(Ajin 開口)
感謝X大大報碼底下辣媽希拉蕊這篇書評。她的書評倒是比較像是藉著老季的新書來為她自己大選所作的宣傳。
若由俺來作書評的話,老季這本書一個非常重要且必須面對解決的就是:小歐,老季,辣媽他們三位都一致地推行且堅持美國價值,而這價值又這麼合乎人類理想,公義,自由,為何美國價值無法伸張?更慘的是,阻力不但絲毫沒有減少,而且越來越大,越多,為何?
辣媽的書評一直強調老季說啥,她贊成啥。但最關鍵是出在1970年美國政策。到底是老季影響尼克森,或是尼克森影響老季,不管是怎樣,一直到2000年之間,美國扶植北京的經濟發展 (藉著大量進口中國貨品而奠定中國成為世界工廠的地位) 讓北京有足夠累積資本的空間,進而往世界各角落發展投資,並提升軍事力, 是所有當今世界問題的始作俑者,也是病毒擴散傳播的開端。
辣媽,小歐,老季,犯了一個大錯,他們認為,只要是採用山姆體制,遲早就會呈現山姆價值,這是錯到離譜的假設。北京經濟的崛起就是帶來顛覆美國價值根本緣由。換句話說,學習你美國價值的目的不外乎是要打倒美帝體制在世界的地位,而讓我北京來左右。這點,辣媽沒有碰觸,而老季當然更不敢碰了。他們將北京經濟的崛起看成一種自然現象,而完全丟棄美國在這方面的助長紂虐。老季不敢承認他在70年代的理論是完全假設錯誤了,而把這些當做事過境遷的現象而已。
那麼再來從另一角度來看,若沒有老季敲開土龍大門,開啟中國吸金機的話,中國目前會如何?一個可以大膽推論的,中國的經濟發展速度絕對不會翻倍地增長,會呈現慢速成長,而從這,中國或許會自我更精密地發展出另一套經濟體系,而不是採用山姆體制來以牙還牙。
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Hillary Clinton reviews Henry
Kissinger’s ‘World Order’
By Hillary Rodham
Clinton September 4 at 3:00 PM
Hillary RodhamClinton
was the 67th secretary of state.
Hillary Rodham
When Americans look around the
world today, we see one crisis after another. Russian aggression in Ukraine, extremism and chaos in Iraq and Syria, a deadly epidemic in West Africa, escalating territorial
tensions in the East and South China seas, a global
economy that still isn’t producing enough growth or shared prosperity — the
liberal international order that the United States has worked for generations
to build and defend seems to be under pressure from every quarter. It’s no
wonder so many Americans express uncertainty and even fear about our role and
our future in the world.
In his new book, “World Order,” Henry Kissinger explains the
historic scope of this challenge. His analysis, despite some differences over
specific policies, largely fits with the broad strategy behind the Obama
administration’s effort over the past six years to build a global architecture
of security and cooperation for the 21st century.
During the Cold War, America’s
bipartisan commitment to protecting and expanding a community of nations
devoted to freedom, market economies and cooperation eventually proved
successful for us and the world. Kissinger’s summary of that vision sounds
pertinent today: “an inexorably expanding cooperative order of states observing
common rules and norms, embracing liberal economic systems, forswearing
territorial conquest, respecting national sovereignty, and adopting
participatory and democratic systems of governance.”
This system, advanced by U.S.
military and diplomatic power and our alliances with like-minded nations,
helped us defeat fascism and communism and brought enormous benefits to
Americans and billions of others. Nonetheless, many people around the world
today — especially millions of young people — don’t know these success stories,
so it becomes our responsibility to show as well as tell what American
leadership looks like.
This is especially important at
a time when many are wondering, as Kissinger puts it, “Are we facing a period
in which forces beyond the restraints of any order determine the future?”
For me, this is a familiar
question. When I walked into the State Department in January 2009, everyone
knew that it was a time of dizzying changes, but no one could agree on what
they all meant. Would the economic crisis bring new forms of cooperation or a
return to protectionism and discord? Would new technologies do more to help
citizens hold leaders accountable or to help dictators keep tabs on dissidents?
Would rising powers such as China ,
India and Brazil become global
problem-solvers or global spoilers? Would the emerging influence of non-state
actors be defined more by the threats from terrorist networks and criminal
cartels, or by the contributions of courageous NGOs? Would growing global
interdependence bring a new sense of solidarity or new sources of strife?
President Obama explained the
overarching challenge we faced in his Nobel lecture in December 2009. After
World War II, he said, “America
led the world in constructing an architecture to keep the peace. . . . And yet,
a decade into a new century, this old architecture is buckling under the weight
of new threats.”
I was proud to help the
president begin reimagining and reinforcing the global order to meet the
demands of an increasingly interdependent age. In the president’s first term,
we laid the foundation, from repaired alliances to updated international
institutions to decisive action on challenges such as Iran ’s nuclear program and the
threat from Osama bin Laden.
The crises of the second term
underscore that this is a generational project that will demand a commitment
from the United States
and its partners for years to come. Kissinger writes that foreign policy is not
“a story with a beginning and an end,” but “a process of managing and tempering
ever-recurring challenges.” This calls to mind John F. Kennedy’s observation that peace and progress are
“based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in
human institutions . . . a process — a way of solving problems.”
Much of “World Order” is
devoted to exploring this challenge. It is vintage Kissinger, with his singular
combination of breadth and acuity along with his knack for connecting headlines
to trend lines — very long trend lines in this case. He ranges from the Peace
of Westphalia to the pace of microprocessing, from Sun Tzu to Talleyrand to
Twitter. He traces the Indian view of order back to the Hindu epics; the Muslim
view to the campaigns of Muhammad; the European view to the carnage of the
Thirty Years’ War (which elicits a comparison to the Middle East today); the
Russian view to “the hard school of the steppe, where an array of nomadic
hordes contended for resources on an open terrain with few fixed borders.” This
long view can help us understand issues from Vladimir Putin’s aggression to Iran ’s
negotiating strategy, even as it raises the difficult question of “how
divergent historic experiences and values can be shaped into a common order.”
Given today’s challenges,
Kissinger’s analyses of the Asia-Pacific and the Middle
East are particularly valuable.
When it comes to Asia, he notes
that all of the region’s rising powers, China included, have their own
visions of regional and global order, shaped by their own histories and present
situations. How we contend with these divergent visions — building a
cooperative relationship with China
while preserving our other relationships, interests and values in a stable and
prosperous region — will go a long way toward determining whether we can meet
the broader global challenge.
In my book “Hard Choices,” I describe the strategy President
Obama and I developed for the Asia-Pacific, centered on strengthening our
traditional alliances; elevating and harmonizing the alphabet soup of regional
organizations, such as ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and
APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization); and engaging China
more broadly — both bilaterally, through new venues such as the Strategic and
Economic Dialogue, and multilaterally, in settings where regional pressure
would encourage more constructive behavior and shared decision-making on
matters from freedom of navigation to climate change to trade to human rights.
Our “pivot to Asia ,” as it came to be known,
is all about establishing a rules-based order in the region that can manage the
peaceful rise of new powers and promote universal norms and values.
This kind of methodical,
multilateral diplomacy is often slow and frustrating, rarely making headlines
at home, but it can pay real dividends that affect the lives of millions of
people. And without an effective regional order, the challenges multiply. Just
look at the Middle East . “Nowhere,” Kissinger
observes, “is the challenge of international order more complex — in terms of
both organizing regional order and ensuring the compatibility of that order
with peace and stability in the rest of the world.”
Kissinger is a friend, and I
relied on his counsel when I served as secretary of state. He checked in with
me regularly, sharing astute observations about foreign leaders and sending me
written reports on his travels. Though we have often seen the world and some of
our challenges quite differently, and advocated different responses now and in
the past, what comes through clearly in this new book is a conviction that we,
and President Obama, share: a belief in the indispensability of continued
American leadership in service of a just and liberal order.
There really is no viable
alternative. No other nation can bring together the necessary coalitions and
provide the necessary capabilities to meet today’s complex global threats. But
this leadership is not a birthright; it is a responsibility that must be
assumed with determination and humility by each generation.
Fortunately, the United States
is uniquely positioned to lead in the 21st century. It is not just because of
the enduring strength of our military or the resilience of our economy,
although both are absolutely essential. It goes deeper than that. The things
that make us who we are as a nation — our diverse and open society, our
devotion to human rights and democratic values — give us a singular advantage
in building a future in which the forces of freedom and cooperation prevail
over those of division, dictatorship and destruction.
This isn’t just idealism. For
an international order to take hold and last, Kissinger argues, it must relate
“power to legitimacy.” To that end, Kissinger, the famous realist, sounds
surprisingly idealistic. Even when there are tensions between our values and
other objectives, America ,
he reminds us, succeeds by standing up for our values, not shirking them, and
leads by engaging peoples and societies, the sources of legitimacy, not
governments alone. If our might helps secure the balance of power that
underpins the international order, our values and principles help make it acceptable
and attractive to others.
So our levers of leadership are
not just about keeping our military strong and our diplomacy agile; they are
about standing up for human rights, about advancing the rights and role of
women and girls, about creating the space for a flourishing civil society and
the conditions for broad-based development.
This strategic rationale guided
my emphasis as secretary of state on using all the tools of foreign policy,
even those sometimes dismissed as “soft.” I called it “smart power,” and I
still believe it offers a blueprint for sustained American leadership in the
decades ahead. We have to play to our strengths. And in an age when legitimacy
is defined from the bottom up rather than the top down, America is better positioned than
our more autocratic competitors.
Kissinger recognizes this as
well. He understands how much the world has changed since his time in office,
especially the diffusion of power and the growing influence of forces beyond
national governments. International problems and solutions are increasingly
centered, in ways both good and bad, on nongovernmental organizations,
businesses and individual citizens. As a result, foreign policy is now as much
about people as it is about states. Kissinger rightly notes that these shifts
require a broader and deeper order than sufficed in the past. “Any system of
world order, to be sustainable, must be accepted as just — not only by leaders,
but also by citizens,” he writes.
That is true abroad, and it is
also true at home. Our country is at its best, and our leadership in the world
is strongest, when we are united behind a common purpose and shared mission,
and advancing shared prosperity and social justice at home. Sustaining America ’s
leadership in the world depends on renewing the American dream for all our
people.
In the past, we’ve flirted with
isolationism and retreat, but always heeded the call to leadership when it was
needed most. It’s time for another of our great debates about what America
means to the world and what the world means to America. We need to have an
honest conversation together — all of us — about the costs and imperatives of
global leadership, and what it really takes to keep our country safe and
strong.
We have a lot to talk about.
Sometimes we’ll disagree. But that’s what democracy is all about. A real
national dialogue is the only way we’re going to rebuild a political consensus
to take on the perils and the promise of the 21st century. Henry Kissinger’s
book makes a compelling case for why we have to do it and how we can succeed.
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