<谷歌翻譯>
北京要以眼還眼？以牙還牙？
美國總統當選者採取了第一步升級的梯子，但中國緝獲一架海軍無人機顯示它很高興跟隨。
比爾•海頓 2016年12月19日
春天早到了南海。許多分析家認為，中國將在新當選的總統上任後做一些測試。布什面臨了一個早期的事件，當一艘中國護衛艦在2001年3月幾乎撞毀了USNS Bowditch和幾個星期後，幾個月後他開始了間諜飛機碰撞。巴拉克•奧巴馬在2009年3月發生了USNS無可挑戰的事件。但是對於當選的唐納德•特朗普，中國緝獲了一個隸屬於USNS
Bowditch的水下無人機，提前了。
我們只能推測為什麼。也許這是對特朗普與台灣總統蔡英文打電話的反應，以及隨後關於改變美國對“一個中國”政策立場的評論。也許這是要發生的東西。
無人機扣押炸毀了美國和中國海軍之間的友好關係，巴拉克奧巴馬總統的政府在過去幾年裡一直堅持不懈地追求。通過港口訪問，參與聯合演習，領導討論和實際協議建立的商譽已受到嚴重破壞。有一個簡單的術語，在沒有合法理由的海上抓住船隻：海盜。
在國際法的眼中，這一行動使中國海軍與索馬裡海盜使用AK-47突擊步槍。
中國官員一再表示，他們的國家不會對南中國海的法治構成威脅。習近平主席在2015年11月在新加坡告訴聽眾：“從未有過任何航行和飛越自由的問題;也不會有任何在未來，因為中國需要不受阻礙的商業通過這些水域比任何人。
檢獲無人機是一個提醒東南亞國家和超越，中國的行動往往不符合他們的光滑保證。它只增加了在區域首都關於中國崛起的後果的警報，並增加了他們通過新的安全安排減輕風險的願望
- 無論是與美國，還是彼此或鄰近的朋友，如日本，印度和澳大利亞。
為了中國增加這些關注，它必須決定它有更多的獲得而不是偷竊無人機的損失。它可能希望獲得設備上的技術和數據，或者希望阻止美國使用其潛艇附近的無人機。不過，最重要的是，它可能想要傳達一個關於美國在該地區的力量的限制的消息，以及關於侵入其核心利益，特別是在台灣的核心利益的後果。
USNS Bowditch是計算升級的明顯目標。如同2009年的USNS無可挑剔（以及2001年的EP-3偵察機），這艘船是非武裝的。它主要是民用船員，其使命是監視和海洋研究。中國軍隊厭惡其活動，認為他們對海南彈道導彈潛艇基地榆林的安全構成特別威脅。對中國來說，這不是和平研究，而是軍事衝突的準備。如果美國知道如何追蹤和跟蹤北京的潛艇，它將能夠抵消其核威懾的一部分。
在理論上可能的是，癲癇發作完全是自發的。據美國太平洋艦隊的前情報處長，現在在日內瓦安全政策中心的詹姆斯•弗內爾（James
Fanell）說，自2015年10月以來，中國船隻已經影響了進入南海國際水域的每艘美國軍艦;據美國國防部報導，博迪奇的影子是大朗三級救援救援船南九郭510.中國國防部說，“中國海軍救生艇在水域中有一個未被識別的裝置的南海“是可笑的，但至少可以想像，中國船員只是抓住機會的目標，沒有北京的直接命令。
然而，五角大樓對事件的描述使得這似乎不太可能。
TheBowditch的沿岸戰鬥空間感應滑翔機可以在海上停留幾天，幾週，甚至幾個月，他們可以在表面上定位和抓住的時刻是罕見的。事實上，Nan-Jiu
510恰好在Bowditch從水中檢索到一架無人機並準備收回第二架飛機的時刻發生了乾預，為了報復特朗普最近的評論，它被命令跟著美國船的明確意圖抓住無人機。
事件的位置提供了關於中國計算侵略的進一步線索。它發生在離中國600英裡處，甚至在該國地圖上標註的模糊的U形中國“邊界”之外。一個看法是，這標誌著中國在南海實現控制的努力大大升級。
EP-3和無可挑剔的事件發生在距離海南僅70海裡處。 2001年的博迪奇事件是在黃海，在中國海岸幾百英裡之內。相比之下，無人機的緝獲量遠遠超過任何以前聲稱的“中國水域”。
然而，北京不可能突然決定擴大其在南中國海已經擴張的索賠，包括在菲律賓蘇比克灣西北部57海裡的一個地區。看來更有可能的是，在特朗普的評論之後，南九期510的船員被給予綠燈，在第一次可用的機會抓住無人機。這只是巧合，這個機會只是遠在中國。特朗普在12月2日的台灣電話會議安排下，走上了升級階梯的第一步。特朗普在一個多星期後增加了第二步，他對福克斯新聞的評論說，美國沒有義務遵循一個中國政策。現在中國顯示它也可以升級，並且為了它的威望和主權，願意在與美國的海軍合作或區域批評方面承擔巨大的代價。
梯子從這裡通向哪裡？特朗普的採訪評論表明，他的團隊中至少有一些成員正在尋找一個新的現狀與中國涵蓋所有這些問題的協議。
“我不知道為什麼我們必須受”一個中國“政策的約束，除非我們與中國有關的其他事情，包括貿易，”他告訴福克斯新聞周日。特朗普提到他和他的團隊在中國看到的其他問題，包括貶值，重稅關稅，北京在南中國海的大規模堡壘建設和朝鮮的問題。
特朗普顧問和前中央情報局局長詹姆斯•伍爾西建議“一個偉大的交易，美國接受中國的政治和社會結構，並承諾不以任何方式破壞它，以換取中國的承諾，不挑戰亞洲的現狀”。問題該地區目前正在尋求答案是，為了達到新的現狀，特朗普願意對中國的政治和社會結構造成多大的破壞？或者，換句話說，為了達到這個位置，他將準備吸收多少對美國和地區利益的損害？
在所有這些問題中，無人機的實際命運仍然是，目前，一個謎。它保留在南九街510，還是被卸載在中國的一個新的人工島在南沙群島？中國技術人員目前正在探索其秘密嗎？中國國防部已經承諾退回，但沒有指定多少件將被退回。特朗普通過微博推遲了大家的平衡，最近通過tweeting，“我們應該告訴中國，我們不想要他們偷走的無人機。 - 讓他們保持它！“也許他考慮了中國可能需要一些讓步作為回報的可能性。對於特朗普營地，堅持其斷言線似乎比無人機的損失更重要。
然而，結束了，今年的Bowditchincident將被視為奧巴馬對中國戰略的合適的標誌，它強調了在全球挑戰和避免衝突的合作。
然而，它結束了，今年的博迪奇事件將被視為奧巴馬的對華戰略的合適的標誌，它強調了在全球挑戰和避免衝突的合作。一個成功的結果，無人機返回和避免的危機，將被視為一種平反。東南亞國家認為美國
- 中國衝突在其鄰國是最可能的結果，將非常感謝。
然而，一大批批評者，遠遠超出了特朗普政府的看法，認為奧巴馬總統對風險的厭惡只使北京在南中國海上更加激烈。特朗普顧問亞歷山大•格雷和彼得•納瓦羅在外交政策中寫的他們的“和平通過實力”的方法到中國。他們準備埋葬奧巴馬的戰略。我們即將看到一個具有更大風險傾向的政府將在東亞和東南亞釋放。
The U.S. president-elect took
the first steps up the ladder of escalation, but China’s
seizure of a naval drone shows it’s glad to follow.
BY BILL
HAYTON
DECEMBER 19, 2016
Spring has come early to the
South China Sea. Many analysts had assumed that China would do something to
test the newly elected president once he was in office. George W. Bush faced an
earlier incident when a Chinese frigate nearly rammed the USNS Bowditch in March 2001 and the spy plane collision a few weeks later,
months after he was inaugurated. Barack Obama had the USNS Impeccable incident in March 2009. But for President-elect
Donald Trump, China’s seizure of an underwater drone,
affiliated with the USNS Bowditch, has come ahead
of schedule.
We can only speculate why.
Perhaps this was a response to Trump’scontroversial
phone call with Taiwanese President Tsai
Ing-wen and subsequent comments about changing America’s
stance toward the “One-China”
policy. Perhaps it was something that was going to happen anyway.
The drone seizure has torpedoed
the rapprochement between the U.S. and Chinese navies that President Barack
Obama’s administration has steadily pursued
over the past few years. The goodwill built up through port
visits, participation in joint exercises, leadership
discussions, and practical
agreements has been badly damaged. There’s a simple term for seizing a vessel at sea without lawful
reason: piracy.
In the eyes of international
law, this action puts the Chinese navy in the same category as Somali pirates
with AK-47 assault rifles.
In the eyes of international
law, this action puts the Chinese navy in the same category as Somali pirates
with AK-47 assault rifles.
Chinese officials have
repeatedly said their country does not pose a threat to the rule of law in the
South China Sea. President Xi Jinping told an audience so in Singapore in
November 2015: “There has never been any problem with
the freedom of navigation and overflight; nor will there ever be any in the
future, for China needs unimpeded commerce through these waters more than
anyone else.”
The seizure of the drone is a
reminder to countries in Southeast Asia and beyond that Chinese actions are
often inconsistent with their smooth assurances. It only adds to the alarm felt
in regional capitals about the consequences of China’s rise
and increases their desire to mitigate the risks through new security
arrangements — whether with the United States or
with each other or among nearby friends such as Japan, India, and Australia.
For China to increase these
concerns, it must have decided that it had more to gain than lose from stealing
the drone. It may want access to the technology and data on board the device,
or it might wish to deter the United States from using drones near its
submarines. Above all, however, it probably wants to send a message about the
limits to U.S. power in the region and about the consequences of trespassing on
its core interests, particularly over Taiwan.
The USNS Bowditch was an obvious target for a calculated escalation.
Like the USNS Impeccable in 2009 (and the EP-3 surveillance plane in 2001),
the ship is unarmed. It has a predominantly civilian crew, and its mission is
surveillance and ocean research. The Chinese military loathes its activities,
regarding them as a particular threat to the security of its ballistic missile
submarines based at Yulin, on the southern tip of Hainan. For China, this is
not peaceful research but preparation for military conflict. If the United
States knows how to trace and follow Beijing’s submarines, it will be able
to neutralize part of its nuclear deterrent.
It’s
theoretically possible that the seizure was entirely spontaneous. According to
James Fanell, the former director of intelligence at U.S. Pacific Fleet and now
at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, since October 2015 Chinese vessels have
shadowed every American warship entering the international waters of the South
China Sea; the Bowditch’s
shadow, according to the U.S. Defense Department, was a Dalang III-class rescue
and salvage ship, the Nan-Jiu 510. The explanation given by the Chinese
Ministry of Defense that “a Chinese naval lifeboat
located an unidentified device in the waters of the South China Sea” is laughable, but it is at least conceivable that the
Chinese crew just grabbed a target of opportunity without a direct order from
Beijing.
The Pentagon’s account of the incident, however, makes this seem
unlikely. TheBowditch’s littoral battlespace
sensing gliders can remain at sea for days, weeks, or even months, and the moments when they can
be located and seized on the surface are rare. The fact that the Nan-Jiu 510 happened to be in a position
to intervene at just the moment the Bowditch had retrieved one drone from the water and was about
to retrieve a second suggests, in retaliation for Trump’s
recent comments, it had been ordered to follow the American boat with the
explicit intention of seizing the drone.
The location of the incident
offers further clues about China’s calculated aggression. It
happened about 600 miles from China, outside even the ambiguous U-shaped
Chinese “boundary” marked
on that country’s maps. One reading is that this
marks a major escalation in China’s efforts to attain control
in the South China Sea. The EP-3 and Impeccable incidents took place just 70 nautical miles from
Hainan. The 2001 Bowditch incident
was in the Yellow Sea, within a couple of hundred miles of the Chinese coast.
The drone seizure, by contrast, was well beyond any previously claimed “Chinese waters.”
However, it’s unlikely that Beijing has suddenly decided to expand its
already expansive claims in the South China Sea to include an area just 57 nautical miles northwest of Subic Bay
in the Philippines. It seems more likely that, after Trump’s comments, the crew of the Nan-Jiu 510 was given the green light to seize the drone at the
first available opportunity. It was just coincidence that the opportunity only
arose so far from China. The Trump team took its first step on the ladder of
escalation with the arrangement of the Taiwan call on Dec. 2. Trump added a
second step a little more than a week later with his comments to Fox News that the
United States was under no obligation to follow the One-China policy. Now China
is showing that it, too, can escalate and that it’s willing, for the sake of
its prestige and sovereignty, to bear a significant price in terms of naval
cooperation with the United States or regional criticism.
Where does the ladder lead to
from here? Trump’s interview comments suggest that at least
some members of his team are looking for an agreement on a new status quo with
China covering all these issues. “I don’t know
why we have to be bound by a ‘one China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with
other things, including trade,” he told Fox News Sunday. Trump mentioned other issues he and
his team see with China, including devaluation, heavy border taxes, Beijing’s massive fortress-building in the South China Sea, and
the problem of North Korea.
Trump advisor and former CIA
Director James Woolsey has suggested “a grand bargain in
which the U.S. accepts China’s political and social
structure and commits not to disrupt it in any way in exchange for China’s commitment not to challenge the status quo in Asia.” The question to which the region is now seeking answers
is how much disruption to China’s political and social
structure will Trump be willing to inflict in order to reach the new status
quo? Or, to put it another way, how much damage to U.S. and regional interests
will he be prepared to absorb in order to reach that position?
Amid all of these questions,
the actual fate of the drone remains, at present, a mystery. Does it remain on
the Nan-Jiu 510, or has it been offloaded at one of China’s new artificial islands in the Spratlys? Are Chinese
technologists currently probing its secrets? The Chinese Ministry of Defense
has promised to return it but didn’t specify how many pieces it
will be returned in. Trump threw everyone off balance recently by tweeting, “We should tell China that we
don’t want the drone they stole back.- let them keep it!” Perhaps he has considered the likelihood that China may
want some concessions in return. For the Trump camp, sticking to its assertive
line seems more important than the loss of the drone.
However it ends, this year’s Bowditchincident will be
seen as a fitting epitaph for Obama’s strategy toward China,
which has stressed cooperation on global challenges and the avoidance of
conflict.
However it ends, this year’s Bowditch incident will be seen as a fitting epitaph for Obama’s strategy toward China, which has stressed cooperation on
global challenges and the avoidance of conflict. A successful outcome, in
which the drone is returned and a crisis averted, will be hailed as a
vindication. Southeast Asian states, which regard a U.S.-China conflict in
their neighborhood as the worst possible outcome, will be hugely grateful.
However, a large group of
critics, well beyond the incoming Trump administration, believe that President
Obama’s aversion to risk has only
emboldened Beijing in the South China Sea. Trump advisors Alexander Gray and
Peter Navarro have written
in Foreign Policy of their “peace through strength” approach to China. They are
ready to bury the Obama strategy. We are about to see what an administration
with a greater predilection for risk will unleash in East and Southeast Asia.
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