。

美國幻覺

不幸的是，華盛頓對這些根本的美國利益的關注在過去37年來最不穩定，因為美國共和黨和民主黨政府不斷追求與中國的友好合作關係的幻想。美國對華政策實際上是基於一系列錯誤或短視的假設，包括：

改善與中國關係的地緣戰略論證將成為抵制蘇聯的槓桿（並且也更快結束越南的戰爭）最終被證明是錯誤的。在當今世界最密切的政治和軍事夥伴中，中俄與美國在聯合國安理會和其他地方的利益合作，定期舉行聯合軍事演習。

中美合作的預期具體政策利益很難找到。例如，關於朝鮮擴散的六方會談沒有產生持久的結果，中國一貫削弱或不執行對朝鮮的製裁。儘管北京堅持與台灣統一，它反對朝鮮半島的統一。北京簽署了伊朗核協議，但一個美國政府官員在2015年公開表示，中國沒有表現出“必要的能力和意願”停止其向伊朗非法轉讓敏感技術。

與中國貿易將導致一個更加透明和開放的法治社會的經濟論證被證明是假的，特別是在習近平上台後。

與中國貿易將有利於美國經濟的論點取決於你問誰 - 那些少數有利可圖的商業部門;美國工人失去了對中國的製造業工作，而不是一個更好的選擇;或不滿的美國商人，幾年來一直在向北京美國商會報告他們在與中國做生意時面臨的越來越多的問題和歧視。

誇張美國與中國的關係和我們的共同利益的潛在利益，華盛頓低估或忽視了台灣作為發展中的民主和戰略夥伴的潛力，以及我們共同的價值觀和利益。華盛頓也低估了中國日益增長的威脅。隨著中國軍事力量和其投射能力的迅速擴大，其對鄰國的態度的侵略性也在加強。南海人工島嶼的建設及其軍事化是北京日益增長的敵對態勢的最明顯的證據。

“台灣關係法”

同時，華盛頓一直沒有履行“台灣關係法”規定的義務，“向台灣提供必要數量的國防物品和國防服務，使台灣能夠保持足夠的自衛能力”美國是世界上唯一公然繼續向台灣出售武器和提供軍事訓練和建議的唯一國家，它以一種非常仔細校準的方式這樣做，以不過分打擾中國。因此，台灣的防禦能力不足。

這不是否認台灣本身對中國軍事能力整體下降負有一定責任。儘管在2001年喬治•布什總統批准可能出售柴電潛艇，但國民黨黨領導的立法機構反對當時的陳水扁總統（2000 - 2008年）阻止了必要的資金。隨後，儘管馬英九總統的選舉保證將國內生產總值的3％用於國防，國防開支在他的兩個任期（2008年至2016年）期間下降，因為他認為台灣最好的國防部改善了兩岸關係。儘管馬雲努力與中國建立更好的關係，中國的軍事建設繼續進行，包括更多的針對台灣的導彈和軍事演習對台灣的兩棲攻擊。

更廣泛的視角

然而，確保台灣安全，特別是在蔡英文主席選舉之後，為了“威懾”的目的公開談論防務需要是符合美國利益的。不幸的是，在這個美國總統選舉，唯一的解決台灣問題的候選人是參議員馬裡奧•魯比奧在2015年11月的聲明說：“面對中國強制，美國必須重申其對台灣安全的承諾...台灣的繼續存在作為一個在亞洲中心的充滿活力，繁榮的民主對於美國在那裡的安全利益以及在該區域繼續擴大自由和自由企業至關重要。我們必須做更多的工作來幫助台灣應對來自中國日益增長的軍事威脅。

認識到軍事防禦只是安全的一個方面，參議員魯比奧補充說，“而不是側重於小型雙邊貿易爭端，美國應該推動台灣最終納入額外的國際組織和貿易協議...。台灣是美國最古老，最穩固的安全夥伴之一。我們需要共同努力，追求我們對繁榮，和平和自由的亞洲的共同利益。

然而，諷刺的是，台灣在華盛頓有更強大的遊說，並且在蔣介石通under（Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek）下是軍事獨裁時更強大的美國支持。這必須改變。幸運的是，最近對台灣有一些積極的信號。 3月，奧巴馬總統簽署了立法，要求美國國務卿制定一項戰略，幫助台灣進入國際刑警組織。今年5月，國會通過了一項重申1979年“台灣關係法”和裡根總統1982年對台灣“六項保證”的決議，作為美台關係的基石。

雖然這些是重要的符號信號，我們必須做更多。台灣需要並應得到美國與以色列關係的廣泛支持和政策承諾。與以色列一樣，台灣是一個小但是繁榮和技術先進的民主 - 在戰略重要和敏感的地方，仍然是繼續存在的威脅。

威廉•斯坦頓博士清華大學亞洲政策中心主任。

https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2016/09/28/taiwan-deserves-stronger-u-s-support/

Why Taiwan Deserves Stronger U.S. Support

William A. Stanton 

September 28, 2016

Taiwan is a modern miracle. In less than 40 years Taiwan transformed itself from a military dictatorship into a vibrant democracy and moved from poverty to prosperity. And it did so while under continuing military threat from China and with virtually no natural resources. Nonetheless, it achieved enormous economic, political, social, and technological success, largely through the native intelligence, education, and hard work of its people.

Taiwan’s Place in the World

Overshadowed as Taiwan is by the enormous Chinese mainland, most people are unaware of Taiwan’s success, are ignorant of its history, and underestimate its importance. Some Americans even confuse Taiwan with Thailand. Nonetheless, although small compared to China, Taiwan ranked in 2015 as the country with the 22nd largest GDP in the world in total purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. On  a PPP per capita basis, which is generally regard as the best measure of an economy’s comparative strength, Taiwan ranked 29th, placing it just behind Germany (28) and ahead of Canada (32), France (38), the UK (39), Japan (42), and Israel (55). (Rankings are taken from the online CIA World Factbook.)

Other global rankings are also evidence of Taiwan’s success. In the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom for 2016, Taiwan ranks 14th, ahead of Germany (17), Japan (22), South Korea (27), Israel (35), France (75), and China (144). In the Global Economic Forum Competiveness Report for 2015-16, Taiwan ranks 15th, ahead of Belgium (19), Australia (21), France (22), South Korea (26), Israel (27), and China (28). In the World Banks’s 2016 “Ease of Doing Business” rankings, Taiwan earned 11th place, ahead of Australia (13), Canada (14), Germany (15), Israel (54), and China (84). And in the UN-initiated annual World Happiness Report for 2016, Taiwan ranked 35th out of 157 countries, ahead of Spain (37), Italy (50), Japan (53), South Korea (58), and China (83).

Taiwan is a key link in global supply chains, particularly in information and communications technology, and it is a world leader in semiconductors, flat panel displays, and software development. It is also a major U.S. trading partner. As of the end of 2015, Taiwan ranked 9th in two-way trade with the United States, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, outranking even huge India, and Taiwan was the 8th largest market for U.S. food and agricultural products, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

An Evolving Democracy

A strong and still evolving democracy, Taiwan has held six free and fair presidential elections since 1996 and the political parties holding the presidency have changed three times. It enjoys a first-rate national health care system, excellent universities, and a very low crime rate. Taiwan is in fact precisely the kind of democracy the United States has spent far more treasure and blood futilely trying to nurture in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Taiwan therefore has tremendous symbolic importance as a model of democratic transformation for Asia and the world. While relatively small in land area, Taiwan is still bigger than 46% of world’s nations and territories, and its population of some 23.4 million people is actually larger than nearly 78 percent of the world’s 238 countries and territories.

Despite Taiwan’s extraordinary achievements, some commentators, faced with the threat of an increasingly powerful China, have argued that Taiwan is not worth continuing U.S. support given the possibility of military conflict over the island nation that China claims as part of its territory. Australian academic Hugh White, for example, has argued that “China is simply too important economically, and too powerful militarily, for anyone to confront it on Taiwan’s behalf, especially when everyone knows how determined China is to achieve reunification eventually.” We can imagine, however, White’s reaction should Australia, a U.S. ally and democracy with a slightly smaller population than that of Taiwan, become the target of China’s ambitions.

The Security Equation: China

Such arguments dismiss not only Taiwan’s importance as an economically successful democracy, but also underestimate its geostrategic significance at the center of the East Asian Pacific Rim. As early as 1950, Gen. Douglas MacArthur stressed the strategic importance of Taiwan (or as it was then called, Formosa) in an effort to persuade the Truman Administration not to abandon the Republic of China on the island for the sake of improved relations with Beijing.  MacArthur wrote that “Formosa in the hands of the Communists can be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish Soviet offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate counteroffensive operations by the United States Forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines.”

Although it was the Sino-Soviet Treaty and North Korea’s invasion of South Korea later in 1950 that changed Truman’s thinking, both Chinese and U.S. military planners continue to recognize the enormous strategic military significance of Taiwan. Control of the seas along the Pacific Rim requires control of the first island chain, which reaches from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Taiwan is the central and critical link in the chain. Over time, Chinese military ambitions have expanded to include the projected ability to dominate the sea out to the similarly U.S. controlled second island chain, some 1,800 nautical miles beyond China’s coast.

China’s control of these island chains would enable China to dominate the major sea-lanes of commerce and communication for Japan and Korea, as well to gain enormous leverage in territorial disputes, not only over Taiwan, but also in the South China Sea. Control of these waters has offensive as well as defensive dimensions. Reaching from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in the southwest to the Taiwan Strait in the northeast, the South China Sea is one of the most important energy and trade routes in the world. Almost a third of global crude oil and over half of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) pass through the South China Sea, and it carries an equally enormous volume of commercial trade, according to the U.S. Energy Information Agency. In addition, according to Robert Kaplan in Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, “More than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points [the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits], and a third of all maritime traffic worldwide.

China: The Broader View

If China controlled both Taiwan and the South China Sea, it would in effect control the entire Pacific rim of East Asia, and the smaller countries along China’s periphery would have little choice but to become subservient tributary states of China or to suffer the consequences of disobedience. Thus, it is not hard to see why People’s Republic of China domination of both Taiwan and the South China Sea are part of President Xi Jinping’s Chinese “dream.” 

Taiwan’s loss of de facto sovereignty would therefore also undermine the entire U.S. alliance system in Asia and other Asian military partnerships that have maintained the peace, stability, and increasing prosperity that East Asian countries, including China, have enjoyed since the Korean War. This is why most Asian countries have welcomed President Obama’s “pivot to Asia,” and why there is increasing military cooperation among India, Vietnam, Japan, Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines, and with the United States.

The U.S. commitment to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and continued U.S. support for Taiwan as defined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act are the “canaries in the coal mine” for our allies. Should the United States falter in these commitments, our allies’ confidence in the United States would evaporate. The only alternative to Chinese subjugation for Japan and South Korea might be the development of nuclear weapons, already an issue broached by leading politicians in Seoul.

American Illusions

Unfortunately, Washington’s attention to these fundamental U.S. interests has been inconsistent at best over the past 37 years as U.S. administrations, both Republican and Democratic, continually pursued the ever receding illusion of friendly and cooperative relations with China. U.S. policy toward China has in fact been based on a series of mistaken or shortsighted assumptions, including:

The geostrategic argument that improved relations with China would serve as leverage against the Soviet Union (and also end the war in Vietnam more quickly) ultimately proved wrong. Among the closest political and military partners in the world today, China and Russia cooperate against U.S. interests in the UN Security Council and elsewhere and hold regular joint military exercises. 

The anticipated concrete policy benefits of Sino-U.S. cooperation are hard to find. For example, the Six Party Talks on North Korean proliferation yielded no lasting results, and the PRC has consistently weakened or not enforced sanctions against North Korea. Despite Beijing’s insistence on unification with Taiwan, it opposes reunification of the Korean peninsula. Beijing signed the Iranian nuclear agreement, but a U.S. government official publicly stated in 2015 that China has not demonstrated “the necessary capability and will” to stop its illicit transfers of sensitive technology to Iran.

The economic argument that trade with China would lead to a more transparent and open society based on the rule of law proved false, especially after Xi Jinping came to power.

The argument that trade with China would benefit the U.S. economy depends on who you ask – those few business sectors that have profited; the American workers who lost manufacturing jobs to China rather than a more benign alternative; or the disaffected American business people who for several years running have reported to AmCham Beijing the increasing problems and discrimination they face in doing business with China.

While exaggerating the potential gains of the U.S. relationship with China and our common interests, Washington has underestimated or ignored Taiwan’s potential as a developing democracy and strategic partner, as well as our shared values and interests. Washington also underestimated the growing threat from China. As PRC military power and the ability to project it have rapidly expanded, so too has the aggressiveness of its posture toward its neighbors intensified. The building of artificial islands in the South China Sea and their militarization is the most glaring evidence of Beijing’s increasingly belligerent posture.

The Taiwan Relations Act

Meanwhile, Washington has consistently failed to meet its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” While it is true that the United States is the only country in the world that openly continues to sell weapons to Taiwan and to provide military training and advice, it has done so in a very carefully calibrated way designed not to upset China too much. As a result, Taiwan’s defensive capacity is now inadequate.

This is not to deny that Taiwan itself bears some responsibility for the overall decline in its military capability relative to China. Even though in 2001  President George W. Bush approved the possible sale of diesel-electric submarines, the Kuomintang Party-led legislature in opposition to then President Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) blocked the necessary funding. Subsequently, despite President Ma Ying-jeou’s election pledge to devote 3% of GDP to defense, defense spending declined during his two terms (2008-2016) as he argued that the best defense for Taiwan was improved cross–Strait relations. Despite Ma’s effort’s efforts to forge a better relationship with China, the PRC military build-up continued, including more missiles aimed at Taiwan and military exercises for an amphibious assault against Taiwan.

The Broader Perspective

Nonetheless, it is in the U.S. interest to ensure Taiwan’s security, especially following the election of President Tsai Ing-wen, who now speaks publicly about the need for defense for the purpose of “deterrence.” Unfortunately, in the run-up to this year’s U.S. presidential election, the only candidate who addressed the issue of Taiwan was Senator Mario Rubio who in a November 2015 statement said: “In the face of Chinese coercion, the United States must reassert its commitment to Taiwan’s security… Taiwan’s continued existence as a vibrant, prosperous democracy in the heart of Asia is crucial to American security interests there and to the continued expansion of liberty and free enterprise in the region. We must do more to help Taiwan counter the growing military threat from China.”

Recognizing that military defense is only one aspect of security, Senator Rubio added, “instead of focusing on petty bilateral trade disputes, the United States should be pushing for Taiwan’s eventual inclusion in additional international organizations and trade agreements…. Taiwan is one of America’s oldest and most steadfast security partners. We need to work together to pursue our common interest in an Asia that is prosperous, peaceful, and free.”

Ironically, however, Taiwan had a stronger lobby in Washington and stronger overall American support when it was a military dictatorship under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. This must change. Fortunately, there have recently been some positive signals to Taiwan. In March, President Obama signed legislation that requires the U.S. Secretary of State to develop a strategy to help Taiwan gain entrance into INTERPOL. In May, Congress passed a concurrent resolution reaffirming the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and President Reagan’s 1982 “Six Assurances” to Taiwan as cornerstones of U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Although these are important symbolic signals, we must do more. Taiwan needs and deserves the kind of widespread popular support and policy commitment that underlies the U.S. relationship with Israel. Like Israel, Taiwan is a small but prosperous and technologically advanced democracy – in a strategically important and sensitive location – that remains under continuing existential threat.

William A. Stanton, Ph.D. is Director of the Center for Asia Policy at National Tsing Hua University.