川普對台灣意味著什麼？

川普對台灣意味著什麼？

（Ajin開口）

如題的分析報導，太多了，看不完。需要網友們幫忙看完，消化，分析給大家享受。僅挑一篇，用谷歌翻譯。這篇大意是說：

川普的國際觀是歐洲，穆斯林，和中國。世界的組成就是這麼多，這麼簡單。頂多加上墨西哥和加拿大。川普根本連台灣在哪裡？是啥樣邦國？有啥樣議題，對美國有啥關係，川普一頭霧水啦。

這樣的總統，配合上孤立主義，又要商業發達，又要對中國限東限西，很多自相矛盾的政策，可能性都會影響到台灣。但不管如何，台灣需要做最壞打算的準備，因為大變化隨時會來臨，而川普絕對是一個大變化的來源。

說到變化，有兩個極端：一是高價典當台澎給習董，川普狠狠賺一筆！另一是AIT改制升級成為大使館！在這兩個極端，川普四或八年之間是否會讓任一極端發生？嘿嘿嘿，你說呢？

若不會，或不知，那有啥值得煩惱的？繼續安心打共匪咩！

相關閱讀：

1. EDITORIAL: What Trump means for Taiwan
2. What Does The Trump Presidency Mean For Taiwan And The Asia .
3. What Does President Trump mean for Taiwan, China and Asia?
4. If a President Trump Turns His Back on Taiwan - WSJ
5. China Just Won The U.S. Election | Foreign Policy
6. What would a Donald Trump presidency mean for Asia? | Asia Times
7. What Would A Trump Presidency Mean For China? - Forbes
8. Why a Trump presidency could spell big trouble for Taiwan | Brookings ...
9. Could Trump be bad for Taiwan? - The China Post

https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/2016/11/09/what-does-trump-mean-for-taiwan/

特朗普對台灣意味著什麼？

在過去十個月的幾次，我曾想過為這個博客寫瘋狂的美國選舉。每次，我都決定反對。畢竟，這是一個關於台灣選舉的博客，而不是全世界的選舉。現在，在看到令人震驚的選舉結果進來幾個小時後，我覺得有必要解決特朗普總統的想法。

作為一個美國人，我是一個堅實的藍色黨派。我更喜歡民主黨對共和黨。事實上，特朗普和共和黨人現在將扭轉奧巴馬和民主黨人組織起來的很多東西，對我來說是非常痛苦的。認為國家醫療保健可能會被削弱，最高法院將繼續由保守派控制，使我對我的胃病。 ％$＃@％＃！

然而，這些是在民主中勝利和失敗的普通黨派痛苦。選舉應該有後果，唯一比總統特朗普和共和黨執行（愚蠢的）共和黨政策更糟的是，如果沒有選舉，使（錯頭）選民沒有機會放置（卡通化誤導）人在辦公室。我們美國人可以生存另一個循環（根本上有缺陷）的政策失誤。

我更擔心另外兩件事。作為一個台灣人和美國人，我擔心特朗普對民主規範的理解和承諾。在競選期間，他攻擊了各種少數民族和媒體，既要求其他行為者欺負和攻擊他們，也有明確的威脅使用法院來趕牛。他威脅要把希拉里·克林頓在監獄裡是不安心。

我擔心的另一件大事是特朗普對在世界各地維持美國聯盟的承諾。他似乎把外部關係看作零和交易方程。如果你運行貿易順差，你就贏了。如果你運行貿易赤字，你失去了，另一邊可能是你為一個吸盤。他似乎沒有從貿易互利的角度來思考。在這個世界的零和經濟觀點，他似乎不像以前的總統那樣高度重視安全關係。至少在他的競選修辭中，他沒有看到與日本，韓國或北約的互助條約是不可談判的。恰恰相反，他認為這些是現金問題。如果美國花了很多錢維持這些軍事陣地，特朗普看到一個問題。他們正在美國玩耍;他們應該自己支付。這是美國總統自二戰以來沒有採取的立場，這是我們在台灣的根本威脅。

台灣作為一個獨立的政治實體的繼續存在取決於美國的保護傘。 與韓國，日本或北約不同，台灣沒有與美國的正式互助條約，所以這個傘更脆弱。 如果特朗普不認為與俄羅斯在北約發生衝突是值得的，我不禁想想他會如何感覺到與中國在台灣的衝突。 在過去25年裡，台灣已經能夠指出它的民主制度，它與美國的密切經濟聯繫，以及它激烈的親美的輿論，華盛頓一直認為這種關係是一個重要的美國利益。 這是一個兩黨的立場：民主黨和共和黨人都分享了關於美國在世界上的領導地位的必要性的基本假設，既保持穩定，又保持具有類似價值的友好民主盟友的聯盟。 特朗普正在挑戰那些根本的基礎。

不要犯錯：特朗普的選舉並不意味著 - 正如台灣的許多專家似乎認為 - 我們將照常在台灣和美國之間開展業務。普遍的智慧似乎是，外交政策取決於大的官僚，在政府，智囊團和企業中密切的關係，所以特朗普將不能單獨地上升他們。問題是總統在外交政策上有巨大的自由。特朗普剛剛完成了對美國企業的敵意收購，所以他對所有這些精英網絡很少。我們還不知道他將由誰負責國務院，但我不認為特朗普總統將所有決定交給標準的共和黨人。共和黨精英似乎在賭博，他們可以控製或指導特朗普，但這還沒有工作。到目前為止，特朗普似乎很有能力推翻和彎曲共和黨精英的意志。如果特朗普想做某事，他將不容易被布魯金斯，CSIS，美國企業研究所，甚至國務院的專家勸阻。

我們可以希望善良的忽視。特朗普很少知道日本或韓國，更不用說亞洲的任何小國。他對外部世界的（粗略）知識似乎集中在歐洲和中東。我從來沒有聽說過他提到台灣。當然，他提到中國，但只有很淺的術語。 （他們的領導人非常聰明，他們勝過美國人，他們奪走了美國的工廠和工作，他們出色地操縱他們的貨幣。）與大多數國家一樣，他似乎認為需要的是新的貿易條件：他要去談判一個更好的交易。中國作為竊取美國工作的地方的願景對我並不安慰。我害怕一個可能的協議。只要特朗普不認為民主是根本重要的，台灣可能很容易成為特朗普可以在中國前面搖擺的議價籌碼。

我希望我沒有寫上一句話。這是可怕和噁心的我。然而，這是一個具體的危險。台灣可以成為議價籌碼。 （情景：中國放慢對美國的製成品出口，美國可能會靜靜地通知台灣政府軍事支持可能不會出現，所以台灣可能想與中國談判和平條約）。

台灣需做什麼？

首先，在接下來的幾個月裡，台灣需要密切關注特朗普新政府，看看特朗普在設計他的外交政策時如何跟隨他的競選修辭。然而，雖然我們可能希望最好的，但我們應該準備最壞的。

第二，特朗普不喜歡任何人從美國軍事預算中解脫出來的想法。如果這是觸發，那麼台灣必須證明它不是一個自由騎士。多年來，美國一直在推動其盟國將3％的GDP用於軍事預算。現在是台灣實現這一目標的時候了。據我所知，台灣目前的軍費約佔GDP的2.3％。用新設備，更高的薪水，更多的人員或更好的設施來給軍隊淋水可能不是有效的。 （事實上，我在最近幾個月被告知幾次，美國外交和軍方不再強調3％的目標，因為其他用途的寶貴預算資金可能做更多，以加強盟國的經濟和軍隊）。但是，它可能是好的戰略花費3％，即使它是有點浪費，只是作為一種手段防止特朗普選擇台灣作為一個自由騎士。台灣不能給他藉口，把台灣作為世界的榜樣。

第三，特朗普一再譴責華盛頓精英，特別是布什政府的精英，試圖在中東創造民主。伊拉克戰爭是一個巨大的錯誤，因為它總是不可能奇蹟般地將伊拉克轉變成一個民主的社會。 “促進民主”證明華盛頓精英完全脫節。台灣的挑戰是在美國政治話語中與伊拉克分離。台灣應該與其他民主國家合作，強調沒有必要創造或建立民主。台灣已經是一個蓬勃發展的民主國家。台灣已經擁有美國價值觀。台灣已經是美國的自然朋友和盟友。在沒有人存在的情況下嘗試創造民主可能是愚蠢的，但美國放棄已經存在的友好民主盟友也是愚蠢的。這是關於捍衛民主。

最後，台灣在未來幾年可能要對中國更加和解。特朗普不願意在世界各地積極投射美國力量。困難的真相是，美國現在不太可能支持台灣與中國發生衝突。台灣可能要更努力一點，以防止這種衝突發生。我不是建議單方面投降中國。相反，我建議台灣可能不想對國際外交辱罵這麼大聲，甚至可能想探討一些中國與台灣關係的替代模糊方案。台灣不想做的是陳水扁在任期結束時所進行的那種公然的，侵略性的民族主義行為。這在昨天很重要;明天更加重要。

唐納德·特朗普被選為美國總統。 這標誌著美國政治的巨大動盪。 以前被認為是神聖不可侵犯的許多想法即將受到挑戰。 很少有美國人考慮外交政策投票，但外交政策將（可能）經歷一些根本性的轉變。 華盛頓州的友好人士可能會向台灣保證，他們仍然重視美國與台灣的關係，並希望保持其穩定，但這些人可能突然比昨天的影響小得多。 我們台灣最糟糕的事情就是忽視新的現實，儘管它可能是令人不快的。 變化正在進行，我們最好為他們做好準備

https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/2016/11/09/what-does-trump-mean-for-taiwan/

What does Trump mean for Taiwan?

Several times over the past ten months, I have thought about writing something about the crazy American election for this blog. Each time, I have decided against it. This is, after all, a blog about elections in Taiwan, not elections worldwide. Now, a few hours after watching the shocking election result come in, I feel the need to grapple with the idea of President Trump.

As an American, I am a solid blue partisan. I strongly prefer the Democratic Party over the Republican Party. The fact that the Trump and the Republicans will now reverse much of what Obama and the Democrats put together is very painful to me. The thought that national health care will probably be gutted and the Supreme Court will continue to be dominated by conservatives makes me sick to my stomach. %$#@%#!

However, these are the ordinary partisan pains of victory and defeat in democracy. Elections are supposed to have consequences, and the only thing worse than President Trump and the Republicans implementing (stupid) Republican policies would be if there were no elections so that (wrong-headed) voters didn’t have the opportunity to put (cartoonishly misguided) people in office. We Americans can survive another cycle of (fundamentally flawed) policy missteps.

I am much more worried about two other things. As a Taiwanese and as an American, I worry about Trump’s understanding and commitment to democratic norms. During the campaign, he attacked various minorities and the media, both with tacit invitations for other actors to bully and attack them and also with explicit threats to use the courts to cow them into submission. His threat to put Hillary Clinton in jail is not reassuring.

The other big thing I worry about is Trump’s commitment to maintaining American alliances around the world. He seems to view foreign relationships as zero-sum trading equations. If you run a trade surplus, you are winning. If you run a trade deficit, you are losing and the other side is probably playing you for a sucker. He does not seem to think in terms of mutual gains from trade. In this zero sum economic view of the world, he does not seem to value security relationships as highly as previous presidents have. At least in his campaign rhetoric, he did not see the mutual defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, or NATO as non-negotiable. Quite the contrary, he sees these as questions of cash. If the USA is paying a lot of money to maintain these military positions, Trump sees a problem. They are playing the USA for suckers; they should pay their own way. This is a position that no American president has taken since WWII, and it is a fundamental threat to us here in Taiwan.

Taiwan’s continued existence as an independent political entity depends on the American protective umbrella. Unlike Korea, Japan, or NATO, Taiwan does not have a formal mutual defense treaty with the USA, so this umbrella is more tenuous. If Trump doesn’t think it is worth it to clash with Russia over NATO, I shudder to consider how he might feel about a clash with China over Taiwan. Over the past 25 years, Taiwan has been able to point to its democratic system, its close economic ties with the USA, and its fiercely pro-American public opinion, and Washington has always seen the relationship as a vital American interest. This has been a bipartisan position: both Democrats and Republicans shared fundamental assumptions about the need for American leadership in the world, both to maintain stability and to maintain alliances of friendly democratic allies with similar values. Trump is challenging those fundamental underpinnings.

 Make no mistake: Trump’s election does not mean – as many experts here in Taiwan seem to think – we will have business as usual between Taiwan and the USA. The common wisdom seems to be that foreign policy depends on large bureaucracies, dense relationships based in government, think tanks, and businesses, so Trump won’t be able to single-handedly upend them. The problem is that the president has enormous freedom in foreign policy. Trump has just completed a hostile takeover of the American establishment, so he owes very little to all those elite networks. We do not yet know who he will put in charge of the State Department, but I do not expect President Trump to simply hand over all decisions to a standard Republican. Republican elites seem to be gambling on the idea that they can control or guide Trump, but that hasn’t worked yet. So far, Trump has seemed quite capable of pushing back and bending the Republican elites to his will. If Trump wants to do something, he won’t be easily dissuaded by experts at Brookings, CSIS, the American Enterprise Institute, or even the State Department.

We could hope for benign neglect. Trump apparently knows very little about Japan or Korea, much less any of the smaller countries in Asia. His (cursory) knowledge of the outside world seems to be focused on Europe and the Middle East. I’ve never heard him mention Taiwan. Of course, he has mentioned China, but only in very shallow terms. (Their leaders are very smart, they outcompete Americans, they take away American factories and jobs, and they brilliantly manipulate their currency.) As with most countries, he seems to think that what is needed are new terms of trade: he is going to negotiate a better deal. The vision of China as a place that steals American jobs is not comforting to me. I am terrified of a possible deal. As long as Trump doesn’t see democracy as fundamentally important, Taiwan might easily become a bargaining chip that Trump could dangle in front of China.

I wish I didn’t have to write that previous sentence. It is terrifying and nauseating to me. However, this is now a concrete danger. Taiwan could become a bargaining chip. (Scenario: China slows down the exports of manufactured goods to the USA, and America might quietly inform the Taiwanese government that military support might not be forthcoming so Taiwan might want to negotiate a peace treaty with China.)

What is Taiwan to do? First, Taiwan needs to watch the new Trump administration very closely over the next few months to see just how far Trump will follow his campaign rhetoric in designing his foreign policy. However, while we might hope for the best, we should probably be preparing for the worst.

Second, Trump doesn’t like the idea of anyone free-riding off the American military budget. If that is the trigger, then Taiwan has to demonstrate that it is not a free-rider. For years, the USA has been pushing its allies to spend 3% of GDP on military budgets. Now is the time for Taiwan to reach for that goal. As I understand, Taiwan currently spends about 2.3% of GDP on the military. It might not be efficient to shower the military with new equipment, higher salaries, more personnel, or better facilities. (In fact, I have been told several times in recent months that American diplomatic and military no longer stress the 3% goal since other uses of precious budget funds may do more to strengthen allies’ economies and militaries.) However, it might be good strategy to spend 3%, even if it is somewhat wasteful, just as a means of preventing Trump from singling Taiwan out as a free-rider. Taiwan must not give him an excuse to make an example of Taiwan to the rest of the world.

Third, Trump has repeatedly lambasted the Washington elites, especially those from the Bush administration, for trying to create democracy in the Middle East. The Iraq war was a colossal mistake because it was always going to be impossible to miraculously transform Iraq into a democratic society. “Promotion of democracy” is proof that the Washington elite are completely out of touch. The challenge for Taiwan is to separate itself from Iraq in the American political discourse. Taiwan should cooperate with other democratic countries to stress that there is no need to create or builddemocracy. Taiwan is already a thriving democracy. Taiwan already shares American values. Taiwan is already a natural friend and ally for the United States. It might be folly to try to create democracy where none exists, but it would also be folly for the USA to abandon friendly democratic allies that already exist. This is about defending democracy.

Finally, Taiwan may have to be more conciliatory toward China for the next few years. Trump is not predisposed to want to actively project American power around the world. The hard truth is that the USA is now less likely to support Taiwan in a clash with China. Taiwan may have to work a little harder to prevent such a clash from happening. I am not suggesting a unilateral surrender to China. Rather, I am suggesting that Taiwan might not want to scream so loudly about international diplomatic indignities, and it might even want to explore some alternate fuzzy formulations of the relationship between China and Taiwan. What Taiwan does not want to do is the sorts of overt, aggressive nationalist acts that Chen Shui-bian engaged in toward the end of his term. That was important yesterday; it will be even more important tomorrow.

Donald Trump has been elected president of the USA. This marks an enormous upheaval in American politics. Many ideas that were previously considered sacrosanct are about to be challenged. Very few Americans cast their votes with foreign policy in mind, but foreign policy will (probably) nonetheless experience some fundamental shifts. Friendly people in the Washington establishment might reassure Taiwanese that they still value the American relationship with Taiwan and hope to maintain its stability, but those people may suddenly have far less influence than they did yesterday. The worst thing we in Taiwan could do is to ignore the new reality, however unpleasant it may be. Changes are afoot, and we had better be prepared for them.