無能川普帶給全球的後果
The Global Consequences of
Trump’s Incompetence
From China to the Gulf to
Europe, the world's power players are moving ahead without America.
JULY 18, 2017
(谷歌翻譯)
我從歐洲假期回到過去的一個週末，希臘的會議，在溫布爾登排隊，在愛爾蘭劃皮划艇，一般都在做自己的一小部分來刺激歐盟的經濟。我不是湯姆·弗里德曼，所以我沒有採訪我遇到的每一個出租車司機，但是我曾經談過的那輛司機在美國的第45任總統身上相當不錯。我相信在歐洲有幾個川普的支持者，但最近的調查顯示，他們是一個明顯的少數。這似乎也越來越真實，儘管那些支持者的頑固忠誠，即使他堅持這個人，實際上也是在第五大道拍攝某人。
自從唐納德·川普開幕以來，大量的墨水和數十億像素被用於記錄，解剖，譴責或捍衛他無視已經確定的體面和政治克制的規範。我正在談論公然的裙帶關係，巨大的利益衝突，明顯的歧視，以及福克斯新聞的謝潑德·史密斯對川普與俄羅斯的關係所謂的謊言之後的謊言。總統鐘擺從有尊嚴（巴拉克·奧巴馬）到令人噁心的（川普）惡夢，而且，他的所有人的時間都過度膨脹，而不是處理重要的政策問題。
但真正的問題不是川普的不間斷的大氣;他日益明顯的缺乏能力。
但真正的問題不是川普的不間斷的大氣;他日益明顯的缺乏能力。當有經驗的共和黨人警告說，川普在2016年的運動期間不適合辦公，他們大多數的關注都圍繞著性格問題。但是他們的警告並沒有使我們為第一天的行政管理表現出來。
“能力”是什麼意思？牛津英語詞典將其定義為“成功或有效地做某事的能力”。在外交政策中，能力取決於對世界狀況的充分了解，以及驅動世界政治的關鍵力量，使人們能夠獲得知情和智能化政策選擇。這也意味著組織技能，紀律和判斷力，選擇正確的下屬，使他們結合國家權力的不同要素來追求良好的目標。換句話說，外交政策的能力需要有能力確定使國家更加安全和/或繁榮的目標，然後組合手段來實現所期望的結果。
和其他社會各界一樣，對外交政策的掌握並不意味著100％的正確或成功。國際政治是一個謙虛和不確定的境界，甚至精心策劃的政策也有時候會失敗。但是，總的來說，主管決策者的成功勝過失敗，因為他們對世界如何運作有著非常準確的看法，因為他們有必要的技能來有效地實施他們的選擇。因此，即使有些個人行動不按預期的方式解決，這些領導人也會保留別人的信心。
在戰後的大部分時間裡，美國從總體的能力氣氛中受益匪淺。第二次世界大戰中的勝利，諸如北約和布雷頓森林等重要的戰後機構，以及（大部分）成功地管理冷戰與蘇聯的對抗，使許多觀察家相信美國官員知道他們在做什麼。科學技術的實力（如登陸月球），經濟增長大多穩定，在一定程度上取決於種族問題的進步，但後者的努力不盡如人意。當然，像越南這樣的失敗同樣的光環也被玷污了，但其他國家還是明白，美國既是非常強大的，也是理解這個世界的人們的指導，而且完成做得不錯。喬治H.W.布什政府成功地處理了蘇聯的崩潰，德國的統一和第一次海灣戰爭，加劇了廣泛的意義，即美國的判斷力和技能應該被認真對待，即使華盛頓是不可靠的。
然而，從那時起，事情從好到壞都變得非常糟糕。克林頓政府管理美國經濟，但處理外交政策只是這樣，其在中東和其他地方的政策為今後的麻煩奠定了基礎。喬治·布什政府充滿了經驗豐富的外交政策，但是傲慢，總統無知，9/11後恐慌以及少數新保守主義思想家的駭人聽聞的影響造成了伊拉克和阿富汗昂貴的失敗。奧巴馬做得更好一些（幾乎沒有變得更糟），但他從來沒有把Blob的承諾變為自由霸權，並且犯了一些同樣的錯誤，比如年輕的布什，雖然規模較小。即使是那些被吹捧的美國軍方似乎比在實現類似勝利的任何事情上都更有技巧。
這讓我們來到了川普。
他已經任職六個月了，但是他的無能為力的後果已經很明顯了。
他已經任職六個月了，但是他的無能為力的後果已經很明顯了。
首先，當你不了解世界的時候，當你的團隊缺乏技術官員來彌補總統無知時，你會犯下很大的政策錯誤。川普迄今為止最大的做法是減少跨太平洋夥伴關係（TPP），這一決定破壞了美國在亞洲的地位，為中國更大的影響力打開了大門，也不會使美國經濟受到輕微的影響。類似的無知的燃料錯誤包括走出巴黎氣候協定（這使得美國人看起來像一群科學拒絕，頭痛的無知的無知者），並沒有意識到中國不是 - 重複，不是
- 為我們解決朝鮮問題。更不用說他的團隊無法對他們正在談論的國家進行混淆。
第二，一旦其他國家得出結論，美國官員是愚蠢的，他們不會非常重視華盛頓的建議，指導或要求。當人們認為你知道你在做什麼時，他們會仔細聽你說的話，更傾向於跟隨你的領導。但是，如果他們認為你是一個白痴，或者他們不相信，你實際上可以交付任何你所期待的，他們可以禮貌地點頭表達你的意見，而是跟隨自己的本能。
我們已經看到了這個跡象。沙特阿拉伯在訪問利雅得期間，川普的弱勢人士的自我表現出色，目前無視美國努力解決海灣國家與卡塔爾之間的混亂爭端。事實上，以色列並不關心川普對以色列 - 巴勒斯坦爭端或敘利亞局勢的看法。可以肯定的是，這兩個國家歷史悠久，忽視了美國的意見和興趣，但對華盛頓的看法似乎已經達到了新的高度。而現在韓國已宣布將與朝鮮開始談判，儘管川普政府認為時機不正確。
與此同時，歐盟和日本剛剛達成大宗貿易協議;沒有美國的TPP般的談判正在恢復;而德國和加拿大的兩個領導人 - 美國兩個最親密的盟友 - 都公開說出了自己的路線圖。即使是澳大利亞的外交部長，也是美國的一個堅定盟友，他在川普對法國第一夫人的貶低言論中，已經挖了一大堆。誰能怪他們？我的意思是：如果你是一個負責任的外國領導人，你是否有智慧的人的意見，任命塞巴斯蒂安高爾卡到白宮國家安全的位置，想把國務院的預算削減30％，並認為賈里斯·庫什納是能處理困難的外交任務的天才？
美國當然還是非常強大的，所以盟友和對手在處理這個問題時會繼續保持謹慎。這就是為什麼法國的Emmanuel Macron和加拿大的Justin Trudeau對待川普而不是應得的尊重。
如果你發現自己和醉酒的犀牛在同一個房間，你也會小心翼翼。但你可能不會問犀牛的建議或諮詢地緣政治戰略。
如果你發現自己和醉酒的犀牛在同一個房間，你也會小心翼翼。但你可能不會問犀牛的建議或諮詢地緣政治戰略。
而不是依靠美國的指導和（一般來說）支持美國的政策舉措，失去對美國能力的信心的國家將開始對沖和做出自己的安排。他們將彼此交易，有時候會與美國認為是對手的國家進行交易。中國和伊朗已經發生了這樣的事情，只要美國的外交政策將Wile E. Coyote的戰略頭腦，三個Stooges的有紀律的團隊合作，以及豐富的frat效率，在動物屋。
保護主義者和孤立主義者可能會歡迎這一結果，因為他們認為美國在全球負擔中所承擔的份額過大，只有當它試圖運行世界時，它才能扭轉局面。他們有一點，但他們採取的方式太遠了。如果美國要盡可能地脫離接觸，另外95％的人類會繼續創造一個世界秩序，美國的影響力會相當小，幾個關鍵地區的事件幾乎肯定會發生變化，美國最終會後悔。而不是退縮到“美國之城”，採用約翰·米爾斯海默和我一年前概述的海上平衡政策更為有道理。
但如果其他國家對美國的判斷力，技能和能力幾乎沒有信心，海上平衡就不會奏效。為什麼？因為這個策略要求美國在主要地區（即歐洲，亞洲，也可能是中東地區）“平衡”，如果一個潛在的霸主地位出現，準備好在這些地區承擔這個責任。美國要加入聯合國的國家，必須充分相信華盛頓可以適當地衡量威脅，必要時干預技巧和效果。簡而言之，美國承諾的信譽取決於能力的最低聲譽，正是川普和公司一直在浪費的貨幣。
要說清楚的是，我並不是說在美國政府中服役的人不多，或者美國今天無力做任何事情。事實上，儘管白宮混亂，川普蓄意破壞我們的外交政策機制，我的帽子也是盡職盡責的公務員。
唐納德·川普也不稱職，在所有的情況下，他是一個比平均高爾夫球手好得多（即使他可能 - 現在這是一個令人震驚的 - 容易作弊），這可能解釋了為什麼他喜歡打高爾夫球治理。他擅長吸引外國女性嫁給他，雖然不是特別擅長結婚。而且他顯然是絕對世界級的胡說八道的藝術家，具有真正令人印象深刻的謊言，褻瀆，逃避，誤導，拉伸真理和解體的能力。這些技能明顯地使他成為一名房地產開發商，但他們並沒有像總統一樣幫助他。因為一旦有人決定你是一個笨蛋，要么他們利用你的無能，還是更喜歡處理更可靠的人。這讓我不高興，但你可以責怪他們嗎？
The Global Consequences of
Trump’s Incompetence
From China to the Gulf to
Europe, the world's power players are moving ahead without America.
JULY 18, 2017
I returned this past weekend
from a European vacation: conferencing in Greece, queuing up at Wimbledon,
kayaking in Ireland, and generally doing my own small part to stimulate the EU
economy. I’m not Tom Friedman, so I didn’t interview every taxi driver I
encountered, but the one I did talk to was pretty down on the 45th president of
the United States. I’m sure there are a few Trump supporters in Europe, but
recent surveys suggest they are a distinct minority. That seems to be
increasingly true here, too, despite the stubborn loyalty of those supporters
who would stick with the guy even if he did, in fact, shoot someone on Fifth Avenue.
Since Donald Trump was
inaugurated, a vast amount of ink and billions of pixels have been devoted to
documenting, dissecting, condemning, or defending his disregard for
well-established norms of decency and political restraint. I’m talking about
the blatant nepotism, the vast conflicts of interest, the overt misogyny, and
what Fox News’s Shepard Smith called the “lie after lie after lie” regarding Trump’s relations with
Russia. The presidential pendulum has swung from dignified (Barack Obama) to
disgusting (Trump), and it’s tempting to spend all one’s time hyperventilating
about his personal comportment rather than his handling of important policy
issues.
But the real issue isn’t
Trump’s nonstop boorishness; it’s his increasingly obvious lack of competence.
But the real issue isn’t
Trump’s nonstop boorishness; it’s his increasingly obvious lack of competence. When
experienced Republicans warned that Trump was unfit for office during the 2016 campaign, most of
their concerns revolved around issues of character. But their warnings didn’t
prepare us for the parade of buffoonery and ineptitude that has characterized
his administration from Day One.
What do I mean by “competence”?
The Oxford English Dictionary defines it
as “the ability to do something successfully or efficiently.” In foreign
policy, competence depends on a sufficient knowledge about the state of the
world and the key forces that drive world politics so that one can make
well-informed and intelligent policy choices. It also means having the
organizational skills, discipline, and judgment to pick the right subordinates
and get them to combine the different elements of national power in pursuit of
well-chosen goals. In other words, foreign-policy competence requires the
ability to identify ends that will make the country more secure and/or
prosperous and then assemble the means to bring the desired results to
fruition.
As in other walks of life, to
be competent at foreign policy does not mean being 100 percent right or
successful. International politics is a chancy and uncertain realm, and even
well-crafted policies sometimes go awry. But, on balance, competent policymakers
succeed more than they fail, both because they have a mostly accurate view of
how the world works and because they have the necessary skills to implement
their choices effectively. As a result, such leaders will retain others’
confidence even when a few individual initiatives do not work out as intended.
For much of the postwar period,
the United States benefited greatly from an overarching aura of competence.
Victory in World War II, the creation of key postwar institutions like NATO and
Bretton Woods, and the (mostly) successful management of the Cold War rivalry
with the USSR convinced many observers that U.S. officials knew what they were
doing. That aura was reinforced by scientific and technological prowess (e.g.,
the moon landing), by mostly steady economic growth, and to some extent by the
progress made in addressing issues such as race, however imperfect those latter
efforts were. That same aura was tarnished by blunders like Vietnam, of course,
but other countries still understood that the United States was both very
powerful and guided by people who understood the world reasonably well and
weren’t bad at getting things done. The George H.W. Bush administration’s
successful handling of the collapse of the USSR, the reunification of Germany,
and the first Gulf War reinforced the broad sense that U.S. judgment and skill
should be taken seriously, even if Washington wasn’t infallible.
Since then, however, things
have gone from good to bad to worse to truly awful. The Bill Clinton
administration managed the U.S. economy pretty well, but its handling of
foreign policy was only so-so, and its policies in the Middle East and
elsewhere laid the foundation for much future trouble. The George W. Bush
administration was filled with experienced foreign-policy mavens, but a fatal
combination of hubris, presidential ignorance, post-9/11 panic, and the baleful
influence of a handful of neoconservative ideologues produced costly debacles
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama did somewhat better (one could hardly have done
worse), but he never took on the Blob’scommitment to liberal hegemony and made
some of the same mistakes that the younger Bush did, albeit on a
smaller scale. Even the vaunted American military seems more skilled at blowing
things up than at achieving anything resembling victory.
Which brings us to Trump.
He has been in office for only
six months, but the consequences of his ineptitude are already apparent.
He has been in office for only
six months, but the consequences of his ineptitude are already apparent.
First, when you don’t
understand the world very well, and when your team lacks skilled officials to
compensate for presidential ignorance, you’re going to make big policy
mistakes. Trump’s biggest doozy thus far was dropping the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), a decision that undermined the U.S. position in Asia, opened
the door toward greater Chinese influence, and won’t benefit the U.S. economy
in the slightest. Similar ignorance-fueled errors include walking away from the
Paris climate accord (which makes Americans look like a bunch of
science-denying, head-in-the-sand ignoramuses) and failing to appreciate that
China wasn’t — repeat, wasn’t — going to solve the North Korea problem for us.
Not to mention his team’s inability to spelland confusion over which countries they are talking about.
Second, once other countries
conclude that U.S. officials are dunderheads, they aren’t going to pay much
attention to the advice, guidance, or requests that Washington makes. When
people think you know what you’re doing, they will listen carefully to what you
have to say and will be more inclined to follow your lead. But if they think
you’re an idiot, or they aren’t convinced you can actually deliver whatever you
are promising, they may nod politely as you express your views but follow their
own instincts instead.
We are already seeing signs of
this. Having played to Trump’s vulnerable ego brilliantly during his visit to
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is now blithely ignoring U.S. efforts to resolve the
simmering dispute between the Gulf states and Qatar. True to form, Israel
doesn’t care what Trump thinks about the Israeli-Palestinian dispute or the situation in Syria either. To be sure, these two
countries have a long history of ignoring U.S. advice and interests, but their
indifference to Washington’s views seems to have reached new heights. And now
South Korea has announced it will begin talks with North Korea, despite the
Trump administration’s belief that the time was not right.
Meanwhile, the EU and Japan
just reached a large trade deal; TPP-like talks are resuming without the United States; and the leaders of
Germany and Canada — two of America’s closest allies — have openly spoken of
the need to chart their own course. Even the foreign minister of Australia —
another staunch U.S. ally — has taken a dig at Trump for his demeaning remarks to
France’s first lady. And who can blame them? I mean: If you were a responsible
foreign leader, would you take the advice of the man who had the wisdom to
appoint Sebastian Gorka to a White House national security position, wants to
cut the State Department budget by 30 percent, and thinks Jared Kushner is a
genius who can handle difficult diplomatic assignments?
The United States is still very
powerful, of course, so both allies and adversaries will continue to be
cautious when dealing with it. That’s why Emmanuel Macron of France and Justin
Trudeau of Canada have treated Trump with more respect than he deserves.
You’d tread carefully, too, if
you found yourself in the same room as a drunk rhinoceros. But you probably
wouldn’t ask the rhino for advice or consult it on geopolitical strategy.
You’d tread carefully, too, if you
found yourself in the same room as a drunk rhinoceros. But you probably
wouldn’t ask the rhino for advice or consult it on geopolitical strategy.
Instead of relying on U.S.
guidance and (generally) supporting U.S. policy initiatives, states that lose
confidence in America’s competence will begin to hedge and make their own
arrangements. They’ll do deals with each other and sometimes with countries that
the United States regards as adversaries. That is happening already with China
and Iran, and you can expect more of the same as long as U.S. foreign policy
combines the strategic acumen of Wile E. Coyote, the disciplined teamwork of
the Three Stooges, and the well-oiled efficiency of the frat in Animal
House.
Paleoconservatives and
isolationists might welcome this outcome, because they think the United States
has been bearing too large a share of global burdens and that it just screws
things up when it tries to run the world. They have a point, but they take it
way too far. If the United States were to disengage as far as they would like,
the other 95 percent of humanity would proceed to create a world order where
U.S. influence would be considerably smaller and where events in a few key
regions would almost certainly evolve in ways that the United States would
eventually regret. Instead of retreating to “Fortress America,” it makes more
sense to adopt the policy of offshore balancing that John Mearsheimer and I outlined a year ago.
But offshore balancing won’t
work if other states have little or no confidence in U.S. judgment, skill, and
competence. Why? Because the strategy calls for the United States to “hold the
balance” in key regions (i.e., Europe, Asia, and perhaps the Middle East) and
to stand ready to bring its power to bear in these areas should a potential
hegemon emerge there. The countries with which the United States would join
forces should that occur have to be sufficiently convinced that Washington can
gauge threats properly and intervene with skill and effect when necessary. In
short, the credibility of U.S. commitments depends on a minimum reputation for
competence, and that is precisely the currency that Trump and Co. have been
squandering.
To be clear, I am not saying
there are not a lot of competent people serving in the U.S. government or that
the United States is incapable of doing anything right these days. Indeed, my
hat is off to the dedicated public servants who are trying to do their jobs
despite the chaos in the White House and Trump’s deliberate effort to cripple
our foreign-policy machinery.
Nor am I saying that Donald
Trump is incompetent at everything. He is, by all accounts, a much better than
average golfer (even if he may be — now here’s a shocker — prone to cheating), which may explain why he prefers
golfing to governing. He has been adept at getting attractive foreign women to
marry him, though not especially good at making the marriages last. And he is
clearly an absolutely world-class bullshit artist, with a genuinely impressive
ability to lie, prevaricate, evade, mislead, stretch the truth, and dissemble.
These skills clearly served him well as a real estate developer, but they
aren’t helping him very much as president. Because once people decide you’re a
bumbler, either they take advantage of your ineptitude or they prefer to deal
with those who are more reliable. It gives me no joy to say this, but can you
blame them?
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