“理想主義者” 基辛格 ？？？

(Ajin 開口)

不管學界，政界如何地推崇，或評斷季辛吉，俺斬釘截鐵對季老仙的一句概括論定：
「他的視線死角在於無法體認孔儒文化與中華族觀。他的整個理論也就因此建立在一個錯誤假設，導致錯估整個大局！」

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001064809?full=y

2015年12月04日 07:12 AM

“理想主義者”基辛格

牛津大學名譽校長 彭定康 為英國《金融時報》撰稿

《基辛格1923-1968年：理想主義者》(Kissinger: 1923-1968: The Idealist)

作者：尼爾•弗格森(Niall Ferguson)

牛津萬靈學院(All Souls College,Oxford)歷史學家羅恩•巴特勒(Rohan Butler)在為法國政治家舒瓦瑟爾(Choiseul)所寫傳記的第一卷末尾寫道（第1078頁）：“舒瓦瑟爾公爵的外交與政治生涯剛剛開始。”

可惜，巴特勒還沒來得及繼續書寫這部傳記就去世了。我們一定期待同樣的命運不要降臨到尼爾•弗格森(Niall Ferguson)這位為一名偉大的“國際公僕”、學者撰寫鴻篇傳記的作者身上。這部傳記長達近1000頁，結尾時才寫到1968年亨利•基辛格(Henry Kissinger)在華府首次被委以重任——擔任總統理查德•尼克松(Richard Nixon)的國家安全顧問。起飛前滑跑了很長一段距離。

這不是質疑基辛格在20世紀歷史中的重要性和知名度。現年92歲的基辛格是美國全球霸主時代的偉大人物之一。無怪乎他在先後擔任國家安全顧問和國務卿期間曾15次登上《時代》(Time)雜志封面。此外，在1977年卸任後的幾十年裡，他依然繼續受到明星般的關注。這部分是由於他任職時的作為使他成為陰謀論者的隱秘寵兒；這本傳記的下一卷想必會談及此類爭議。基辛格對公共辯論（一直持續到今日）經常性、權威的干預也使自己成為公眾關注的焦點。

他提出自己的觀點，不僅是作為一名經驗豐富的外交官，還是一名優秀的歷史學家。也許正是後面這一點吸引了弗格森——哈佛大學(Harvard University)歷史系教授、紙媒和電子媒體活躍的撰稿人。他對傳記對像的早期學術著作進行了廣泛的分析並且大量引用，仿佛這一切理所當然會揭示出當基辛格在總統權力之下轉變成世界最強大政府核心圈子中的一位政策制定者時可能具有的行事作風。這些段落實際的作用是提醒我們，基辛格並非生活在價值中立之域；他顯然受斯賓諾莎(Spinoza)和康德(Kant)的影響比受到馬基雅維利(Machiavelli)的影響更大。

但我們可以從基辛格從政多年之後的著述中更多地了解他的策略和戰略。例如，通過閱讀1994年出版的經典著作《大外交》(Diplomacy)，你可以了解他作為一個政策制定者頭腦中的先占觀念。該書闡述了為現代世界帶來最持久穩定的兩個國際體系的重要相似之處：1815年至1914年之間的“歐洲協調”(Concert of Europe)以及二戰後美國主導的體系。如今，通向世界秩序的道路更加難以辨別和前行。

基辛格從巴伐利亞——那裡的猶太社區遭到納粹團伙的恐嚇——的工業城鎮菲爾特(Furth)來到富蘭克林•德拉諾•羅斯福(Franklin Delano Roosevelt)領導下的、“快樂的日子又回來了”時期的紐約，這段個人旅程可以讓我們對他的價值觀和勇氣有很大的了解。起初，他對自己的新家園的感情是相當矛盾的。在1939年寫給一個朋友的信中，他寫道，像其他許多首次踏入美國的歐洲人一樣，他不得不在自己贊美的事情與譴責的事情之間保持平衡：“除了過量的財富、極端的貧困。然後就是個人主義！你完全只能靠自己，沒人在乎你，你不得不自己往上爬。”

這正是他所做的：首先，作為一名公民和士兵在歐洲戰鬥，然後，作為一份子，參與了戰後非納粹化運動，並在集中營發現了納粹主義對數百萬猶太人、同性戀者及其他少數族群來說意味著什麼。他細致地向自己的父母解釋，為什麼自己的工作不應該涉及追求復仇。公正與堅強同樣重要；他並沒有失去對德國是歐洲文明中心的堅定信念。他曾指示那些為他工作的人“不要失去任何機會以言行證明我們理想的堅不可摧”。

回到美國後，像另外200萬美國軍人一樣，基辛格依靠《退伍軍人法》(GI Bill)獲得了獎學金進入哈佛大學——帶著一條小獵狗Smoky。他的同輩中人才濟濟，其中許多人後來在政治、新聞和公共服務領域身居要職。他主修政府管理，但撰寫了一篇名為《歷史的意義》(The Meaning of History)的長篇論文。然後，他開始了多年的激烈論戰，這在充滿競爭的學術界是很常見的，辯論的激烈程度往往與議題的重要性成反比。

像其他雄心勃勃的學者一樣，基辛格不停地穿梭於波士頓與華盛頓之間，向任何願意傾聽他的人給出自己的建議，無論他們是哪個政黨的。他很反感蘇聯在歐洲施加權力和影響力的計劃——如建議德國在中立的基礎上實現重新統一。他對德國政治以及德國對歐洲大陸其他地區的戰略重要性有深刻的認識，而且在飛往歐洲時總是傾向於先到波恩和柏林，甚至巴黎，之後才到倫敦。

弗格森認為，說到基辛格在德國事務上的洞見，他的問題在於，相對其國籍所在的美國，他更了解自己出生的國家。本傳記的作者認為，直到1959年，在美國50個州中，基辛格到過的可能不到10個。這必然導致了他的一個主要盲區：他無法理解為何富有貴族氣派的納爾遜•洛克菲勒(Nelson Rockefeller)州長——他曾投效此人——越來越不可能在共和黨中吸引多數支持，這個政黨當時很輕易地在轉向右傾立場。他被1964年共和黨全國代表大會上巴裡•戈德華特(Barry Goldwater)的右翼支持者狂熱的偏執嚇到了，就像他後來震驚於大學校園裡各種奇怪的反越戰活動一樣。

基辛格首次成名源於他關於核戰爭中戰術的著作，這讓他獲得了“奇愛博士”(Dr Strangelove)的不公正聲譽。平心而論，他試圖要解決的問題是在很多人看來難以置信的美國安全政策的基礎，即如果美國的利益或其盟友（如德國）的利益受到嚴重威脅，那麼大規模的核報復將成為必然的回應。在學術層面，很難想像地球上有人能嚴肅地考慮迎接世界末日，如果（比方說）莫斯科過於逼迫柏林的話。基辛格認為，每一種威脅都應以適當力度應對；可以用小型核武器應對較小的威脅。但使用小型的所謂的戰術核武器不會帶來災難性後果的說法無法令人信服。從任何意義上講，由此帶來的後果都可能無法控制。

如果上述情況發生的話，可以進行靈活的政策回應，就像約翰•肯尼迪(John F Kennedy)總統所做的，將可信的軍事威脅與富有想像力的外交結合起來，在不會毀掉整個世界的情況下結束古巴導彈危機。至於冷戰期間的其他危機，它們受到莫斯科與華盛頓都具有的一種相同認識的制約——在安全事務上任何過火的企圖都會導致“相互確保摧毀”(mutually assured destruction)。這項政策被恰當地縮寫成“MAD”（瘋狂），正如其名。近年來，基辛格加入了其他前美國外交政策及安全官員的行列，倡導銷毀所有核武器。

弗格森反對一種流行看法——基辛格是一名終極務實的現實主義者、一個與用理想塑造並貫穿自己行動的人士截然相反的類型——的論述尤其令人信服。當然，根據情況，在某一刻務實、在下一刻又成為一個理想主義者也是可能、明智的。的確，正如托尼•布萊爾(Tony Blair)的職業生涯所展現的，有時甚至可能（即使令人困惑）出現在同一時間被兩種思想意識所左右的情況。這位英國前首相在對那些踐踏本國公民人權的國家進行干預時提出的理由就是這樣的。在弗格森看來，基辛格是主流的歐洲保守派，由康德的關於人性的現實主義和伯克(Burke)的對歷史力量的尊重所塑造。“這是保守主義的困境，”基辛格曾寫道，“不得不匿名進行革命鬥爭，用其實質，而非其對外所宣稱的。”基辛格關於如何處理戰後德國、如何遏制蘇聯的野心以及如何表述美國的外交和安全政策的觀點都既有實用主義的精神，也有道德和理想主義的內核。

如前所述，基辛格的盲區包括缺乏對美國民主政治的了解，這無疑導致了他與尼克松之間的看似不可能的聯盟。他曾經為肯尼迪和約翰遜效力，在為後者工作時，被越南人圓滑的外交手腕所迷惑，可敬地尋求促成一項可使美國避免一場可怕的分裂戰爭的和平協議。他一定會喜歡為洛克菲勒政府工作，而且在這位億萬富翁政治家的總統夢最終破碎之前貢獻了許多好的觀念。一個更加雄心勃勃的人可能在那很久之前就已經放棄了洛克菲勒號這艘船。然後尼克松——狡猾但聰明的迪克——幾乎在偶然之中向他伸出了他不可能拒絕的橄欖枝。歷史中的偶然因素又一次發揮了作用。

尼克松與基辛格一樣崇拜偉大歷史人物。在我看來，基辛格本人過於誇大了夏爾•戴高樂(Charles de Gaulle)的地緣政治智慧。就像他的新主人一樣，他正確地看到了毛澤東——一個可怕的暴君、但又是一個龐大國家的領導人，這個國家在二戰後部分源於其領導層的殘酷統治而團結起來——的巨大重要性。中國有巨大的潛力和希望。尼克松可能比基辛格更清楚地看到了中國的經濟重要性，基辛格似乎從來對國內生產總值(GDP)推算、出口數據和人口結構這些東西不太在行。尼克松明白，越南問題對美國而言是一個極具破壞性的使人分心的問題，因為資本主義必然將戰勝共產主義，而且全球化將創造一個不同的、但不那麼兩極化的世界。如何最有效地擺脫越南並將中國吸引到不斷變化的全球秩序中？對1968年在華盛頓結成的伙伴——“不相配的一對”——而言，這些都是占主導地位的主題。

弗格森只講述到這裡。他在最後一段告訴我們，對基辛格而言，“變為……的時代已經結束”；“作為……的時代終於開始”。這種基調類似於巴特勒對舒瓦瑟爾的評價。我們可以確定的是，敘述“作為……的時代”的未來卷將比本卷激起更多爭議。討厭基辛格的人士一定在數著日子。因此，下一次，激情將會更加高漲；刀劍將要出鞘；結論將會做出，過於簡單地要求對一個非常了不起的政治家的從政生涯做出評判，而他就像我們這些人一樣（但在全球層面上）試圖設法解決作為人類所面臨的困境。

彭定康(Lord Patten)是牛津大學名譽校長。他曾擔任歐盟外交事務專員、香港末任總督

攝影 艾略特•厄韋特(Elliott Erwitt)/瑪格南圖片社(Magnum)

譯者/申凱

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0a69b8b8-5c73-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html

September 18, 2015 1:27 pm

‘Kissinger’, by Niall Ferguson

Chris Patten

In his account of a journey from Bavaria to the heart of power in Washington, Niall Ferguson portrays his subject as a man driven by principle more than pragmatism

The All Souls historian Rohan Butler concluded the first volume of his biography of the French statesman Choiseul with this sentence on page 1,078: “The diplomatic and political career of the Duke of Choiseul had begun.”

Alas, Butler died before he was able to continue the story. We must hope that the same fate does not befall Niall Ferguson, the author of this huge biography of a great international public servant and scholar. Weighing in at close to 1,000 pages, it ends at the moment in 1968 when Henry Kissinger gets his first big job in a Washington administration, as national security adviser to President Richard Nixon. The runway to take-off stretches a very long way.

This is not to contest Kissinger’s importance and notoriety in 20th-century history. Now 92, he is one of the giants of America’s years of global pre-eminence. No wonder he appeared 15 times on the cover of Time magazine during his period as national security adviser and then secretary of state. Moreover, he continued to attract celebrity attention for decades after leaving office in 1977. This is partly because of his record in government, which made him the dark darling of conspiracy theorists; the next volume of this biography will presumably cover some of these controversies. Kissinger has also been kept in the spotlight by his regular and authoritative interventions in public debate, which continue to this day.

He offers his views not just as an experienced diplomat but also as a fine historian. This perhaps lured Ferguson — a professor of history at Harvard University and a ubiquitous contributor to the written and electronic media — into extensive analysis of and quotation from his subject’s early academic work, as if it all pointed the way inexorably to what he would do when transformed by presidential authority into a policymaker at the heart of the most powerful government in the world. What these passages admittedly do is to remind us that Kissinger’s life is not a value-free zone; he was clearly shaped more by Spinoza and Kant than by Machiavelli.

But we can understand more about Kissinger’s tactics and strategy from what he wrote after his years in office. You learn about his preoccupations as a policymaker, for example, by reading his masterlyDiplomacy (1994). This draws significant parallels between the two international systems that have brought the modern world the greatest stability: the Concert of Europe that existed between 1815 and 1914, and the system dominated by the US after the second world war. Today the route to world order is more difficult to discern and navigate.

Kissinger’s personal journey from the industrial town of Fürth in Bavaria, whose Jewish community was terrorised by Nazi gangs, to the “Happy Days Are Here Again” years of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New York tells us much about his own values and fortitude. He was initially quite ambivalent about his new home. Writing to a friend in 1939 he noted, as have many other Europeans on their first encounter with the US, that he had to balance things he admired against things he deplored: “Alongside excessive wealth, unspeakable poverty. And then this individualism! You stand completely on your own, no one cares about you, you have to make your own way upwards.”

That is exactly what he did, first as a soldier-citizen fighting in Europe, then as one of those who managed the denazification campaign after the war’s end and the discovery in the concentration camps of what Nazism had meant for millions of Jews, homosexuals and other minorities. He explained thoughtfully to his parents why his job should not involve the pursuit of vengeance. It was vital to be fair as well as tough; nor did he lose his profound sense of the centrality of Germany to European civilisation. He had instructed those who worked for him to “lose no opportunity to prove by word and deed the virility of our ideals”.

Returning to America, Kissinger, like 2m other American servicemen, took advantage of the GI Bill to go to university on a Harvard scholarship — in his case accompanied by a cocker spaniel, Smoky. His peer group was rich in talent that took many of its members to the top in politics, journalism and public service. He majored in government but wrote his immensely long thesis on “The Meaning of History”. Then began the years of hand-to-hand combat common to so many competitive academic careers, where the ferocity of the argument is often in inverse proportion to the importance of the subject.

Kissinger was initially quite ambivalent about the US. ‘Alongside excessive wealth, unspeakable poverty,’ he wrote. ‘And then this individualism!’

Like other ambitious academics, Kissinger pitched his tent in “BosWash”, travelling backwards and forwards from Harvard to Washington to give his advice to any who would listen, regardless of their political affiliations. He was deeply hostile to the Soviet Union’s scheme for exerting its power and influence on Europe, for example by its proposal for a reunification of Germany on the basis of that country’s neutrality. He had a deep knowledge of German politics, as well as of the country’s strategic importance to the rest of its continent, and was always inclined to give precedence in his transatlantic travels to Bonn and Berlin, and even Paris, over London.

Ferguson argues that for all Kissinger’s expertise in German affairs, his problem was that he knew more about his country of birth than he did about the country of his citizenship. As late as 1959, the biographer suggests, Kissinger had probably visited fewer than 10 of America’s 50 states. This must have contributed to one of his major blind spots: his inability to understand that the aristocratic Governor Nelson Rockefeller, to whom he hitched his wagon, was increasingly unlikely to attract majority support in a Republican party that was moving at a canter to the right. He was horrified by the rabid intolerance of rightwing Barry Goldwater supporters at the 1964 Republican convention, just as he was later shocked by the antics of the anti-Vietnam war left on university campuses.

Kissinger became notorious for the first time through his writings on the tactics of nuclear warfare, which left him with the unjust reputation of a Dr Strangelove. To be fair to him, he was wrestling with what seemed to many to be the implausible basis of America’s security policy, namely that if its interests or those of an ally such as Germany were seriously threatened then massive nuclear retaliation would be the inevitable response. At an intellectual level it was impossible to imagine that anyone could seriously contemplate visiting Armageddon on the planet if, say, Moscow pushed too hard on Berlin. Kissinger argued that each threat should be dealt with at an appropriate level; the response to a smaller threat could be a smaller nuclear device. But it was not convincing that you could use smaller so-called tactical nuclear weapons without catastrophic consequences. The fallout in every sense could not be contained.

As it happened, it was possible to conduct a policy of flexible response, as President John F Kennedy did, combining credible military threats with imaginative diplomacy to end the Cuban missile crisis without blowing up the world. As for the other crises of the cold war, they were contained by the realisation, in Moscow as in Washington, that mutually assured destruction would follow any attempt to overplay a security hand. The policy was turned suitably enough into the acronym “MAD”, which it was. In recent years, Kissinger has joined other former American foreign policy and security officials to advocate beginning the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Ferguson is particularly convincing in arguing against the popular view that Kissinger is the ultimate pragmatic realist, a polar opposite to those whose ideals shape and infuse their actions. It is of course possible and sensible to be pragmatic at one moment and an idealist the next, according to circumstance. Indeed as Tony Blair’s career demonstrated, it is even possible, if confusing, sometimes to be motivated by both sentiments at the same time. That was the case with the former British prime minister’s arguments for intervention in states that abused their citizens’ human rights. For Ferguson, Kissinger is a mainstream European conservative, moulded by Kant’s realism about humanity and by Burke’s respect for historical forces. “It is the dilemma of conservatism,” Kissinger once wrote, “that it must fight revolution anonymously, by what it is, not by what it says.” Kissinger’s views on how to handle postwar Germany, how to hold at bay Soviet ambitions, and how to articulate American foreign and security policy all had a moral and idealistic as well as a practical core.

As noted earlier, Kissinger’s blind spots included knowledge of American democratic politics, which certainly contributed to his unlikely alliance with Nixon. He had previously worked for both Kennedy and Johnson, in the latter case being led up the garden path by wily Vietnamese diplomacy in the honourable pursuit of a peace deal that would enable the US to escape from a terrible and divisive war. He would have liked to work for a Rockefeller administration, and contributed much good sense to the governor up to and beyond the point at which the billionaire politician’s presidential ambitions were finally sunk. A more cynically ambitious man might have abandoned the Rockefeller ship long before that. And then Nixon — tricky, but pretty clever, Dicky — almost accidentally made him an offer which he could not possibly refuse. The contingent factor in history took another bow.

Nixon shared Kissinger’s admiration for big historical figures. Kissinger himself rather exaggerated, in my view, the geopolitical wisdom of Charles de Gaulle. He was surely correct, like his new master, to see the huge significance of Mao, an appalling tyrant but the leader of a vast country that had held together after the war partly thanks to the ruthlessness of its leadership. China had mighty potential and promise. Nixon probably saw its economic significance more clearly than Kissinger, who never seems quite at home in the world of gross domestic product extrapolations, export figures and demography. The president understood that Vietnam was an appallingly damaging diversion for the US, since capitalism was inevitably going to trump communism and since globalisation would create a different and less polarised world. How best to get out of Vietnam and draw China into a changing global order? These were to be dominant subjects for the partnership of the “odd couple” formed in Washington in 1968.

This is where Ferguson leaves us. His last paragraph tells us that “the time of becoming was over” for Kissinger; “the time of being had at last begun”. The sentiment echoes Rohan Butler on Choiseul. What we can be sure of is that future volumes about “the time of being” will excite a lot more controversy than this one. Kissingerphobes must be counting the days. So next time passions will run much higher; knives will be out; judgment will be reached and simplistically demanded about the career in office of a very remarkable statesman, who like the rest of us (but on a global scale) tried to wrestle with the predicament of what it is to be human.