中國將如何入侵征服台灣（以及如何阻止它）

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-china-would-invade-conquer-taiwan-heres-how-stop-it-24977

How China Would Invade and Conquer Taiwan (And Here's How to Stop It)
中國將如何入侵征服台灣（以及如何阻止它）

Ian Easton

March 19, 2018

(谷歌翻譯，原文於下)

台灣的政府和軍隊（與其他台灣社會一樣）要遠遠超過他們的信譽。但他們只能靠自己做很多事情。五角大樓在協助台灣最大限度發揮其戰鬥能力方面可發揮關鍵作用。在美國的幫助下，台灣可以確保其防禦投資成為北京計算的一個因素，並有望預防未來入侵的發生。

據說來自中華人民共和國的不同消息來源表明，台灣民主時代已經到來。在他們的敘述中，中國的鐵腕領導人習近平正在“失去耐心”，並可能在二十世紀二十年代初期下令入侵台灣。也許在2021年7月之前，這個世界上最危險的閃點可能會出現壓倒性的兩棲突擊，紀念中國共產黨成立一百週年。

這是敘述。事實上，中國可能不會以如此激進和高風險的方式攻擊台灣。習近平和他的上尉更有可能引發和加劇台海之間的緊張戰爭。他們將繼續使用虛假信息和其他技術來消除華盛頓對台灣可以得到捍衛的信心，同時加大顛覆活動，破壞台灣國家的信心和意志力。

習近平會安排時間，希望台灣政府承受巨大的壓力，讓他能夠廉價征服目標。與此同時，他的軍事將領將繼續策劃和準備履行他們的“神聖”使命。強制可能很容易失敗，使入侵成為一種誘人的選擇 - 特別是在未來的情況下，權力平衡對北京比今天更有利。

評估威脅：

海峽兩岸的政治和安全環境日益緊張，需要準確描述解放軍的能力，優勢和不足。

解放軍的優勢比其弱點更明顯。中國的軍事力量在國內外都受到媒體的高度重視和宣傳。毫無疑問，中國的彈道導彈，網絡戰能力和反太空武器使它成為一支不容忽視的力量。或許更危險的是它在國外的間諜活動和秘密行動來塑造外交決策。

但是故事總是有更多的。著名的海軍戰爭學院教授安德魯埃里克森在他最近出版的書“中國海軍造船”中明確指出，雖然北京的艦隊正在壯大，但中國人民解放軍海軍還沒有準備好支持入侵台灣。中國海軍仍然缺乏它需要的電梯容量和防空能力。儘管如此，明天的形勢幾乎肯定會與今天完全不同。

“中國軍隊今日”的作者丹尼斯布拉斯科指出，中國共產黨的地面部隊，如海軍，還沒有準備好進行最終的戰鬥。對於入侵是一個現實的選擇，中國將不得不有更多的直升機，傘兵，特種作戰人員，兩棲機械師和海軍陸戰隊。此外，解放軍需要建立一支堅實的軍委軍官隊伍，並為整個指揮系統上下的單位領導人提供更好的訓練。大部分工作已經開始，並將在未來十年開始取得成果。

台灣的反侵略戰略：

那麼台灣的軍事專家如何計劃捍衛自己的國家不受襲擊？美國如何提供幫助？

台灣處於從征兵部隊過渡到全志願軍隊的最後階段。建立一支職業戰士的精英力量是一件好事。它使台灣具有比較優勢。中國沒有國家軍隊，主要依賴短期投入。

根據蘭德公司最近的一份報告，台灣可以通過精英後備部隊增加其全志願軍事力量，進一步增強其應對中國在電磁，空中和海域威脅的能力。台灣軍隊也可以受益於新的培訓機會。與美國軍方進行雙邊訓練演練和聯合人道主義任務將使台灣亟需一槍。

現代戰爭越來越不是由暴力決定的，而是由智力決定的。這只能通過高級培訓來加以利用。台灣的主要防禦目標之一就是為島內人民解放軍（PLA）所發生的雷電衝擊的衝擊做好準備。這樣做需要高度積極的人員組織起來，訓練有素，並配備適應敵對侵略行動的絕大多數抵抗​​力量。

海峽兩岸規模和經濟的不對稱要求島內的防務規劃人員掌握權力的各個方面，並在需要時提供廣泛的潛在能力。台灣的全面防禦戰略要求動員全國，加強每一個健全的男人和女人的支持反侵略行動。

正如倫敦國王學院的Lauren Dickey所指出的那樣，台灣國防部（MND）正在不斷磨礪其抵制中國入侵的能力。每年，國防部都會進行密集的國家和地方軍事演習，測試和磨銳計劃，以便在敵人著陸時保衛該島。

據估計，台灣將有大約四周時間提前警告中國入侵。鑑於中國在黑暗藝術中的戰略欺騙技巧，這不能被視為理所當然。然而，解放軍預想的兩棲行動規模龐大，這意味著它的攻擊意圖將會被預示。

警示標誌包括部隊調動，後備動員，工業儲存，軍事演習，媒體信號，外交消息和對台灣的破壞。最明顯和令人擔憂的跡像是在中國東南部已知的兩棲登陸地區聚集大批民用和海軍艦艇。

隨著這一切的進行，台灣總統，她的內閣顧問和議會領導人將辯論他們的回應方案。他們將權衡來自雷達，衛星，監聽站和中國代理商的情報。他們最明顯的選擇是提高準備水平並動員島嶼對敵人發動攻擊。

開採海峽兩岸的通道並不需要很長時間，也不需要加強入侵海灘，港口和簡易機場。手動橋樑和發電站等所有內陸關鍵點並將非必要人員從潛在戰區撤出只需要稍長一些時間。但要實現這一目標，需要動員軍隊預備役人員和承包商的龐大勞動力隊伍。因此，台灣在短短幾天內就有能力動員多達兩百五十萬人和近一百萬民防人員。

在台灣，澎湖和外島（Kimen和Matsu），每年都要對應急動員系統進行測試。他們的結果令人印象深刻他們表示，公民士兵將以極快的速度召集數量非凡的編組職位。

台灣全面的國防動員計劃不僅僅是將潛在的軍事能力付諸行動。內閣辦公室（行政院）及其下屬部委，如交通部，內政部和經濟部（其他）都在為民防建設整合民防部隊發揮作用。

未來之路：

台灣的政府和軍隊（與其他台灣社會一樣）要遠遠超過他們的信譽。但他們只能靠自己做很多事情。五角大樓在協助台灣最大限度發揮其戰鬥能力方面可發揮關鍵作用。在美國的幫助下，台灣可以確保其防禦投資成為北京計算的一個因素，並有望預防未來入侵的發生。

蘭德報告建議成立一個由助理國防部長率領的美國方面的聯合工作組。事實上，台灣軍隊將受益於美國新型專業軍事教育和技術培訓。美國導師可以支持台灣繼續轉型成為一支強大的全志願軍，並幫助創建一個更具戰略性的後備力量。

台灣軍隊也需要定期和可靠的軍售，不幸的是布什政府和奧巴馬政府否認了這一點。對台灣而言，美國武器系統的正面作戰和戰術作用是無可爭辯的。特朗普政府應該為台灣提供與日本和韓國相同的能力，包括新型隱形戰鬥機，導彈防禦電池和驅逐艦。

另外，美國公司應該被華盛頓聯合起來，讓他們爭奪台灣本土防禦潛艇項目。比火力更重要的是，這種物質支持對島上的招募和留存產生巨大的士氣促進作用 - 以及它向中國傳達目標和解決問題的強大信號。

台灣軍方制定了堅實的防務計劃，並培養了一支職業戰士隊伍。但隨著時間的推移，該島面臨的嚴重入侵威脅正在增加。除非美國在亞洲開展業務的方式發生重大變化，否則保持中國進攻能力的步伐將非常困難。

展望未來，特朗普白宮將為發展推進美台關係的新戰略做好準備。確保台灣擁有強大的自衛能力，將有助於保持全球最大的火藥桶不被點燃。無視中國問題只會使情況更糟。

Ian Easton是2049計劃（這是第一次出現）研究所和即將出版的書“中國入侵威脅：台灣防務和亞洲美國戰略”一書的研究員。

(英語原文)

Taiwan's government and military (like the rest of Taiwanese society) are far tougher than they get credit for. But they can only do so much by themselves. The Pentagon has a critical role to play in assisting Taiwan maximize its war fighting capabilities. With America's help, Taiwan can make sure its defense investments factor into Beijing's calculations and, hopefully, prevent a future invasion from occurring in the first place.

Various sources from within the People's Republic of China have allegedly suggested that time is running out for Taiwan's democracy. In their narrative, China's iron-fisted leader, Xi Jinping, is "losing patience" and could order the invasion of Taiwan in the early 2020s. The world's most dangerous flashpoint might witness an overwhelming amphibious blitz, perhaps before July 2021 to mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).    

That's the narrative. The reality is that China will probably not attack Taiwan in such a radical and high-risk fashion. Xi and his top lieutenants are far more likely to draw-out and escalate the war of nerves across the Taiwan Strait. They will continue using disinformation and other techniques to drain Washington's confidence that Taiwan can be defended, while ramping up subversive activities to undermine the island nation's confidence and willpower.

Xi will bide his time and hope the Taiwanese government cracks under mounting pressure, allowing him to conquer his target cheaply. At the same time, his military generals will continue planning and preparing to deliver on their "sacred" mission. Coercion could easily fail, making invasion a tempting option―especially in a future scenario where the balance of power looks more favorable to Beijing than it does today.   

Assessing the Threat:

The ever-tense political and security environment across the Taiwan Strait necessitates an accurate depiction of PLA capabilities, strengths, and shortfalls.

The PLA's strengths are more apparent than its weaknesses. China's military muscle is frequently highlighted and hyped up by the media, both in Beijing and abroad. Undoubtedly, China's ballistic missiles, cyber warfare capabilities, and counter-space weapons make it a force to be reckoned with. Perhaps even more dangerous are its espionage and covert actions abroad to shape foreign policymaking.   

But there is always more to the story. Renowned Naval War College professor, Andrew Erickson, makes it clear in his recently published book, Chinese Naval Shipbuilding that while Beijing's fleets are growing at a remarkable clip, the PLA Navy is not ready to support the invasion of Taiwan. The Chinese navy still lacks the lift capacity and the air defense capability it needs. Nonetheless, the situation will almost certainly look very different tomorrow than it does today.   

Dennis Blasko, author of The Chinese Army Today, observes that the CCP's ground forces, like the navy, are not yet ready for the ultimate fight. For invasion to be a realistic option, China would have to have far more helicopters, paratroopers, special operators, amphibious mechanized divisions, and marines. Moreover, the PLA would need to build a solid non-commissioned officer corps and provide better training to unit leaders up and down the entire chain of command. Much of this work has already begun and will start to bear fruit over the next decade.  

Taiwan's Anti-Invasion Strategy:

So how do Taiwanese military experts plan to defend their country against attack, and how can the United States help?   

Taiwan is at the tail end of a transit from a conscription force to an all-volunteer military. Building an elite force of professional warriors is a good thing. It gives Taiwan a comparative advantage. China has no national army and relies mostly on short-term draftees.

According to a recent RAND Corporation report, Taiwan could augment its all-volunteer military with elite reserve force units, further enhancing its ability to counter Chinese threats in the electromagnetic, air, and sea domains. Taiwan's armed forces could also benefit from new training opportunities. Bilateral training exercises and joint humanitarian missions with the U.S. military would give Taiwan a much-needed shot in the arm.

Modern wars are increasingly decided not by brute force, but by brainpower. This can only be harnessed with advanced training. One of Taiwan's primary defense goals is to prepare the island for the shock of a lightning war waged by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). Doing so requires highly-motivated personnel who are organized, trained, and equipped to meet an enemy invasion campaign with overwhelming resistance.      

The asymmetry of size and economy across the Taiwan Strait requires defense planners on the island to harness every aspect of power, bringing a wide range of latent capabilities to bear when needed. Taiwan's all-out defense strategy calls for mobilizing the entire country, gearing-up every able-bodied man and woman in support of anti-invasion operations.

As Lauren Dickey of Kings College London points out, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) is constantly honing its ability to repulse Chinese invasion. Every year, MND conducts intensive national and local-level military exercises, testing and sharpening plans to defend the island in the event of enemy landings.

It is estimated that Taiwan will have approximately four weeks advanced warning of a Chinese invasion. Given China's skill in the dark arts of strategic deception, this cannot be taken for granted. Yet the vast scale of the PLA's envisioned amphibious operations necessarily means its offensive intentions would be foreshadowed.

Warning signs would include troop movements, reserve mobilization, industrial stockpiling, military drills, media signaling, diplomatic messaging, and sabotage against Taiwan. The most obvious and worrisome sign would be the gathering of massive fleets of civilian and naval vessels at known amphibious staging areas in southeast China.      

As all this was playing out, Taiwan's president, her cabinet advisors, and parliamentary leaders would debate their response options. They would weigh intelligence pouring in from radars, satellites, listening posts, and agents in China. Their most obvious option would be to increase readiness levels and mobilize the island to gun-down an enemy attack.

It would not take long to mine the maritime lines of approach across the Taiwan Strait, nor to fortify invasion beaches, ports, and airstrips. It would take only slightly longer to man all inland key points like bridges and power stations, and to evacuate non-essential personnel from potential battle zones. But accomplishing this would require a colossal workforce in the form of mobilized army reservists and contractors. For this reason, Taiwan maintains the ability to mobilize up to two and a half million men and nearly one million civil defense workers in just a few days time.

Tests of the emergency mobilization system are carried out on a yearly basis at sites across Taiwan, Penghu, and the outer islands (Kimen and Matsu). Their results are impressive. They indicate that citizen-soldiers will muster at marshalling posts in extraordinary numbers and at rapid speeds.

Taiwan’s all-out defense mobilization plan entails more than just bringing latent military capabilities into action. The Cabinet Office (Executive Yuan) and its subordinate ministries such as the Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Economic Affairs (among others) all play a role in the integration of civil defense units for homeland defense.

The Way Forward:  

Taiwan's government and military (like the rest of Taiwanese society) are far tougher than they get credit for. But they can only do so much by themselves. The Pentagon has a critical role to play in assisting Taiwan maximize its war fighting capabilities. With America's help, Taiwan can make sure its defense investments factor into Beijing's calculations and, hopefully, prevent a future invasion from occurring in the first place.

The RAND report suggests the establishment of a joint working group, led on the U.S. side by an assistant secretary of defense. Indeed, Taiwanese forces would benefit from new types of professional military education and technical training in the United States. American mentors could support Taiwan’s continued transit to a potent all-volunteer force and help create a more strategically focused reserve force.         

Taiwanese troops also need regular and dependable arms sales, something that unfortunately was denied them by the Bush and Obama administrations. For Taiwan, the positive operational and tactical effects of American weapons systems are indisputable. The Trump administration should offer Taiwan the same capabilities it is offering Japan and South Korea, including new stealth fighter jets, missile defense batteries, and destroyers.

In addition, American companies should be unchained by Washington, allowing them to compete for access to Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine program. Even more important than firepower would be the huge morale boosting effects such material support would have on recruitment and retention on the island―and the powerful signal of purpose and resolve it would send to China.           

Taiwan's military has developed a solid defense plan and is cultivating a force of professional warriors. But the grave invasion threat facing the island is growing over time. Keeping pace with China's offensive power will be extremely difficult unless big changes are made to the way America does business in Asia.

Going forward, the Trump White House would do well to develop a new strategy for advancing U.S.-Taiwan relations. Making sure Taiwan has the strong self-defense capabilities it needs will help keep the globe's greatest powder keg from ever igniting. Ignoring the China problem would only make it worse.   

Ian Easton is a research fellow at the Project 2049 (where this first appeared) Institute and author of the forthcoming book, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia.