Trump Isn’t Sure If Democracy
Is Better Than Autocracy
《谷歌翻譯》
川普不確定民主優於專制
Stephen M. Walt是哈佛大學Robert和Renée Belfer國際關係教授。
幾十年來有什麼不同呢？早在20世紀90年代中期，美國人（和其他一些人）相當相信，美國式的自由民主是全球未來的潮流。華沙條約已經崩潰，拉美獨裁政權正在投票，人權正在蔓延，自由主義機構風靡一時。弗朗西斯·福山著名描述人類已經到了“歷史的終點”，而湯姆·弗里德曼（Tom Friedman）告訴我們，每個人都必須穿上“金箍盔”，接受DOS資本主義6.0。這個制度的主要範例，當然是美國強大而成功的美國。
可以預見的是，接下來的三位總統都接受並讚揚了這些理想。比爾·克林頓有他的“參與和擴大國家安全戰略”，其目的是盡可能地傳播民主。小布什有他的“自由主義”，尋求“有利於自由的力量均衡”，並發表了第二次就職演說，宣布這是美國的神聖使命。巴拉克·奧巴馬對這一目標採取了更為有力的觀點，但他甚至在利比亞或敘利亞等地推翻了暴君，並在2010年告訴聯合國大會“沒有比選擇領導人的能力更重要的決定權命運“。在過去的二十多年中，美國相信世界正走向更加開放，負責任和民主的治理。
快進到2017年，然而，專制似乎已經流行起來。俄羅斯已經恢復了事實上的專政，自毛澤東以來，中國國家主席習近平鞏固了比任何領導人更多的權力，沙特王儲穆罕默德·本·薩勒曼已經對潛在的對手進行了廣泛的清洗，並將大量的權力掌握在自己手中。埃及再一次受到殘酷和腐敗的軍事專政的統治，土耳其的埃爾多安（Recep Tayyip Erdogan）對記者和學者進行了打擊，清除了政府，並將數千人關入監獄，他正在慢慢扼殺曾經看起來有希望的實驗在溫和的伊斯蘭政府。沒有人知道在一個破碎的敘利亞的殘餘中最終會出現什麼樣的政府，但是它是不會民主的。而匈牙利和波蘭的執政黨正在走向專制的方向，公然否決自由主義的理想，如果今天申請成為歐盟成員國，他們可能沒有資格成為歐盟成員。
同時，美國政府對這些趨勢有什麼看法？在唐納德·特朗普的大多數讚美之詞中。分而治之的國家似乎完全滿意於 - 也許甚至有點嫉妒 - 那些比他（或兩者）更富有或者更有權力的獨裁者，擺脫了不斷受到的那些不便的憲法制約和製衡特朗普的爭執，怪念頭和破壞性的衝動。畢竟，這位總統把我們的司法系統稱為“笑柄”，說他後悔沒有更多的控制權，並且解雇了聯邦調查局局長James Comey，因為他不會向總統提供堅定的個人忠誠，關閉俄羅斯調查。他也是那個建議我們不需要國務院的人，因為“我是唯一一個很重要的人”。現在有一個人認為理想的政府體制是領導人可以隨心所欲地做任何事情的人。對不起，唐納德，但這正是美國人長久以來拒絕的政府體制，許多人為了防止被強加在這里而犧牲了生命。
但是，特朗普並沒有站出來讓美國成為民主的燈塔，而是祝賀習近平獲得了更多的權力，溫順地接受了中國人對新聞界的指責，對於雄心勃勃的沙特王儲（王儲）儘管後者的混亂計劃和反复的外交政策失誤）。事實上，特朗普好像任何好的言論似乎都容易被粗俗的過度表現所迷惑，無法區分美國的利益和大家庭的自身利益。正如愛德華·盧斯（Edward Luce）在“金融時報”上所言的那樣，沙特之家和特朗普之間的親密關係，如果有什麼超過的話。不要忘記，他早些時候與弗拉基米爾·普京（Vladimir Putin）交往，在特朗普被迫淡化的情況下，俄羅斯與特朗普和/或他的顧問在2016年競選活動中相互勾結。
不用說，這種行為與過去的美國實踐是大相徑庭的。可以肯定的是，美國在支持民主方面往往是不一致的，而且在涉及重大戰略問題時，太願意與獨裁者和暴君結盟。但是承認核心政治價值觀和其他利益之間的權衡，有時候贊成後者是一回事，而完全拋棄我們的理想，並且每天踐踏那些踐踏他們的人，是一回事。這樣做也是不好的策略，因為它浪費了過去一直是寶貴的外交資產的東西：即相信美國確實代表著赤裸裸的私利以外的東西，即使其實際表現下降缺乏自稱的理想。
這場財富逆轉並不是人們在冷戰剛剛結束之後所預期的，但也不足為奇。世界主要民主國家在過去的25年中，都沒有因為實力的原因而遭受一系列的自我傷害。美國以虛假的方式入侵伊拉克，扼殺了佔領，隨後遭受了本可以通過更大的監管來避免的金融危機。美國國內的政治秩序變得日益失調，公眾對政治人物的信心下降到了新的低谷（沒有多少理由）。更糟糕的是，幾乎沒有任何後果被追究責任，強化了公眾對一個失去聯繫的自我保護精英的看法，並助長了特朗普如此成功（並迅速被出賣）剝削的民粹主義浪潮。
在歐洲，歐元被證明是一個致命的錯誤，具有深遠的政治後果，而英國退出歐盟的決定既暴露了通過公民投票進行治理的愚蠢行為，也暴露了不斷擴大的英國的統治階級。要讓傑里米·柯賓（Jeremy Corbyn）成為一個有吸引力的替代者，需要很多的無能，但是奈傑爾·法拉日（Nigel Farage），戴維·卡梅隆（David Cameron），特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）和鮑里斯·約翰遜（Boris Johnson）（他們的一些下屬）卻成功地將其取而代之。如果賈斯丁·特魯多和他的加拿大人應該恢復對民主秩序的信任，他們就會為他們裁掉工作。
那麼現在是為民主敲響死亡之機的時候了嗎？如果20世紀是“美國世紀”，2000年代是否會成為一個新的專制時代？沒那麼快首先，大多數專制國家的長期記錄並不是那麼好，尤其是當它們變得更加集中和腐敗，失去了幫助政府糾正錯誤的反饋機制。正如詹姆斯·斯科特（James Scott）在他的著作“看似一個國家”（Seeing Like a State）中所記載的那樣，專制和大野心的結合通常會導致社會工程方面的努力，造成巨大的人類痛苦，但不會產生預期的結果。
而且，特朗普的許多獨裁者似乎也很佩服，也沒有特別輝煌的往績記錄。土耳其從“零鄰居問題”轉向幾乎所有問題，土耳其經濟可能面臨越來越多的問題（和潛在的人才流失），因為埃爾多安收緊。普京在一些相對較小的領域表現出色，但他沒有做任何事情來振興俄羅斯疲軟的經濟或解決其內部的社會問題（健康，預期壽命等），俄羅斯勢必隨著時間的推移而日益衰弱。埃及仍然是一場災難，穆罕默德·本·薩勒曼（Mohammed bin Salman）對沙特政治秩序進行重組的雄心勃勃的努力仍然是一場長期的賭博。此外，穆罕默德·本·薩勒曼對外交政策的無能為力也導致了也門失敗，與卡塔爾的對峙，黎巴嫩的新興危機，以及沙特的主要競爭對手伊朗的更多機會。即使中國在這方面的表現也有嚴重的問題，我甚至認為，習近平簽名的“一帶一路”倡議最終會失敗。
美國和其他民主國家在過去的二十年中運行得相當糟糕（部分原因是因為它們狀況良好，可能會變得愚蠢），但是它們仍然有自我糾正的能力（如最近的選舉弗吉尼亞州和新澤西州建議）。值得一提的是，美國從2008年危機中恢復得比其他任何人都快，這是奧巴馬從來沒有獲得足夠信貸的成就。
此外，修正美國目前的疾病並不需要徹底的改革（儘管放棄選舉學院和減少金錢的作用將會有所幫助）。你可以通過合理的稅收改革來做很多事情（輕微減少企業稅，消除商業和富人最嚴重的漏洞等），嚴重的基礎設施計劃（似乎完全從特朗普的政策議程中消失了），更大的克制在外交政策上（而不是孤立主義），也許對現有的權利作一些調整。
簡而言之，美國人的好消息是，這個國家的命運仍然掌握在我們手中。我們不能保證我們將解決目前的困境，重新獲得冷戰結束時的魔咒，我甚至會主張拒絕那種傲慢自大的態度，把我們的政治基礎放在理想主義的幻想上，更多地放在現實主義的感覺上在國內外。事實上，我決定結束目前的藍/紅分裂，恢復對我們政治的更大的禮貌，這可能要等到我們拿到POTUS46。但是現在賣空我們的民主還為時過早，我希望現任總統不要像現在這樣做。
Stephen M. Walt是哈佛大學Robert和RenéeBelfer國際關係教授。
原文：
Trump Isn’t Sure If Democracy
Is Better Than Autocracy
America's president is
voluntarily abdicating one of the country's biggest strategic advantages.
Stephen
M. Walt November 13, 2017, 10:38 AM
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert
and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
What a difference a couple of
decades make. Back in the early to mid-1990s, Americans (and some others) were
pretty much convinced that U.S.-style liberal democracy was the wave of the
future worldwide. The Warsaw Pact had crumbled, Latin American dictatorships
were turning to the ballot box, human rights were spreading, and liberal
institutions were all the rage. Francis Fukuyama famously described mankind as
having reached the “end
of history,” and Tom Friedman was telling us everyone had to don the “Golden
Straightjacket” and embrace DOSCapitalism 6.0. The main exemplar of this
system, of course, was the mighty and successful U.S. of A.
Predictably, the next three
presidents all embraced and extolled these ideals. Bill Clinton had his “National
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” whose stated purpose
was to spread democracy wherever we could. George W. Bush had his “Liberty
Doctrine,” sought a “balance
of power that favors freedom,” and gave a 2nd Inaugural Address that declared this to be
America’s sacred mission. Barack Obama took a more measured view of this goal,
but even he worked to topple tyrants in places like Libya or Syria and told the United Nations General Assembly in 2010
“there is no right more fundamental than the ability to choose your leaders and
determine your destiny.” For the past 20-plus years, the United States believed
the world was headed toward more open, accountable, and democratic governance.
Fast-forward to 2017, however,
and autocracy seems back in vogue. Russia has reverted to de facto
dictatorship, Chinese President Xi Jinping has consolidated more power than any
leader since Mao, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has undertaken a
wide-ranging purge of potential opponents and consolidated vast power in his
own hands. Egypt is once again governed by a brutal and corrupt military
dictatorship, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey has cracked down on
journalists and academics, purged the government, and put thousands in jail,
and he is slowly strangling what once seemed to be a promising experiment in
moderate Islamic government. No one quite knows what sort of government will
eventually emerge in the remnants of a shattered Syria, but it is a safe bet it
won’t be democratic. And the ruling parties in Hungary and Poland are headed in
authoritarian directions, openly rejecting liberal ideals, and would probably
be ineligible for European Union membership if they were applying for it today.
Meanwhile, what does the United
States government have to say about these trends? Under Donald Trump, mostly
words of praise. The Divider-in-Chief seems entirely comfortable with — and
maybe even a little envious of — the various autocrats who are richer or more
powerful than he is (or both) and free from those inconvenient constitutional
constraints and checks and balances that keep getting in the way of Trump’s
feuds, whims, and destructive impulses. This is the president, after all, who
called our justice system a “laughingstock,” said he regretted not having more
control over it, and fired FBI head James Comey because he wouldn’t offer the
president unswerving personal loyalty and shut down the Russia investigation.
He’s also the guy who suggested we don’t really need a State Department because
“I’m the only one that matters.” Now there’s a guy who thinks the ideal system
of government is one where a leader gets to do whatever he wants. Sorry,
Donald, but that’s precisely the system of government that Americans have long
rejected and that many sacrificed their lives to prevent being imposed here.
But instead of standing up for
America as a beacon of democracy, Trump congratulated Xi Jinping on his acquisition of even
more power, meekly accepted Chinese dictates about talking to the
press, and has nothing but good things to say about the ambitious Saudi crown
prince (despite the latter’s chaotic program and repeated foreign-policy
blunders). Indeed, like any good parvenu, Trump seems easily dazzled by vulgar
displays of excess and unable to distinguish between the interests of the
United States and the self-interest of his extended family. As Edward Luce
sagely observed in the Financial Times, the affinity between the House of
Saud and the House of Trump is if anything over-determined. And don’t forget
his earlier bromance with Vladimir Putin, which Trump has been forced to
downplay amid continuing suspicions of collusion between Russia and Trump
and/or his advisors back in the 2016 campaign.
Needless to say, this behavior
is a sharp departure from past U.S. practice. To be sure, the United States has
often been inconsistent in its support for democracy and all-too-willing to
ally with dictators and tyrants when there were important strategic issues at
stake. But it is one thing to acknowledge tradeoffs between core political
values and other interests and sometimes to favor the latter, and quite another
to cast off our ideals completely and rush to praise those who trample on them
daily. To do so is also bad strategy, as it squanders something that has been a
valuable diplomatic asset in the past: namely, the belief that the United
States did in fact stand for something other than naked self-interest, even if
its actual performance fell short of its own professed ideals.
This reversal of fortune is not
what people expected in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, but it is also
not surprising. Instead of moving from strength to strength, the world’s major
democracies have all suffered a series of self-inflicted wounds over the past 25
years. The United States invaded Iraq on false pretenses, bungled the
occupation, and then suffered a financial crisis that could have been avoided
with greater regulatory oversight. America’s domestic political order became
increasingly dysfunctional, with public confidence in politicians sinking to
new lows (and without considerable justification). Even worse, hardly anyone of
consequence was held accountable for these screw-ups, reinforcing public
perceptions of an out-of-touch and self-protective elite and fueling the
populist wave that Trump exploited so successfully (and quickly betrayed).
In Europe, the creation of the
euro proved to be a fatal mistake with far-reaching political consequences, and
the British decision to exit the EU has exposed both the follies of trying to
govern via referendum and the ever-expanding circle of ineptitude in the
British ruling class. It takes a lot of incompetence to make Jeremy Corbyn an
attractive alternative, but the toxic combination of Nigel Farage, David Cameron,
Theresa May, and Boris Johnson (along a few of their subordinates) have managed
to pull it off. If Justin Trudeau and his fellow Canadians are supposed to
restore faith in democratic orders, they’ve got their work cut out for them.
So is it time to sound the
death knell for democracy? If the 1900s were the “American Century,” will the
2000s be a new Age of Autocracy? Not so fast. For one thing, the long-run track
record of most autocracies isn’t that great, especially as they become more
centralized and corrupt and lose the feedback mechanisms that help governments
correct mistakes. As James Scott documented in his wonderful book Seeing Like a State, a combination of autocracy and
vast ambition usually results in efforts at social engineering that cause great
human suffering but do not yield the promised results.
Moreover, many of the
dictatorships Trump seems to admire don’t have particularly glowing track records
either. Turkey has gone from “zero problems with neighbors” to problems with
nearly all of them, and the Turkish economy is likely to face growing problems
(and a potential brain drain) as Erdogan tightens his grip. Putin has played a
weak hand well in a couple of relatively minor arenas, but he’s done nothing to
revitalize Russia’s weak economy or fix its internal social issues (health,
life expectancy, etc.), and Russia is bound to grow ever weaker over time.
Egypt is still a disaster, and Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitious effort to
re-engineer the Saudi political order is still a long-shot gamble. Moreover,
Mohammed bin Salman’s inept handling of foreign policy has led to a failed war
in Yemen, a bungled confrontation with Qatar, an emerging crisis in Lebanon,
and even more opportunities for the Saudis’ arch-rival, Iran. Even China’s
otherwise impressive performance contains serious problems, and I’d even bet
that Xi’s signature “One Belt One Road” initiative will be mostly a failure in
the end.
The United States and other
democracies have had a pretty bad run over the past two decades (in part
because they were in such good shape they could afford to be stupid), but they
retain a capacity for self-correction (as the recent elections in Virginia and
New Jersey suggest). It is also worth remembering that the United States
recovered faster from the 2008 crisis than almost anyone else, an achievement
for which Barack Obama never got enough credit.
Furthermore, fixing America’s
current malaise need not require radical reforms (although abandoning the
Electoral College and diminishing the role of money would help). You could do a
lot by a sensible tax reform (reducing corporate taxes
slightly, eliminating the most egregious loopholes for business and the
wealthy, etc.), a serious infrastructure plan (which seems to have disappeared
entirely from Trump’s policy agenda), greater restraint in foreign policy (but
not isolationism), and perhaps some adjustments to existing entitlements.
The good news for Americans, in
short, is that the country’s fate is still mostly in our hands. There is no
guarantee that we will fix the current tailspin and regain the mojo we had when
the Cold War ended, and I’d even argue for rejecting that level of hubris and
basing our politics less on idealistic fantasies and more on a sense of realism
at home and abroad. Indeed, I’d settle for ending the current blue/red division
and restoring a greater sense of civility to our politics, which may have to
wait till we get POTUS46. But it’s too soon to sell our democracy short, and
I’d like our current president to stop acting as if he already had.
Stephen M. Walt is the
Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard
University.
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