華盛頓郵報:中國正走向崩潰 世界將陷入衰退

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華盛頓郵報:中國正走向崩潰 世界將陷入衰退

Robert Samuelson 2015-5-28

（譯者註）美國不時會出現唱衰中國的聲音，此前美國學者沈大偉高調預言中國崩潰，而今《華盛頓郵報》也刊文分析中國是否會崩潰。分析認爲，這是美國對中國仍抱有冷戰思維。

《華盛頓郵報》5月24日發表題爲《中國正走向崩潰？》（China’s coming crash?）的文章稱：

到了該擔憂中國的時候了。

在任何能夠威脅世界經濟的災難名單上，中國的崩潰總是位于第一位的，或者名列前茅。只不過崩潰的將由什麽組成任屬未知。中國的經濟增長已經由每年10%降到了7%，用曆史標准來看，這仍然挺高的。但是問題是，中國的減速是否會繼續，增長是否會進一步放慢。

一個衰落的中國將會使得世界再次陷入衰退。因爲中國是世界原材料的主要消費者，它們的價格將會陷入低迷。中國基本工業品的過剩産能將會越來越多地用于出口，同樣是以低迷的價格。這將阻礙全球商業投資的複蘇。信心也將受挫。

這會有什麽政治後果嗎？ 前IMF官員、美國康奈爾大學經濟學教授普拉薩德（Eswar Prasad）說，中國政府是通過承諾經濟進步發展來維持政權合法性的。如果這個承諾實現不了，很難知道中國群衆會做出什麽樣的反應。中國的領導人又會做出怎樣的反應。他們會變得更加民族主義和強硬以轉移民衆對經濟失望的注意力嗎？

美國人將受到這些潛在的溢出效應的影響。普拉薩德懷疑最壞的情況是否會出現，但是許多其他的學者認爲會出現。畢竟，中國領導人反複證僞了那些末日預言者。有許多理由去相信，中國的經濟能夠繁榮。如果中國人變得更加揮霍一些，他們的經濟有可能繁榮。

但是，仍有有日本的前車之鑒。在上世紀80年代，日本被認爲是世界上最有活力的經濟，超越了美國。但是，日本的前景最後崩潰了。新的亞洲的競爭者（台灣，韓國）以及貨幣升值摧毀了日本出口增長型的經濟。由于無法建立一個新的增長模式，日本從此一蹶不振。

中國現在處于相似的時刻。普遍認爲中國的經濟模式已經過時了。中國的模式強調出口增長以及高投資支出。2008至2009年的金融危機暴露了兩者的局限。

美國和歐洲陷入衰退，中國的出口下降了。房地産或成爲中國經濟增長的最大障礙，因爲它占全國GDP的25%，隨著房屋的供過于求，房屋建設正在放緩。房屋的價格同近期的最高值相比已經下跌了近6%。有專家認爲，下跌最大幅度有可能達到10%。雪上加霜的是，地方政府對基礎設施工程投入的減少。爲了給這些工程投入資金，地方政府的債務猛增，而今中央政府正在努力放緩債務的增長。

但是這些都並不一定意味著全面的金融危機，也存在一些緩解危機的因素。中國的經濟困境同美國的相似，它需要一個不依賴于反複的人工刺激的可持續增長的方法。

有意思的是，中國的政策決策者以及外國經濟學家一致同意需要采取措施將經濟模式由投資轉向消費型。

雖然未來的路很明顯，充滿了政治和心理障礙—-既得利益以及根深蒂固的習慣。一個合理的擔憂是中國不可能在不經曆一場重大崩潰的情況下從這裏到達那裏。

原文︰

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-coming-crash/2015/05/24/fd83ec7e-0095-11e5-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html

China’s coming crash?

By Robert J. Samuelson May 24

It’s time to worry about China.

On any list of calamities threatening the world economy, a China crash ranks at or near the top. Just what would constitute a “crash” is murky. Already, China’s sizzling rate of economic growth has declined from 10 percent annually — the average from the late 1970s until 2011 — to 7 percent, which is still high by historical standards. The question is whether the deceleration continues and growth goes much lower.

Robert J. Samuelson writes a weekly column on economics. View Archive
A faltering China could tip the world back into recession. Because China is a huge customer for raw materials (grains, metals, fuels), their prices would remain depressed. China’s surplus capacity of basic industrial goods, such as steel, would be increasingly exported, also depressing prices. This would dampen any recovery in global business investment. Confidence would suffer.

What about political fallout? “The Chinese government has maintained its legitimacy by promising economic progress,” says economist Eswar Prasad of Cornell University. If the promise seems broken, it’s hard to know how China’s masses would react. Or China’s leaders. Would they become more nationalistic and aggressive to deflect attention from economic disappointment?

Americans are exposed to all these potential spillovers. Prasad doubts the worst-case scenario will come to pass; plenty of other experts agree. After all, China’s leaders have repeatedly disproved doomsayers. There are many reasons the economy can flourish. The most obvious: Consumption spending was only 37 percent of the economy (gross domestic product) in 2014, the lowest of any major country (the U.S. figure: 68 percent of GDP). If the Chinese become a bit more spendthrift, their economy could thrive.

Still, there is the example of Japan. In the 1980s, it was widely regarded as the world’s most dynamic economy, overtaking the United States. Then Japan’s prospects collapsed. New Asian competitors (Taiwan, South Korea) and an appreciating currency destroyed its economic model of export-led growth. Unable to build a new model, Japan has foundered ever since.

China is now at a similar juncture. There’s broad agreement that its economic model is outmoded. It also emphasized export-led growth and high investment spending (the counterpart of low consumer spending). The 2008-2009 financial crisis showed the limits of both.

Exports fell, as China’s biggest customers — the United States and Europe — went into recession. To bolster its economy, China announced a $586 billion stimulus package, almost 13 percent of GDP, in late 2008. But unlike the U.S. stimulus plan in 2009, which was part of the federal budget, much of China’s extra spending was channeled through state-owned banks and local governments. What ensued was a credit boom that has now left a large overhang of unsold housing, surplus industrial capacity and questionable debt.

Housing looms as the largest drag on China’s growth because it amounts to about 25 percent of the country’s GDP, including major supply industries such as steel, cement and glass, Prasad says. With housing supply exceeding demand, building is already slowing. Housing prices are down roughly 6 percent from their recent peak. The decline will go to 10 percent, says economist Yukon Huang of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Compounding this weakness is a slackening of local government spending on infrastructure projects (roads, airports, hospitals). To finance these projects, local government debt surged from about 6 percent of GDP in 2008 to 33 percent of GDP in mid-2013, according to the global bank UBS. The central government is now trying to slow the growth of this debt.

With hindsight, argues Huang, the 2008 stimulus package looks excessive, “They overdid it,” he says — lent too much and “too much money flowed into housing and property [development].”

None of this preordains a full-scale financial crisis. There are mitigating factors. Housing purchases in China are generally made with more cash than in the United States; in most cities, there is no property tax. These practices limit carrying costs and pressures for default. As for government debt, China’s is moderate by global standards, despite the recent increases.

China’s economic predicament resembles the United States’. It needs a formula for sustainable growth that’s not dependent on repeated bursts of artificial stimulus, whether by deficit spending or prolonged easy credit.

Interestingly, Chinese policymakers and foreign economists generally agree on the steps needed to shift spending from investment (now, too much) to consumer spending (too little). The social safety net needs to be strengthened so that people can save less to meet personal disasters. And banks need to be overhauled so that artificially low interest rates don’t subsidize business borrowers at the expense of depositors.

Though the way forward seems clear, it is strewn with political and psychological obstacles — vested interests and ingrained habits. The reasonable fear is that China can’t get from here to there without a major debacle.