國防雜誌：如何幫忙台灣抵擋中國空侵

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/i_love_taiwan/8MLv0acQG20

The F-35: How Taiwan Could Really Push Back Against China

《谷歌翻譯》

國防雜誌：如何幫忙台灣抵擋中國空侵

Michael Mazza Gary Schmitt

2018年1月18日

美國國家安全戰略首次明確提到台灣。國家安全事務委員會承諾“按照”一個中國“的原則，保持與台灣的緊密聯繫，包括我們根據”與台灣關係法“提供台灣合法防務需求和威懾的承諾。

台灣的新高中語言與國會對加強與台北關係的興趣增加相似。去年夏天，參議員湯姆·棉花和科里·加德納介紹了“台灣安全法”。儘管該法案並沒有成為法律，但其關於雙邊交流，培訓和港口訪問的想法最終被納入了特朗普總統2017年末簽署的“國防授權法案”。

這些事態發展源於對島內事實上的獨立是東亞美國和盟國安全的關鍵要素。台灣的地理位置使它成為路障或潛在的中國通向更廣闊的太平洋的途徑，而且與島內南部和北部的日本和菲律賓以及美國盟友的防禦尤其相關。

另外，台灣在美中觀念競爭中的作用不大。台灣不斷提醒民族人士可以自由，民主，成功。

自從蔡英文2016年當選台灣總統以來，北京對北京更加惱火，並拒絕承認台灣是“一個中國”的一部分。從那時起，中國一直在加大對台灣的壓力採取旨在摧毀台灣經濟的政策，將其孤立得更加國際化，並使其安全受到影響。

本月早些時候，中國單方面在台灣海峽開闢了四條新的商業航線，台灣安全規劃者擔心中國軍方可能用於非商業目的。在此之後的幾個星期裡，中國唯一的航空母艦曾兩次駛過台灣海峽，這樣就在中間線上徘徊。隨著台灣國防部12月份的一份報導，這些事態發展緊隨其後，中國軍用飛機比去年環繞了十五次。北京方面認為，由於台灣不承認台灣是一個主權實體，台灣海峽和台灣可以隨心所欲。

當然，台灣軍隊當然也跟踪所有這些中國的活動，而且它的飛機爭先恐後地與大陸同行會面。但解放軍活動步伐加快，使得台灣空軍的壓力越來越大，當時許多飛機太老，無法安全飛行，而且在沒有新飛機和零部件難以到達的情況下，現有的戰機穿著出局更快。

鑑於台灣對美國在東亞的防務要求的重要性，其問題是美國的問題。中國在重要的航空領域的優勢越來越不存在，該怎麼辦？

首先，特朗普政府應該扭轉奧巴馬團隊決定不向台灣出售新的F-16C / D，而是升級台灣的F-16A / B艦隊 - 這個過程需要將非常需要的戰士停止服役延長期限。雖然升級是有用的和必要的，但是提供洛克希德·馬丁公司能夠以相對較短的時間生產的新的F-16C / D戰鬥機將更加直接的效用。台灣不僅需要先進的飛機，還需要增加。

但要真正解決目前台海和台灣空氣不平衡的問題，華盛頓想要向台灣提供什麼樣的想法就要有一個飛躍。在這方面沒有什麼資產可以像F-35B那樣具有潛在的優勢。當面對大量的敵機和現代防空體係時，它的隱身使其更俱生存力。其先進的電子戰系統有能力定位和堵塞敵方雷達和傳感器系統，使其他飛機，如台灣的F-16，有更好的戰鬥和倖存的機會。此外，F-35B具有短距起飛和垂直著陸能力，因此減少了對大型基地要求的需求 - 這是在敵人身上準備巡航導彈和彈道導彈時必不可少的能力。分散飛機將是一個越來越重要的戰略，以確保他們的生存 - 一個戰術更難以執行與傳統的戰鬥機。

即使明天被列入收購名單，台灣也需要一段時間才能收購F-35B，這更是早日作出決定的理由。但與此同時，美國海軍陸戰隊應該開始在台灣附近用F-35B進行空中演習，包括在島上的飛行和降落。這樣的演習不僅可以驗證飛機在台灣防務中的實用性，而且還可以向北京和盟國首都華盛頓對該島安全的承諾發出必要的信號。更具體地說，把F-35送到台灣，將會使中國空軍有信心能夠主宰海峽兩岸和島內的空域。

特朗普總統和國會在採取這些措施的時候，可以糾正以前的政府對台灣防務這個要素的忽視，使台海恢復到更加穩定的地位。如果NSS和NDAA不能被看作是一紙空文，那麼就必須以具體而有效的步驟來支持這些話語。把新的F-16和F-35作為台灣防禦的組成部分是一個很好的起點。

Michael Mazza是美國企業研究所的外交和國防政策研究員，Gary Schmitt是AEI的Marilyn Ware安全研究中心的聯合主管。

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/i_love_taiwan/8MLv0acQG20

The F-35: How Taiwan Could Really Push Back Against China

Michael MazzaGary Schmitt

January 18, 2018

For the first time, an American National Security Strategy (NSS) explicitly mentions Taiwan. The NSS includes a commitment to “maintain our strong ties with Taiwan in accordance with our ‘One China’ policy, including our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide for Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs and deter coercion.”

The NSS language on Taiwan parallels Congress’s increased interest in strengthening ties with Taipei. Last summer, Senators Tom Cotton and Corey Gardner introduced the Taiwan Security Act. Although that bill did not become law, its ideas on bilateral exchanges, training, and port visits were eventually incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act, which President Trump signed late in 2017.

These developments stem from an appreciation that the island’s de facto independence is a key element in American and allied security in East Asia. Taiwan’s location makes it either a roadblock or potential Chinese pathway to the wider Pacific and is of especial relevance to the defense of Japan and the Philippines, American allies that are located directly north and south of the island.

In addition, Taiwan plays an underutilized role in the ideational competition between the United States and China. Taiwan is a constant reminder that an ethnically Chinese population can be liberal, democratic and successful.

The island has become even more of an irritant to Beijing since Tsai Ing-wen was elected president of Taiwan in 2016 and has refused to concede that Taiwan is part of “One China.” Since then, China has been upping the pressure on the island, adopting policies designed to strain Taiwan’s economy, isolate it even further internationally, and unsettle its security.

Earlier this month, China unilaterally inaugurated four new commercial air routes over the Taiwan Strait, which Taiwan security planners fear China’s military might use for non-commercial purposes. In the weeks since, China’s sole aircraft carrier has twice sailed through the Taiwan Strait, skirting the median line as it did so. These developments followed on the heels of a report by Taiwan’s defense ministry in December that Chinese military aircraft had circumnavigated the island fifteen times over the previous year. Beijing’s view is that it can do as it pleases in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan since it doesn’t recognize Taiwan as a sovereign entity.

Taiwan’s armed forces of course track all of these Chinese activities and its aircraft scramble to meet their mainland counterparts in the air. But the heightened pace of PLA activities is placing increasing stress on Taiwan’s air force at a time when many of its planes are too old to fly safely and, in the absence of new planes and hard-to-come by parts, available fighters are wearing out more rapidly.

Given Taiwan’s importance to US defense requirements in East Asia, its problems are America’s problems. And there is no bigger issue than China’s increasing advantage in the all-important air domain. What to do?

To begin, the Trump administration should reverse the Obama team’s decision not to sell new F-16C/Ds to Taiwan and, instead, to upgrade Taiwan’s fleet of F-16A/Bs—a process that requires taking much needed fighters out of service for extended periods. While the upgrades are useful and necessary, providing new F-16C/Ds—fighters that Lockheed Martin could produce in relatively short order—would be of more immediate utility. Taiwan needs not only advanced jets but an increase in numbers as well.

But to truly address the current imbalance in the air over the Strait and skies of Taiwan requires a quantum leap in Washington’s thinking about what to make available to Taiwan. And there is no asset in that regard as potentially advantageous as the F-35B. Its stealth makes it far more survivable when facing large numbers of enemy aircraft and modern air defenses. And its advanced electronic warfare system has the capacity to locate and jam enemy radars and sensor systems, giving other aircraft, such as Taiwan’s F-16s, a better chance of fighting and surviving. In addition, the F-35B with its short takeoff and vertical landing capability reduces the need for large basing requirements—a capability essential when facing an enemy with an arsenal of accurate cruise and ballistic missiles. Dispersing aircraft will be an increasingly important stratagem for ensuring they survive—a stratagem more difficult to carry out with conventional fighters.

It would take some time for Taiwan to acquire F-35Bs even if they were put on the acquisition list tomorrow—even more of a reason to make that decision sooner than later. But, in the meantime, the U.S. Marine Corps should begin carrying out air exercises in the Taiwan vicinity with F-35Bs to include flights over, and landings on, the island. Not only would such exercises validate the aircraft’s utility in Taiwan’s defense but they would send a needed signal to both Beijing and allied capitals of Washington’s commitment to the island’s security. More concretely, sending F-35s to Taiwan would put a real dent in the Chinese air force’s confidence that it could dominate the air space over the Strait and over the island itself.

In taking these steps, President Trump and Congress can correct previous administrations’ neglect of this vital element in Taiwan’s defenses and return the Taiwan Strait to a more stable footing. If the NSS and NDAA are not to be seen as just pieces of paper, words have to be backed by concrete and effective steps. Making new F-16s and F-35s an integral part of Taiwan’s defenses is a good place to start.

Michael Mazza is a research fellow in foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, while Gary Schmitt is co-director of AEI’s Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies.